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All kinds of phenomena about negatives have moti-
vated interesting and valuable studies;[1]   there is
something mystifying about the whole topic, particularly
regarding the types of interaction it necessitates.
One of the most interesting kinds of negative puzzles
is that occasioned by the necessity of accounting for
sentences which possess an abnormal number of negatives
in surface structure. There are a number of types of
sentences represented in this class, and for each
several questions have to be answered:

(1)   In what way(s) is this type of sentence
        abnormal (and therefore interesting)?
(2)   Given that they are abnormal, why do
        such sentences occur?
(3)   What methods of investigation are appro-
        priate to answering (1) and (2)?

Obviously, there are many sub- and sub-sub-
questions that these entail, and linguists of differ-
ring persuasions will differ as to just what "abnormal"
means. For our purposes, however, some simple taxonomy
will suffice; we define a <u>negative sentence</u> as one con-
taining a negative and a <u>normal negative sentence</u> as
one containing precisely one negative morpheme in sur-
face structure, and precisely one negative in logical
(or deep) structure, with the stipulation that the
two be "corresponding nodes" in G. Lakoff's (1973)
sense. This leaves us a wide field of "abnormal" nega-
tives to play with.
    A first division of the field can be made by
separating those sentences which have more than one
negative, but which have a 1-1 correspondence between
negatives in SS and those in LS. This is the class
upon which much ingenuity and effort have been lavished
in an effort to establish logical (and occasionally
sociological) principles for the interpretation and
generation of the multiple negation. Some examples
of this class (which I will call "logically interpre-
table") are:

(4)   I don't want him not to come.
(5)   I didn't realize nobody knew him.
(6)   There isn't anybody who doesn't know him.
(7)   You can't just not say anything.

These sentences are interesting in that they display a

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wide variety of ways of combining the negatives,
illustrating many important points relevant to the
proper use of logical principles in natural language;
they are abnormal only by definition, in that they
are more complicated than the normal negative sentence.
As to why they occur, this is a consequence of the
possibilities of embedding, and the methods of genera-
tive syntax/semantics, combined with logic, provide
some tools that have been productive (if not always
adequate). There is sufficient interest in and work
on these sentences to justify our not considering them
any further here.

   We are left, then, with sentences that have either
fewer negatives in SS than in LS, or more. Let us
consider the former case first, since it defines a
small class of sentences, idiomatic in nature, which
seem to evidence a change in the perceived negativity
of various elements. The only sentences I have en-
countered with fewer SS negs that LS are exemplified by:

   (8]   I could care less.
   (9]   I could give a damn.

Quite aside from the idiomatic nature of these con-
structions,the fact thata modal seems to be required
makes them exceptional. Yet the fact remains that
they are negative in force (in fact synonymous), thus
having a negative in their semantics, while there
appears to be none in their surface structure. This
poses a problem for social and diachronic linguistics,
in that what seems to be going on is that the idio-
matized polarity item is associated with the negative
sufficiently to give it what amounts to independent
negative strength. A similar procedure seems to have
occurred in French, with the effect that the usual
negative morpheme in that language is pas, not ne
(...pas), as the grammar texts claim. This is inter-
esting and unusual, but not particularly productive.

   Coming now to the abnormal negative sentences
with more negatives in SS than in LS, we have several
distinctions to make. First, there is a small class
of sentences which have no negatives in logical
structure, yet have one in surface structure. This
phenomenon is present in several regional dialects,
including my own native dialect, that of DeKalb
County, Illinois, as well as (I have been informed)
several New England dialects. This phenomenon (which
I will call "spurious negation') is exemplified by (10).
Since (10) is not only ungrammatical but also unintel-
ligible for most speakers, I hasten to add a trans-
lation, (11), which is also grammatical in DeKalb County.

(10)   %Bill can touch the ceiling, and so can't
        I.[3]
(11)   Bill can touch the ceiling, and so can I.

Note that (10) is synonymous with (11), and <u>not</u> with (12):

(12)   Bill can touch the ceiling, and I can't.

That is, the negative in the <u>so</u>-clause of (10) is com-
pletely spurious, and represents no logical negation
at all. There are a lot of details one could add about
this construction, for example the fact that it is
restricted to <u>so</u>-clauses with subject-verb inversion,
typically (but not always) takes VP-deletion in addition,
and is ungrammatical if an overt negative is present
in the first clause. Thus:

(13)   %Bill is going/has gone/will go/goes to
        school, and/but so isn't/hasn't/won't/
        doesn't Harry.
(14)   He can't touch the ceiling, and neither
        can(*'t) I/I can't either/*so can't I.
(15)   *Bill is going to school, and Harry
        isn't too.

