I am supposed to send you away from here fired up and inspired to take on the challenges of the real world. Fortunately, the speaker has enthusiastic, if invisible assistance. There is a feeling among the audience that if they can just endure the challenge of the next twenty minutes, the last obstacle will have been cleared away.

But lest you think that your burden is great I would remind you that a challenge of twenty minutes is a marked improvement over the 2-3 hours which the great orators confronted their audiences.

I hate to disappoint you—though I suspect that more than a few of you will be delighted if I do.

But more than my own generation at a comparable time and despite a regrettable relapse after the Vietnam War, you have already been aware of the real world.

In any event

Commencement Address
May 3, 1980
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry
The University of Michigan
Diplomacy is not what it used to be, although sometimes I wish it were. Among other things, I wish it had not become a dangerous profession. Despite the recent celebrated breakdown in communications between Washington and New York, easy transportation and communications facilitate interplay between principals in Washington and embassy personnel around the world. We are instructed on concepts, sentences, commas and question marks—and sometimes, when diplomacy rather than nature dictates a hurried absence. What a contrast this makes with the conduct of diplomacy in our country’s early days.

Benjamin Franklin, you will recall, was the first American envoy to France. He was sent to Paris shortly after the commencement of the American Revolution. His instructions: Conclude a treaty of amity and commerce. But distance between continents left Ambassador Franklin to his own devices for a considerable period.

On May 2, 1778, the Congress finally received a letter from Franklin. The letter had been written almost three months earlier. When the delegates opened the missive, here is what they read:

"Sir: We have now the great satisfaction of acquainting you and the Congress that the treaties (plural) with France are at length completed and signed. The first is a treaty of amity and commerce, much on the plan of that projected in Congress: the other is a treaty of alliance, in which it is stipulated that in case England declares war against France, or occasions a war by attempts to hinder her commerce with us, we should then make common cause of it and join our forces and councils."

Ah! to be Benjamin Franklin!

As historian Henry Steele Commager noted, this second treaty "was not
WANTED BY INSTRUCTIONS FROM CONGRESS." NEVERTHELESS, CONGRESS PROMPTLY RATIFIED THE UNAUTHORIZED TREATY, AND THE UNITED STATES ENTERED ITS FIRST ALLIANCE.


IF WE FEEL THE EFFECTS OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY IN OUR DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS, IMAGINE HOW MUCH MORE PROFOUNDLY THE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY CAN BE FELT IN THE NATIONS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

THE UNITED STATES, GEOGRAPHICALLY DISTANT AND BLESSED WITH AN ABUNDANCE OF RESOURCES, WAS FREE TO DEVELOP ITS PROWESS AND WORK OUT ITS PROBLEMS IN RELATIVE ISOLATION FROM INFLUENCES ABROAD. TODAY, DEVELOPING STATES ARE NOT SO FORTUNATE; THEY MUST UNDERGO THE SAME PERILOUS PROCESS WITHOUT THE SAME ABUNDANCE OF RESOURCES--AND TO THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF CAMERAS, RADIO, MICROPHONES, AND A GOOD DEAL OF GRATUITOUS, ETHNONCENTRICALLY BASED ADVICE AND CRITICISM.
INSTANT COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE AS MUCH A DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT IN THIS PROCESS AS THEY ARE A BLESSING. FOR INSTANT COMMUNICATIONS REMIND THE PEOPLE OF THE THIRD WORLD OF THE TREMENDOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR LIFESTYLES AND OUR OWN. INSTANT COMMUNICATIONS CAN CREATE RESENTMENT THAT SPILLS OVER INTO ANTI-AMERICAN BEHAVIOR. WE SAW THIS GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED WHEN RADIO BROADCASTS, REPEATING THE FALSE RUMOR OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ATTACK ON THE GRAND MOSQUE AT MECCA, ALMOST IMMEDIATELY LED TO AN ATTACK BY OUTRAGED MOSELEMS ON THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN PAKISTAN.

THE TRAGEDY IN ISLAMABAD WAS SYMPTOMATIC OF THE ARRAY OF CHALLENGES THAT WE FACE TO OUR WORLD LEADERSHIP. SOME OF THOSE CHALLENGES ARE FAMILIAR TO US. THE RECENT INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS RENEWED OUR OMNIPRESENT FEAR OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, WITH ITS GRAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION AND NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST.

BUT THERE ARE OTHER CHALLENGES—CHALLENGES WHICH ARISE FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FORCES WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS LARGELY UNFAMILIAR, AND OVER WHICH WE HAVE LITTLE CONTROL.

