Philosophy 433 History
of Ethics Darwall Winter 2004
BUTLER
I
For an introduction to Butler's
life and work, I refer you to the excellent introduction of your edition of the
Sermons. This introduction is not wholly to be trusted,
however, as the author suggests that Hume's moral sentiment is a direct
descendant of Butler's conscience, whereas
the former certainly derives from Hutcheson's moral sense. Ah, the impetuousness
of youth!
It may seem odd to find an important work of moral
philosophy published as a collection of sermons. Indeed, Butler
himself seems to feel this: "I shall not set about to justify the
propriety of preaching, or under that title publishing, discourses so abstruse as some of these are." However, while moral
philosophy was becoming increasingly secular during this period, the line between
it and theology was not entirely sharp.
I Butler’s
distinction between two methods: rational intuitionist vs. agency theory. At Pr12, Butler
distinguishes "two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated."
The first, which would have characterized rational intuitionists such as Samuel
Clarke, is a metaphysical inquiry into the "nature of things" to
discern relations of "fitness and unfitness,” as Clarke called them, e .g., between benevolence and gratitude. The other is a more
practical and empirical inquiry, into human nature, and, in particular, into
our nature as agents. Butler's
method in the Sermons is the second.
Like Hutcheson, he holds that our psychological nature is a
complex of various affections, principles, and sentiments. Both he and
Hutcheson agree that, in addition to particular passions and desires, human
beings are subject to self-love and benevolence. Self-love is a desire for
one's own happiness, and benevolence is a desire for the happiness of others.
And, also like Hutcheson, Butler
believes that human beings feel approbation and disapprobation when they
reflect, disinterestedly, on motives and desires (Butler
tends to use 'principle' to refer to these). But, whereas for Hutcheson the
moral sense can play no role in directing conduct, it is perhaps Butler's
central idea that a moral agent will govern his conduct by what he (Butler)
calls conscience or the principle of reflection. This is what enables the agent
to be autonomous or self-governing. In these respects, Butler's
thought looks forward to Kant. He anticipates the Kantian themes that a moral
agent must have a
capacity for directing conduct by
self-critical reflection, exercise of which capacity realize autonomy, and that
exercising this capacity is our fundamental moral task. For Butler,
as for Kant, freedom is realized by acting morally, and we are moral agents by
virtue of having the capacity to realize freedom in this way. [I should make
explicit that I will be stressing this "proto-Kantian" aspect of Butler's
work, and, in doing so, I will be emphasizing some elements and de-emphasizing
others. I will mention some of these in passing.]
II A taste of the autonomous agency
theme. We can begin to get some of the flavor of this
"autonomy" theme by reading the beginning of the Preface carefully. (emphasis added)
(i) "Though it is scarce possible to avoid judging, in
some way or other, of almost everything which offers itself to one's thoughts;
yet it is certain, that
many persons, from different causes
never exercise their judgment, upon what comes before them, in the way of
determining whether it be conclusive or holds."
(ii) "Arguments are often wanted for some accidental
purpose: but proof as such is what they never want for themselves; for their
own satisfaction of mind, or conduct in life."
(iii) "I have often wished, that it had been the custom
to lay before people nothing in matters of argument but premises, and leave
them to draw conclusions themselves; which, though it could not be done in all
cases, might in many."
(iv) "The great number of books and papers of
amusement, which, of one kind or another, daily come into one's way, have in
part occasioned, and most perfectly fall in with and humour,
this idle way of reading and considering things. By this means, time even in solitude
is happily got rid of, without the pain of attention. . . . spent
in reading." (Can you imagine what he'd say about television?!)
(v) "Thus people habituate themselves to let things
pass through their minds, as one may speak, rather than to think of them."
(vi) "Review and attention,
and even forming a judgment, becomes fatigue; and to lay anything before them
that requires it, is putting them quite out of their way.I'
(viii) “ . . nothing
can be understood without that degree of [attention] , which the very nature of
the thing requires. Now morals, considered as a science. ..plainly
requires a very peculiar attention.”
III
Authority of conscience. Butler expresses one of his major
contentions, which he takes to have been the view of the "ancient
moralists" [note that he refers to this as an "inward" feeling,
perception or conviction], that virtue is the life which is "correspondent
to this [our] whole nature" and that "vice is more contrary to this
nature than torture or death." (Pr13) The "ancient moralists"
here are Socrates and the Stoics. The latter thesis, concerning vice, was a doctrine
of Socrates's. And the idea that virtue consists in "following nature", or "following our nature" was a
Stoic idea.
Crucial to Butler's
version of this thesis is that vice is contrary to our nature because it will
violate the dictates of the principle of reflection or conscience, and it is
part of our nature that this principle be authoritative. It is because we have
this principle that “man is. ..by his very nature a
law to himself. " (Pr29) Following this governing
principle is both our fundamental moral project and what enables us to be
autonomous.
IV
Transcendental vs. teleological argument. I will be
distinguishing two different kinds of argument that Butler
gives for this claim. One argument is
teleological and functional. It appeals
to the function of conscience in a human agent, and its relation to the
functions of his various other appetites and affections. One version of this argument appeals to the
proposition that this function is intended and designed. But implicit in Butler's
text is a second line of argument which does not appeal on claims about natural
teleology, whether deriving from Divine intention or otherwise. This is a transcendental argument which
attempts to exhibit the place that the principle of reflection has as a
necessary
condition for the very possibility
of moral agency. We shall examine this
second argument next time. Let’s begin
to sketch Butler's natural
teleology.
V Beginnings of
the teleological argument Butler takes it as uncontroversial
in Sermon I that the human body can be seen as a teleological whole (1.4), with
the various parts or members having different functions, such that the whole is
healthy only if the parts function properly.
He proposes to give a similar analysis of the different principles, as
he calls of them, of human practical mind (i.e. the human mind insofar as it is
practical).
The various
appetites, passions, and affections have their respective functions. Butler
distinguishes between private affections and public affections. The former is the class of principles that
"tend" to the good of the individual, not just in the sense that they
usually lead to good consequences for the agent, but in the sense that
promoting the good of the individual is part of their function. Thus, hunger is not a desire for the agent's
good; it is simply the desire for food.
But it is a private affection in that its function in the human
psychological system is to get the person to ingest nutrition needed for him to
flourish.
Likewise, Butler
believes that there are various principles in the human psyche which are best
explained by seeing them as public affections:
as principles whose function is to promote the public good. He lists the following examples at 1.7: "desire of esteem from others, contempt and
esteem of them, love of society as distinct from affection to the good of it,
indignation against successful vice."
None of these is explicitly a desire for the public good, but, he
claims, it is reasonable to suppose that the function these principles serve in
the human psyche is to promote the good of all.
Note, by
the way, that the same principle may be both a private and a public affection.