This construction (as one might expect, given
its peculiarity) is much remarked-on locally, and is
considered substandard. Nevertheless, it occurs, a
fact which must give pause to those (like me) who
think of negatives as meaningful elements governed by
syntactic rules. This is a unique datum, and deserves
to be investigated further. I do not however, believe
that the usual methods of generative syntax or seman-
tics are the proper vehicle for such a study, since
the construction is totally opaque semantically (although
it functions in all other regards--note the contractions
--as a normal SS negative). Such a study would, I
think, be far better conducted using the methods of
sociolinguistics; the most semantics can offer to such
an effort is moral support.
    The remaining abnormal negative sentences share
the property of having at least one negative in LS, but
of having more negatives in SS. This would seem to
be a homogeneous class, but I believe more divisions
are in order.
    Probably the most common type of sentence with
this property, and the type that springs to mind most
readily when "double negatives" are mentioned is the
type exemplified by (16)-(19), the so-called "non-
standard" cases:

(16)   %It ain't no cat can't get in no coop.[4]
(17)   %I can't tell nobody.
(18)   %She won't give me no cookies.

(19)   %Nobody never said that.

This phenomenon is widespread and well-known.
What might appear to be happening, from an examination
of the surface structure, is that spurious negative
morphemes occur in apparently unlimited number. This
is, of course, a massive over-simplification. The
position, number, and meaning of the extra surface
negatives are very highly constrained, and not only by
syntactic considerations, as has been demonstrated amply.
There are still, however, problems.

Labov's (1972) study of this phenomenon contains
many intriguing examples, and a number of useful in-
sights, but it is flawed by a failure to recognize and
make use of some concepts which have been developed in
the literature in the last decade. A great deal of
Labov's ingenuity is wasted because he does not utilize
the concept of polarity,[5] which has obvious implications
for a study centering on indefinites like any. The
fact is that there are (at least) two any's, one negative-
polarity, and one 'possible-polarity,' and only the
former is subject to neg-attraction.[6] Labov makes men-
tion of the use of any in "hypotheticals," but does not
seem to realize how many of the "exceptions" he gives
are actually examples of possible-polarity any which are
naturally resistant to neg-attraction.[7] Second, a
negative-polarity any can only undergo neg-attraction
with the negative which triggers its occurrence as a
polarity item. This generalization also is missed by
Labov and accounts for more of his "exceptions."[8] Third,
if the negative which triggers the any is incorporated,
presupposed, or otherwise not free, neg-attraction
is also blocked, regardless of how many other negatives
might seem to be available for attraction; Labov misses
this point as well, with the cumulative result that
the analysis proposed for Standard English neg-attraction
is cumbersome and (in some very important ways) wrong.
Whether or not this vitiates his analysis of neg-concord
is unclear, but since it is based on his account of
neg-attraction, there is considerable doubt.

There is some evidence that the any's involved
here are in fact negatives of some sort in logical
structure (as well as being related in some as-yet-
unknown way to the modal ◊, as I have argued elsewhere
(Lawler (1971)), although they do not "cancel out" the
way negative predicates do in e.g., (6). This would
account for the fact that many languages have patterns
similar to that in (16)-(19), and would analyze the
Standard English any as a special case, requiring an
additional lexical insertion rule to get any instead
of the more natural no. Black English neg-concord

would then be an example of the unmarked case, and would represent a simpler and more natural solution.

What is important to notice about this analysis (or any other) is that the extra negative morphemes in surface structure all derive in some sense from a single negative predicate in logical structure, in that whether or not they represent any kind of neg- ative logically, they are polarity items inside the scope of the primary negative trigger. The "natural" lexical insertion rule hypothesized above does not produce confusion[9] for the reason that the controlling trigger must be specified, and it is understood to be the "real" negative.

After we have separated this class of abnormal negatives, however, a final class is left, and it is with this that the remainder of this discussion will concern itself. While there has been some discussion of sentences like (20)[10]

> (20)   Bill hasn't written any good papers,
> I don't think.

no one (except Postal (1973)) has noted the peculiar- ities of sentences like (21):

> (21)   Not any good ones, he hasn't.

In both (20) and (21) there are two surface negatives, but only one logical negative. A likely source for (20) is (22), and for (21), (23):

> (22)   I don't think Bill has(*n't) written
> any good papers.
> (23)   Bill hasn't written (*not) any good ones.