IN ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA, GOVERNMENTS WITH WHICH WE HAVE FELT COMFORTABLE AND EVEN SUPPORTED HAVE FALLEN FROM POWER, AND BEEN REPLACED BY LEADERS AND UNCERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WE FEAR WILL PROVE INIMICAL TO OUR INTERESTS.

TERRORISTS WAGE A GLOBAL WAR AGAINST WHICH OUR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC MIGHT HAS LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS.

WE ARE NOW IN THE MIDST OF THE ULTIMATE TERRORIST ATTACK BY A BAND OF FANATICS WHO, WITH THE BACKING OF WHAT PASSES FOR GOVERNMENT, HOLD DIPLOMATS HOSTAGE IN A SUPPOSEDLY INVOLABLE EMBASSY.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE MOMENT HAS NOT YET ARRIVED WHEN AMERICANS CAN REST ASSURED THAT OUR SECURITY IS NOT IN JEOPARDY. PERHAPS THAT MOMENT WILL NEVER COME.

SURELY, AS LONG AS IT ELUDES US, WE MUST REMAIN VIGILANT AGAINST THE FORCES THAT THREATEN OUR PEOPLE AND OUR WAY OF LIFE. AMERICANS TEND TO BE SIMPLISTIC ABOUT WHAT THOSE THREATENING FORCES ARE. TODAY, I WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU MY OWN PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE DANGERS TO AMERICA IN THE COMING DECADE.

THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES LIES, AS IT HAS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, IN THE POSSIBILITY OF THERMONUCLEAR HOLOCAUST BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

WE CAN NEVER DISCOUNT THAT POSSIBILITY. WE MUST ALWAYS BE READY TO DEFEND AGAINST IT.

WE MUST REMAIN A POWERFUL NATION, AND OUR WOULD BE ADVERSARIES MUST PERCEIVE THAT WE ARE POWERFUL. FOR, THE TRAGEDY OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST WOULD BE EVEN LESS JUSTIFIABLE IF IT SHOULD RESULT FROM A MISCALCULATION OF OUR STRENGTH OR OUR WILL.

EVEN WHERE THE ACTION OF OUR ADVERSARIES MAY NOT BE AIMED DIRECTLY AT THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AS IN AFGHANISTAN, WE MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THERE CAN BE NO BUSINESS AS USUAL. FOR IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE WARMTH OF OUR RELATIONS WITH ANY COUNTRY MUST LIE IN A COINCIDENCE OF SHARED VALUES AND INTERESTS. WE MUST THEREFORE CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IN OUR OWN INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF MANKIND.

BUT AS ALERT AS WE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD MUST BE TO THE DANGER OF DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT MOST OF THE WORLD IS PREOCCUPIED WITH A SECOND, EQUALLY SERIOUS
THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS ABROAD. THAT THREAT LIES IN THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS THAT PLAGUE THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

LOOK AT THE MAP OF THE WORLD. IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THERE APPEARS TO BE
SOME ADVANCE IN THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM
YOU WILL ALSO FIND THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF LONG—NEGLECTED ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DISORDERS. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES FIND
IRRESISTABLE THE TEMPTATION TO MEDDLE IN THE UNSTABLE AREAS OF THE WORLD.

I BELIEVE THAT THE DANGER THAT THIS INSTABILITYPOSES PRESENTS A GREATER
IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM DANGER TO WORLD PEACE THAN DOES THE SPECTRE OF
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS.

FIRST, IT COSTS THE SOVIETS NOTHING. A STRATEGY OF INTERNATIONAL EXPLOITATION
OFFERS LITTLE OR NO RISK OF A DIRECT ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES. WHILE
THERE IS NECESSARILY SOME DIVERSION OF SOVIET RESOURCES INTO THESE EXTRA
TERRITORIAL ADVENTURES, THE CLOSED NATURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY ENSURES THAT
ANY ENSUING DISLOCATION WILL BE TOLERATED WITH LITTLE OR NO OUTCRY, SUCH
AS WOULD CHARACTERIZE SIMILAR EXPENDITURES HERE. THE SOVIETS HAVE EVEN FOUND
A WAY TO LIMIT THE LOSS OF RUSSIAN LIVES: THEY SEND IN SURROGATE TROOPS
FROM CURA AND EAST GERMANY.
Second, the Soviets entertain every expectation of success. For the economic and social conditions that breed instability throughout the developing world have reached crisis proportions.

