Homer's Ideas on Social Science

            Some scholars have justly noted that Homer is the source of all knowledge, including astronomy, music, poetry, language, and all other arts and sciences.  Pseudo-Plutarch does Homer the greatest justice, claiming that Homer “was adept at every kind of wisdom and skill and provides the starting points and so to speak the seeds of all kinds of discourse and action for those who come after him.”[1]  However, the degree to which Homer’s successors have credited him is perhaps lacking.  Though he has been credited with knowledge of politics, he has yet to earn merit for being the father of social science.  One of the most studied questions in political science is related to the causes of war.  Specifically, what causes war, or what prevents lasting peace between adversaries?  Unsurprisingly, Homer had an explanation.  The following exchange between Achilles and Hector in the Iliad reveals the extent of his knowledge:

 

“                                                    …’Hector, stop!

You unforgivable, you…don’t talk to me of pacts.

There are no binding oaths between men and lions –

wolves and lambs can enjoy no meeting of the minds –

they are all bent on hating each other to the death.

So with you and me.  No love between us.  No truce

till one or the other falls and gluts with blood

Ares who hacks at men behind his rawhide shield.”[2]

 

            In studying the modern politics of the causes of conflict, it becomes eminently clear that Homer has Achilles use wolves and lambs as an allegory for strong and weak states.  He shows that the biggest obstacle to the ability to reach a peaceful settlement short of conflict is a disparity in the power between the two adversaries.  As I was researching what factors may lead to pacts between adversaries that would enable them to live in peace, I decided to test this proposition after naively hypothesizing that it was folly.

            In order to determine what causes had the largest effect on the ability of adversaries to reach a comprehensive settlement that would prevent conflict, I added in a number of factors, which Homer surely had taken into account in his own calculations.  Most factors I accounted for at the national level have a clear analog to the personal level on which this dispute unfolds as told by Homer.  The first is whether the states are both democratic.  This is analogous to the personalities of the individual disputants in the Iliad.  Perhaps if both Achilles and Hector had been peace-loving individuals who were restrained from aggressive action by the benevolent gods governing their passions, then this would have a larger effect on whether or not they fight to the death.  Secondly, I control for the number of previous disputes between the parties.  The logic employed here was that if Achilles and Hector had previously been involved in a large number of disputes, it would be hard to reach agreement short of a fatal duel.  I also factor in whether the disputants are allied or not.  As was shown in the exchange between Diomedes and Glaucus, common family or friendship ties may pacify the tensions between the disputants.  Finally, I account for the disparity in power between the adversaries.  This tests Homer’s proposition that “wolves and lambs” (unequal powers) will not be able to achieve a “meeting of the minds” that will divert them from a war leading to the death of one of the disputants.

            The other factors in my model that are not analogous to the situation described by Homer represent a logical extension of this scene to modern-day considerations, as well as the necessities of the model.  However, their importance is secondary to the factors previously mentioned.  The primary shortcoming in this analysis is my spatial-temporal domain.  While Homer addressed the eternal and timeless truths governing human relations, I can only perform my statistical analysis on disputes between nations since 1816 due to data limitations.  I used a multiple regression model to determine which factors had the largest effect on the ability of adversaries to reach a comprehensive settlement that would prevent conflict.  The results are shown in Table 1.

 

Table 1            The Effect of Power Disparity on the Ability to Reach Comprehensive Agreements, 1816-1994

                                                                                                                         Effect on

                                        Model 5 Coefficienta                                   Agreement

                                        (standard error)                                   Comprehensivenessb

 

Year                                                                 .008                                                      +0.75

                                                                        (.005)                                             

JointDemocracy                                                 1.516                                                     +1.51

                                                                       (1.244)                            

PreviousMIDs                                                     -.034                                                      -0.53

                                                                        (.025)                             

Outcome                                                            -.266                                                      -0.66

                                                                        (.185)                             

Hostility                                                              .251                                                      +0.31

                                                                        (.273)                             

Alliance                                                             -.936                                                      -0.94

                                                                        (.553)                             

PowerDisparity                                                    -.247*                                                   -1.15

                                                                        (.108)                                                             

Contiguity                                                            .127                                                     +0.27

                                                                        (.211)

Constant                                                          -10.778                             

N                                                                        79                                                

r2                                                                      .187                               

 

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

a The coefficients in Model 5 are calculated using the dataset FullagreementMIDs.

b Absolute change in agreement comprehensiveness is measured by a change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for each predictor variable (or a change from 0 to 1 in dichotomous variables) while all other variables are held constant at their respective means.

 

The only statistically significant predictor in this model is PowerDisparity, and its coefficient is negative.  This implies that a greater disparity in material capabilities between disputants negatively affects the likelihood of reaching a comprehensive settlement.  This makes sense theoretically, because a binding peace between nations disparate in power would place more relative restraint on the powerful state, which may not be in its self-interest since it is physically able to change the status quo if it desires to do so.  Less comprehensive agreements are less constraining and more easily and willingly abrogated, thereby making them more attractive to states that have a preponderance of power over their foes.  This explains why the seemingly stronger Achilles tells Hector “…don’t talk to me of pacts. / There are no binding oaths between men and lions – / wolves and lambs can enjoy no meeting of the minds – / they are all bent on hating each other to the death.”  Although complete confidence in my results cannot be exerted due to its temporal restrictions, this study suggests that Homer was indeed the rightful father of the political science of conflict, adding to his already numerous accolades.

 

 

 


 

[1] J.J. Keaney and Robert Lamberton (edd.), [Plutarch]: Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996).

[2] Homer, The Iliad [Trans. Robert Fagles] (New York: Penguin, 1990), p. 550.

 

 

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