Note the ungrammaticality of the extra negatives in (22)-(23). An interesting point to note in this regard is the fact (20) has a variant (24)a without the se- cond negative, but (21) is poor unless both negatives present are, as note (25):

> (24)a   Bill hasn't written any good papers, I
> think.
>   b   *Bill has written some/any good papers,
> I don't think.
> (25)a   *Some/*Any good ones, he hasn't.
>   b   *Not any good ones, he has.

We will see that this is due to the fact that neg- raising, the rule involved in generating (20) and (22), is optional, while neg-insertion, the crucial rule in (21) and (23), is obligatory.

It is important to note the differences between abnormal negation like that in (20)-(21) and that evidenced in the "non-standard" cases discussed above,

in order to show that they are indeed different. Non-standard abnormal negation involves a variant of the lexical insertion rule inserting negative-polarity <u>any</u>, in that the output of that rule resembles the output of neg-attraction. (20)-(21), however, involve some very different phenomena. First of all, they are <u>not</u> non-standard, in that they are not determined by <u>the</u> same criteria that determines the distribution of the non-standard cases above; on the contrary, they exist (I would claim) in the standard English in the United States, at least, and seem to be extremely common. There are, to be sure, some variables involved; for example, many speakers accept (25)b (with <u>some</u>), but there is a peculiar strong, ironic emphasis on the last clause which sets off the apparent contradiction. On the whole, however, I have observed instances of these types of construction everywhere. A second fact to note is that in (21), and in (26), which is a variant of (20):

(26)   Not any good ones, I don't think.

a very special type of process has been applied, namely the fragment-creating rule discussed by Morgan (1972), which requires special contextual situations. In fact, Morgan fragments exist when possess only the first negative in (21):

(27)   Not any good ones.

Obviously, all these facts need an explanation, and it would be nice if a single explanation could do the job for all of them.

Before we can progress to the explanation stage, however, there are a few details of observation and description that need to be cleared up. First, we need some terminology, and our choice of terms makes some implicit choices which we had best be aware of. We could, for example, intuitively decide that (20)-(21) derive from a movement rule, and call the rule "X-movement," where "X" is some question-begging name identifying the phenomenon. This would commit us to several assumptions, some of them questionable: (a) that the sentences are derived, at least in the part we are interested in, by the same rule; (b) that the rule is a movement rule; and (c), since the same rule is involved, both sentences derive from movement to the same side of the sentence. I find these dubious, to say the least. To begin with, there is independent evidence for a rule of Slifting, which performs the movement part of (20); second, while this will obviously not apply to (21), the nature of the rule involved is not very clear; and there is even the

possibility (which there is some evidence against)[11]
that (21) is in fact derived from juxtaposition of two
sentences, each with its own negative, both of which
have had material deleted by various rules. Finally,
whatever the rule involved in (21), and whichever
direction it moves (if it moves at all), the details
of the rule of Slifting as regards left or right move-
ment are equally unclear. Bearing these caveats in
mind, I will maintain that a different rule is involved
in (21) from that in (20); I call this rule negative-
dislocation, and believe it is a movement rule, although
I don't know in which direction it actually moves.
The entire phenomenon of (20)-(21) and sentences like
them I will call negative retention, for reasons which
should become obvious below, and I claim that this is
best statable in terms of a global contraint on surface
structures containing negatives.

The next thing we need to do is determine if any
more familiar rules can be invoked to account for the
data so far. The first thing that comes to mind is
that (21) represents an unusual variety of Y-movement,
in that the object is typically what shows up at the
beginning of the S, just as in Y-movement, and the
addition of the extra negative may be a peculiarity of
this rule in certain circumstances. There are several
arguments against this.

First, note that while Y-movement is restricted
to NP's in object position, and is in many sentences
heavily dialect-dependent, this is not the case with
negative-dislocation. Adverbs, NP's of all kinds, pre-
positional phrases, etc., can all occur fronted with
a negative. It would require a collapsing of adverb-
fronting and Y-movement to account for the data, and
peculiarities arise even then:

(28) a   They don't do that
         in France.
     b   In France they don't. (Adv-fronting)
     c   Not in France, they
         don't.   (Neg-dislocation)
(29) a   I can't open the door
         with this key.
     b   With this key I can't. (Adv-fronting)
     c   Not with this key,
         I can't.   (Neg-dislocation)
     d   *This key I can't.   (Y-movement?)
     e   Not this key, I can't. (Neg-dislocation)
(30) a   *Good ones he hasn't. (Y-movement)
     b   Not good ones, he
         hasn't.   (Neg-dislocation)

