Philosophy 433 History of Ethics Darwall Winter 2004
I. Teleological
strategy (theological). To the idea
that our psyches are teleological/functional wholes, Butler adds the notion
that they are designed to be by God. The
specific principles mentioned above (from 1.7) "are plainly instruments in the hands of another, in the hands of
II.
Filling out the teleological picture: private/public. Now Butler believes that all appetites,
passions, and other principles, when functioning properly, tend to the
promotion of individual good and/or public good. There is no principle in us, he thinks, whose
function is to produce harm, either to ourselves or others. He grants, of course, that people act, on
affections that they really have, sometimes to the detriment of themselves,
sometimes to the detriment of others.
But in no case, when they do so, are they motivated by a principle whose
function is to produce evil. It follows
that people bring evil to themselves or to others only when they are not
functioning properly: "mankind have ungoverned passions which they will
gratify at any rate, as well to the injury of others, as in contradiction to
known private interest: but that as
there is no such thing as self-hatred, so neither is there any such thing as
ill-will in one man towards another, emulation and resentment being away; whereas there is plainly benevolence or
good-will: there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery,
ingratitude; but only eager desires after such and such external goods; which,
according to a very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to
obtain by innocent means, if they were . . . " (1.12)
As we shall
see in more detail in Sermons IV and V,
III.
Principle of reflection (conscience). So far this picture has not brought out what
Butler regards to be our distinctively moral nature: the principle of reflection or conscience. He describes this in the following way: "There is a principle of
reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove
their own actions. We are plainly
constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes
within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting such objects, and in
such degrees; and of the several actions consequent upon them." (1.8)
We get a
clearer idea of what he has in mind when we examine the example he gives to convince
us that we in fact have such a conscience:
"Suppose a man . . .to need being
confuted."
(1.8) Note the
following elements:
(i) it is reflexive.
(ii) it is a capacity for
dispassionate reflection;
(iii) it is a capacity for disinterested reflection.
Note also
the contrast
IV.
Authority of conscience/the teleological argument. Thus far, Butler has only considered
conscience "as another part in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us
in some degree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally and of course
have some influence." But "the
particular place [is] assigned to it by nature, what authority it has, and how
great influence it ought to have, shall be hereafter considered." (1.8)
This is the
task he turns to beginning in Sermon II.
Here he takes it that he has already shown that we are so designed as to
"do good to others, when we are led this way, by benevolence or
reflection." But, this is not
enough to validate "virtue and religion". To do that he needs to show, he says,
"that the whole character be formed upon thought and reflection; that every
action be directed by some determinate rule, some other rule than the strength
and
prevalency of any principle or passion." (2.3)
From here
"authoritative"
principle.
What I have been calling
(a) Just as it is evident that the eye's function
is to see, so is it evident that conscience's function is to govern.
(b) Therefore, we ought to acknowledge this
authority and be governed by conscience (or, alternatively, govern ourselves by
conscience). That is, we ought to act on
motives which on reflection we approve (disinterestedly and dispassionately).
Now, how do
we get from (a) to (b)?
(1)
obligation simply consists in the
will of God.
that the obligation to follow
conscience depends on our nature's being intended. I say this because his many remarks to the effect
that our having a principle of
reflection makes us a law to
ourselves, and that following conscience is the law of our nature, seem to
depend only on what our nature intrinsically is, and not
on its being designed or intended.
(2)
Alternatively, we might think that
conscience, we will therefore only
flourish or realize our good by recognizing the authority of conscience and
using it to guide our lives. But this
suggestion
is not without problems
either. First, it seems to make
conscience's authority conditional on its exercise realizing our good. And, while
various places that there cannot be
any conflict between duty and interest (in the longest run) [e.g.: "Reasonable self-love and conscience are
the chief or
superior principles in the nature
of man: because an action may be
suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated; but becomes unsuitable,
if
either of those are. Conscience and self-love, if we understand
our true happiness, always lead us the same way." (2.9)], he also says frequently that
conscience is authoritative by its
very nature (and this, it would seem, is independent of whether conscientious
conduct realizes our good). Second, in
the Preface, he explicitly takes
Shaftesbury to task for this very position:
"The not taking into consideration this authority, which is implied
in the idea of
reflex approbation or
disapprobation, seems a material deficiency or omission in Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue. He has shewn beyond
all
contradiction, that virtue is
naturally the interest or happiness, and vice the misery, of such a creature as
man, placed in the circumstances which we are in
this world." (Pr.26)
(3) Another
possibility might be that he thinks that, since the function of conscience is
to govern, it is fitting that it do so.
but such an approach belongs to the
"other" of the two methods of ethics than the one he is pursuing in
the Sermons. "One begins from
inquiring into the
abstract relations of things: the other from a matter of fact, namely, what
the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or
constitution;
from whence it proceeds to
determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole
nature. In the former method the
conclusion is
expressed thus, that vice is
contrary to the nature and reason of things; in the latter, that it is a
violation or breaking in upon our own nature." (Pr.12)
[There is a more subtle version of (2) that