(31) a   I didn't ask Bill the
question.
     b   *Bill I didn't.   (Y-movement)
     c   Not Bill, I didn't.   (Neg-dislocation)

Second, note that Y-movement and adverb-fronting moves
the element from a full matrix sentence which does not
have to be fragmented; neg-dislocation requires that
a discourse-deletion of Morgan's type take place. This
is not evident from (28)-(31), since discourse-deletion
is optional and to avoid confusing the issue, the
examples of adverb-fronting and Y-movement above have
been fragmented. If we try similar cases with full
sentences, a different pattern emerges:

(32) a   In January I don't go skinny-dipping in
Lake Michigan too often.
     b   Not in January, I don't (*go skinny-dip-
ping in Lake Michigan too often).
(33) a   Bill I don't see around here very much
any more.
     b   Not Bill, I don't (*see around here very
much any more).[12]

Third, (as noted by Postal) neg-dislocation is
strictly a highest-island phenomenon. It cannot be
embedded or conjoined, unlike adverb-fronting and Y-
movement, which are not penthouse rules:

(34)   I thought they did that everywhere, but
she told me that (*not) in France they
don't.
(35)   In England, they do, but (*not) in France
they don't.
(36)   I thought he liked all kinds of fruit,
but he informed me in no uncertain terms
that (*not) raspberries he didn't.
(37)   Cherries I really like, but (*not) rasp-
berries I don't.

Fourth, there is a great difference in the
pragmatic contexts required here. Y-movement and
adverb-fronting both topicalize, and can introduce
new information; neg-dislocation cannot introduce new
information, at least in the same sense. It typically
requires that the lexical item isolated with the
initial negative be present in the context of the
discourse, either verbally or in some situational way.
Consider the following contexts:

A: You are a guest at breakfast, and your
host sets a bowl of raspberries in front of you.

You hate raspberries and evidence disgust. Your host inquires about your reaction by uttering (30). You can reply by using (39)a, but <u>not</u> (39)b.

(38)   I thought you liked raspberries.
(39)a Not raspberries, I don't.
   b #Raspberries I don't.[13]

B: You are a guest as before. The host inquires your tastes before preparing breakfast by asking (40). You can reply by using (41)b, but <u>not</u> (41)a.

(40)   Is there anything you particularly don't like?
(41)a #Not raspberries, I don't.
   b Raspberries I don't.

C: You are a guest as before and are served raspberries. You evidence disgust, and the host utters (42). You may reply using <u>either</u> (43) a or b.

(42)   I thought you liked all kinds of fruit.
(43)a Not raspberries, I don't.
   b Raspberries I don't.

In situation A, the physical presence of raspberries and the prior use of the lexical item raspberries make it old information, and Y-movement is inappropriate, although neg-dislocation is OK. In B, the lack of prior mention of the lexical item, and the absence of any raspberries in the situational context makes neg-dislocation inappropriate, although Y-movement is fine. In C, the physical presence of raspberries counts as context for neg-dislocation while the lack of prior mention of the lexical item makes Y-movement appropriate as well. It seems clear that the two rules must be separated.

Granted, then, that this represents a new rule, where <u>does</u> the negative come from? And does it come from the same place in cases where Slifting occurs? There are two ways to answer this question, and both converge on the same solution. Let us consider the syntactic solution first.

The fact that is striking in both (44) and (45) is that the negative has been moved by at least one rule prior to the operation of Slifting or neg-dislocation; in (44) the rule is neg-raising---in (45) it is neg-insertion, which also applies (twice) in (44):

(44)   He didn't really do that, I don't think.
(45)   Not that, he didn't.

A solution which is at least somewhat satisfying is
possible in terms of retaining the original negative
after the movement rule has applied, and causing it to
be present in the surface structure because of some con-
straint. This is equivalent to treating neg-raising
(a cyclic, governed, optional, minor raising rule) and
neg-insertion (a post-cyclic, ungoverned, obligatory,
major lowering rule) as both being rules which copy
the negative into the appropriate slot, and then delete
the original (either immediately or post-cyclically
by means of a global constraint like [+DOOM]).[14]
Detailed solutions are possible using any combination
of these features, but some of them raise questions
which are not easily answerable, at least within the
context of this paper. If, for example, these (very
different) rules are decomposable into copy+delete,
how far can we push the analysis? Are all rules which
move negatives copy+delete? Are all movement rules
to be treated this way? Are, then, all deleted neg-
atives (or elements, in the wider hypothesis) available
for appearance in SS under some conditions? If so, does
this involve a constraint on the deletion part of the
rule, and if so, at what stage does this part apply
(and therefore at what stage must the constraint be
stated)? Or should the whole thing be stated in terms
of a global rule? If so, how do we constrain that?

A sketch of the relevant derivational steps in
analysis of (44) and (45) follows:

(Circled nodes are corresponding in (46)-(53))

(48) S ...Neg-in-sert → (49) S (=(44))

(48) tree:
S
  S — V (NEG), NP — S
    S — V DO, NP x
  S — V (NEG), NP — S
    S — V THINK, NP I
    NP — S (that)

(49) tree:
S
  S — NP he, VP — V did (nt), VP — V do, NP that
  S — NP I, VP — V do (nt), VP — V think

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(50) S ...Neg-insert (copy only) → (51) S Discourse deletion → (52)

(50) tree:
S
  V NEG, NP — S
    V DO, NP x, NP — S (that)

(51) tree:
S
  V not, NP — S
    NP he, VP — V did (nt), VP — V do, NP that

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(52) S Neg-dislocate → (53) S (=(45))

(52) tree:
S
  V not, NP — S
    NP he, VP — V did (nt), NP that

(53) tree:
S
  S — V not, NP that
  S — NP he, VP — V did (nt)

Note that the assumption that neg-insertion is post-
cyclic leads to the possibility of the retained orig-
inal negative in (48) inserting after Slifting occurs,
and its status as an occurring element has been deter-
mined. If neg-insertion is cyclic, we need a constraint
to block it if neg-raising is going to apply on the
following cycle, something that this analysis obviates.
Note also that the constraint which allows retention
of the original negative is operational in the cyclic
part of the derivation in (49), but in the post-cyclic
part in (45), probably following subject-formation
and do-support.

Some support for this analysis (or for one akin
to it) is provided by the behavior of retained negatives
devolving both from neg-raising and from neg-dislocation
in regard to neg-attraction. If the retained negative
derives through neg-raising and Slifting, it can neg-
attract; if it derives through neg-insertion and neg-
dislocation, it cannot. Thus,

(54)   (I think) he hasn't written any good
         papers.

(55)a   Not any good ones, I don't think.
         (fragmented)
  b   No good ones, I don't think.
(56)a   Not any good ones, he hasn't.
  b *No good ones, he hasn't.

I believe that this is a result of the fact that, on
this analysis, the next node under the retained neg-
ative in (55) is a S, and (as we saw in (44)), the
negative can insert, a step which I believe is neces-
sary for neg-attraction to occur. In (56), on the
other hand, there is only one simplex sentence, which
is broken up by removal of the inserted negative by
neg-dislocation. The inserted negative is then un-
available for neg-attraction, and the rule of neg-
insertion is not applicable again (even when the
isolated element is itself a S:

(57)a   Not that I could see, he didn't.
  b * (That) I couldn't see, he didn't.)

thus blocking application of neg-attraction.

What, then, is the mysterious constraint that
allows negatives to be retained in SS when they would
ordinarily be deleted (or moved, if we take a completely
global view of the phenomenon)? It seems obvious that
the strange rules, both of which have the effect of re-
moving the isolated element from the scope of the SS
negative, are involved. I believe the appropriate
constraint, which must be globally stated, is some-
thing like (58):

(58)   If an element (call it E) which is com-
manded in Logical Structure by a neg-
ative N_L is isolated outside the scope
of ▓▓▓▓▓ the Surface Structure
negative N_S which corresponds to N_L, E
must appear in Surface Structure inside
the scope of another surface negative
N_S', which also corresponds to N_L.

That is, if you move out the negative that ordinarily
would command the element you are obliged to provide
another in the proper relationship.

If (58) is correct, we should ask why it does
not apply to Y-movement and adverb-fronting (as well
as to dislocation). The answer is, I believe, that the
structural difference between these rules of topicali-
zation and the rules of Slifting and Neg-dislocation
precludes application of the constraint in the former,
but requires it in the latter. In (48) and (53) the
rules are given as Chomsky-adjoining the two S's,

thus removing the command relationship between the
surface negative in the second clause and the isolated
element in the first. In Y-movement and adverb-fronting,
however, the rules do not Chomsky-adjoin, but rather
sister-adjoin, thus retaining the command relationship,
and keeping the isolated element within the scope of
the surface negative. (58) will not apply.

I mentioned above that there were two ways to
approach the problem, and that both of them gave the
same results. The second way to go about investigating
the phenomenon is to ask the second of the three
questions I gave at the beginning---why do such sentences
occur at all? A pragmatic, communicationally-based
inquiry like that soon establishes that negation is, in
fact, a very important thing to communicate, and that
phenomena like polarity items and "non-standard" multiple
negation exist, among other reasons, to increase redun-
dance and ensure that the negative message gets com-
municated. One further way is to impose a constraint
on surface structures like (58), which has the effect
of forbidding sentences (or utterrances) which require
the addressee to re-interpret the meaning after hearing
most of the utterrance, because the negative is not in
the proper place and does not bear the appropriate
relationship to the rest of the utterrance. This way
at looking at the constraint shows why it exists, and
why it also covers the cases noted by Zimmer (1971)
in which compound NP's cannot be formed from nouns
which are joined in a predicative relationship con-
taining a negative.[15] A variant of (58) would cover
this situation, and would do so for precisely the
reason (58) covers the neg-dislocation and Slifting
cases---negatives are highly important pragmatic
items, and must be expressed, and if any syntactic
process intervenes which would have the effect of
vitiating the negative force of the utterrance, some-
thing happens to the derivation---either it blocks, or
another negative must be inserted in some syntactically
determined place. This explanation is 'functional'
in the sense used in Morgan (1973), in that it gives
a pragmatic reason for an otherwise inexplicable and
seemingly ad-hoc phenomenon which is nevertheless felt
as natural in some sense. The explanation is in fact
so simple and sensible that it feels out of place in
a linguistic paper, but to my knowledge it has never
been proposed in so many words as an output constraint.
The situation resembles that currently brewing in
phonology, where conspiracies are being discovered
left[16] and right. This is, in fact, a conspiracy of

the type discussed in Pyle (1974), and his discussion of the
role of output constraints and teleological rules
goes rather far in the direction of giving an elegant
and productive theoretical basis for it. We see, then,
that examining the problem from both sides is of value.

In closing, I would like to leave you with some
observations of a phenomenon that is particularly mysti-
fying to me, and which impelled me in the first place
to begin to investigate this topic. There is a class
of sentences involving negative-dislocation which appear
to violate Ross constraints with impunity; in particular,
the Coordinate Structure Constraint seems to be frac-
tured beyond repair in (59)b:

(59)a   Can linguists study negation?
   b   Not and stay sane, they can't.

Note that the same initial clause is possible in the
corresponding slifted sentence, as well as in the Morgan
fragment:

(60)   Not and stay sane, I don't think.
(61)   Not and stay sane.

This type of construction is severely limited in dis-
tribution. In my speech, it is ungrammatical unless:
(a) the sentence it is derived from is negative---Y-
movement, adverb-fronting, or any other rule that
would effect such a shift is ungrammatical without the
not:

(62)   *And stay sane they can.

(b) the conjoined element is the second member of the
conjunction:

(63)   *Not stay sane and, they can't.

(c) the conjoined element must be a VP; any other
element that can be conjoined will not work:

(64)a   Can Frank eat peas?
   b   *Not and carrots, he can't.
(65)a   Can we go over the river?
   b   *Not and through the woods, we can't.
(66)a   Can we say that Mary came to the party?
   b   *Not and that she enjoyed it, you can't.

Those cases in which some of the above S's (or similar
ones) can be accepted are, I believe, examples of the
relevant generalization here: the and is acceptable
only if it is derived (in whatever mysterious way) from
an underlying conditional. Thus (59)b means not if
they want (intend, try, etc.) to stay sane. Similarly,

some get (65)b if it means <u>not if we want to go through
the woods</u>. The restriction to VP's is imposed because
they represent underlying complements (with EQUI) of
the conditional+want. For some reason, <u>and's</u> repre-
senting conditionals are not at home in environments
containing certain auxiliaries: <u>can</u> in its <u>able</u> sense
is fine, as are its paraphrases, but not in <u>its</u> <u>allowed</u>
sense; similarly, while <u>have</u> of the perfect is not too
bad, the past variant is awful:

> (67)a   Can Frank leave at nine?
>   b   Not and get there on time, he can't.
> (68)a   Can Frank come out to play?
>   b   *Not and get all dirty, he can't.
> (69)a   Did Frank leave at nine?
>   b   *Not and get there on time, he didn't.
> (70)a   Has Frank ever left at nine?
>   b   ?Not and gotten there on time, he hasn't.
> (71)a   Should Frank wash the dishes?
>   b   ??Not and dry them, he shouldn't.
> (72)a   Is it possible for Frank to wash the
>   dishes?
>   b   Not and dry them, it isn't.
> (73)a   Is it necessary for Frank to wash the
>   dishes?
>   b   *Not and dry them, it isn't.

Something is obviously going on there that is
too deep for me to see. I have never had the pleasure
of writing a paper on any topic without modals and
their mysteries intruding somewhere along the line,
and I had hoped that this one might be an exception.
Despite the best of intentions, however, I must con-
clude by saying that much remains to be discovered
about modals, as well as other things.

NOTES

in several versions. None of the above are responsible
for the errors of o- and commission contained herein,
although Postal and Morgan can hardly escape blame for
being stimulating enough to motivate me to attempt this
study.

    1. See, for instance, Baker (1970), Borkin
(1971), Horn (1969, 1970, 1971, 1972), Klima (1964),
and many others.

    2. These are the ones I thought of, that is. I
have since been bombarded with further examples, of
which perhaps the hairiest is (74), which means (75):

> (74)   That'll teach you to trust him.
> (75)   That'll teach you not to trust him.

While this cannot be accounted for in terms of idio-
syncratic polarity items like (8) and (9), there is
obviously some idiomaticity involved. Note, for
instance, that the negative in (75) can trigger polarity
items, while the one we intuit in (74) cannot:

> (76)   That'll teach you *(not) to say anything.

In addition, the construction requires use of the modal
will:

> (77)   That taught me to trust him.

(77) is literal only. I remain at a lost to account for
all these facts.

    3. I will use '%' in this paper to mark sentences
which are acceptable in the dialect under discussion
(in this case, DeKalb County English), but possibly not
others. Stars in this context refer to unacceptability
in the particular dialect.

    4. This is of course Labov's (1972) famous
example (1).

    5. As discovered and named by Horn. There is,
unfortunately, no single source in the literature
which explicates the phenomenon as such, although
the concept is present in spirit in almost every serious
discussion of negatives. See also Klima (1964) for
the feature affect, an ad-hoc precursor of polarity.

    6. For further discussion of the 'possible-
polarity' any, see Horn (1972), as well as Lawler (1973).

    7. For instance, Labov notes that embeddings
of various types make any acceptable. What he does not
note is that some of the embedding predicates he uses
are in fact modals, conditioning possible-polarity any,
and the others have internal negatives, conditioning
negative-polarity any. Neg-attraction is blocked in
both cases; in the first case because the any is of the

wrong type, and in the second, because the negative
is already internal to the predicate and is thus un-
available for attraction. An example is his (24)a:

(78)   For anyone not to go was a shame. (=(24)a)

in which shame is already implicitly negative; the
spurious presence of the negative in the complement
only clouds the matter. Another example, of possible-
polarity any, in his (26)b, where the embedding
predicate O.K. is a deontic modal:

(79)   For anybody not to eat in my mother's
         restaurant is O.K. (=(26)b)

Again, the presence of the negative in the complement
is irrelevant. An example of an embedding predicate
which is neither modal nor negative is normal, and the
following sentences show how the embeddings fail, re-
gardless of the complementizer (to which Labov attributes
the goodness of the any's):

(80)   *For anyone to eat at my mother's
         restaurant is normal.
(81)   *For anyone not to eat at my mother's
         restaurant is normal.
(82)   *Anyone('s) eating at my mother's
         restaurant is normal.
(83)   *Anyone('s) not eating at my mother's
         restaurant is normal.

And extraposition does not help any, as opposed to
the cases Labov cites, where the well-known tendency
to extrapose heavy subjects makes some of his sentences
better, for reasons having nothing to do with negation.
     8. A further example is found in Labov's (22)d,
in which there is no preceding free negative. The any
is triggered by the if.

(84)   If John says that anyone shouldn't go,
         he's exceeding his authority. (=(22)d)

Labov states that the 'obligatory character of neg-
attraction is effectively cancelled'. In fact, it
is not. What is going on is that the
any in (84) cannot attract to a negative that does not
trigger it. If the negative in (84) did trigger the
any, neg-attraction would be obligatory, yielding (85):

(85)   If John says that no one should go,
         he's...

which, of course, is not synonymous to any reading of
(84). Apparently, the cases where Labov thinks neg-

attraction is not obligatory are either cases where
it is blocked altogether, or ones where he confuses
two any's, of which one cannot undergo neg-attraction
at all and the other must undergo it.

   9. That is, most of the time they don't. As
Labov notes, his (1) (my (16)) does produce confusion
to speakers of other dialects. What has apparently
happened here is that the rules for the scope of neg-
concord deviate from those for neg-attraction in
standard English, allowing the Neg to reach down into
a relative (although the subject relative has been
deleted, note---this may be a conditioning environment).
It is still apparent, however, that the appearances
of the negative in this sentence all derive somehow
from the first commanding negative, although the details
have been changed.

   10. Primarily in Ross (1973). Note particularly
that Ross's analysis posits Chomsky-adjunction as the
operation performed; this will become important presently.
We will be restricted here to discussing predicates
which undergo Slifting when negated. As Ross observes,
they all govern Neg-raising, thus opening the possibility
of a copy+delete analysis, which he proposes. Whether
such an analysis is correct or not is irrelevant
to our discussion (although the trees below use it for
simplicity in tracing corresponding nodes), as are the
details of the rule of Slifting. What is relevant
is the fact that a negative which is ordinarily deleted
shows up on the surface in just the right place.

   11. Aside from the details of neg-attraction
below, which argue for a single sentential source for
sentences like (21), there is also some evidence that
they differ in crucial ways from a construction which
might be considered a likely source, namely, whatever
process is at work in generating (86):

  (86) He hasn't written any---not any good ones.

I claim (contrary to Postal's (1973) hypothesis) that
this is unrelated to (21), but is rather the result
of conjoining two sentences, each with its own negative.
Evidence comes, first of all, from intonation. The dash
in (86) represents a contour associated with a sentence
boundary; the impression is one of a qualifying after-
thought, which is substantiated by the fact that paren-
theticals like anyway, at any rate, at least, etc., can
appear in (86) but not in (21). Second, the construction
in (86) must retain an anaphor of the object when it
operates on an object; only with adverbs does it fully
resemble (21):

(87)   They don't do that---not in France.

(In both cases, the first S can be Morgan-fragmented, producing superficial resemblances to (21):

(88)a   They don't---not in France.
    b   He hasn't---not any good ones.)

There is a dialect (not mine)which accepts (89):

(89)   #Not raspberries, he doesn't like.

which differs from the more normal (90) in retaining the main verb:

(90)   Not raspberries, he doesn't.

Even in this dialect, however, an object anaphor may not be retained:

(91)   *Not raspberries, he doesn't like them.

(We ignore the intonation of (91) which has a semicolon or period intonation after raspberries, and which clearly comes from two sentences). But with the postposed Neg in (86), the object is essential in all dialects:

(92)a   *He doesn't like---not raspberries.
    b   *He hasn't written---not any good ones.

There is a reading of (92)b which is grammatical, but it refers to letters, which is the understood object of write when the highly idiomatic rule of object-deletion is applicable. This rule is also applicable in post-posed negative constructions, and the anaphor in the post-posed phrase must be coreferential with the deleted object, and not with any other noun. The point is that the post-posing in (86) requires an object, unless it is deleted under a minor rule which also is applicable in full sentences, while the pre-posing in (21) requires its deletion in all cases. This can be easily and naturally accounted for by treating (21) as being derived by a chopping rule, and (86) as a reduced conjunction of two S's, with no chopping rule, only deletions.

12.   I think the facts here have to do not with the rules per se, but rather with the intonation contours they carry. The b sentences in each case would require a sentence-final low intonation to carry on for the majority of the sentence, thus producing an odd effect. The a sentences have no such restriction, since Y-movement and adverb-fronting do not produce a lowering after the auxiliary.

13.   I use '#' here to indicate sentences which are not ungrammatical, but rather inappropriate in

context. Note that there is a reading (a phonetic
reading, that is---I have been unable to distinguish
any semantic differences) of (39)b which is more accep-
table in this context, but it requires that the intonation
contour on raspberries be identical to that in (38)a.
The other pronunciation of (39)b is inappropriate as
marked here. Note, however, that the good contour in
situation A is inappropriate in situation B, even
though the other contour is appropriate here. I am
at a loss to account for these facts, but the data
read as stands for the single intonation of neg-
dislocation, and for one intonation of Y-movement.

14. This analysis is proposed (for neg-raising
only) in Ross (1973). It can be restated as a global
constraint on outputs, which is what I advocate here.
I doubt whether such a formal mechanism as Ross pro-
poses is justified, particularly in view of the
functional explanation for this constraint, which also
explains a number of other phenomena, such as NP com-
pounds, where the question of copy+delete does not arise
The 'copy only' directions in the trees below should
be taken as indicating corresponding nodes, rather
than as a substantive claim.

15. An example is leg man, which cannot mean
a man who dislikes women's legs, although there are
plenty of other things it can mean.

16. For a non-phonological conspiracy on the
left, see Thrasher (1973, 1974).

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