Two-thirds of the modern world is oppressed by poverty. The average global per capita income is $1,650—well below what we Americans define as the "poverty line." In Asia, Africa, and tropical Latin America, per capita income averages less than the world figure. In a few countries, like Ethiopia and Laos, it is less than $100 per person.

Every day, at least half a billion people go hungry in a world of plenty. Yet food production in Third World countries is declining while the population increases.

The means to economic development prove elusive in the face of world economic woes. Industrialization is hampered by inflation, high energy costs and soaring prices for the manufactured goods that Third World countries must import. At the same time, the frequently single commodity production of Third World countries is subject to erratic fluctuation, ranging from the effect of a freeze on coffee to a decline in the need for commodities for use in making particular goods.

The massive influx of refugees from the warring nations of Asia and Africa into neighboring states drains the resources of countries already struggling to care for their own people.

IN MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ETHNIC IDENTITY IS STRONG AND ETHNIC RIVALRIES ARE INTENSE. OFTEN, MINORITY ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS HAVE BEEN DISCRIMINATED AGAINST AND HAVE NOT BEEN ASSIMILATED INTO THE FABRIC OF A NATIONAL LIFE. NATIONALISM RUNS HIGH, AND SEPARATISTS PRESS FOR AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. THESE CONFLICTS FREQUENTLY SPILL ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, WHICH WERE DRAWN BY COLONIAL POWERS WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES AMONG THEIR POPULATION.

IN OTHER AREAS, POLITICAL STABILITY IS ILLUSORY, FOR IT LASTS ONLY SO LONG AS THE OPPRESSION UPON WHICH IT IS
built can be maintained. It is like a fault in the earth, ever-present and ominous, capable of unleashing its destructive force without warning.

These economic, political and social factors create tremendous unrest throughout most of the Third World, sometimes in those nations thought to be the most stable.

At the ripe old age of 204, the United States has lost the revolutionary fervor of our youth. We have adopted the caution of middle age, if not the insistence on the "status quo" that accompanies a hardening of the arteries. We criticize those, like the Soviet Union, who are willing to fish in the troubled waters of Third World instability. Yet we have developed no comprehensive, sustained, imaginative program to calm those waters.

The Soviets also have an ideological advantage in their dealings with developing nations. They are well aware that their revolutionary "line" is far more alluring to the victims of unstable societies than is doctrinaire Western capitalism. Adlai Stevenson put this case most eloquently as early as 1954, when he made the following observations after a trip through much of the developing world:
"... (1) The new faith of communism," he said, "is a potent weapon for conquest of the peasant and industrial proletariat, the oppressed and the miserable, especially where poverty is the rule and the recollections of colonialism are painful and fresh. While the promises of emancipation and liberation and the ultimate triumph of socialism and the communist 'peoples' paradise are for export only, as the sufferers in all the Russian-occupied countries know so well, the appeal is great to the ignorant and aggrieved."

Stevenson went on to underscore the danger inherent in this honeyed appeal:

"A failure to recognize and to combat the momentum of Russian... expansion, arrayed in communism's seductive panoply of deliverance for the masses of the Middle East, Asia and Africa, could lose to Western civilization vast areas and peoples which are not dispensable."

Stevenson was writing about a danger that was clear and present a quarter century ago. Recent events only underscore the continued existence of that same threat today. For our sake, for the sake of the life and values
WE CHERISH, AND FOR THE PEACE OF THE WORLD, WE MUST FIND A WAY TO DEFUSE THIS TIME BOMB. INHERENT IN THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. WE MUST FIND A WAY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT PLAGUE MOST OF MANKIND SO THAT THOSE WHO SUFFER UNDER THEIR BURDENS ARE NOT SEDUCED BY THE MISLEADING ALLURE OF AN EXTERNAL IDEOLOGY.

THERE HAS LONG BEEN A DEBATE AMONG EQUALLY SERIOUS STUDENTS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS TO HOW WE SHOULD MEET THIS CHALLENGE. SIMPLY STATED, ONE APPROACH ACCEPTS AS GIVEN THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY -- POVERTY, HUNGER, RACISM, THE INTRUSION OF 20TH CENTURY MORES INTO TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES. THESE PROBLEMS ARE INDEED TO BE TACKLED -- BUT IN TIME. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD CONCENTRATE ON INDUCING THE SOVIETS TO REFRAIN FROM EXPLOITATION OF UNSTABLE AREAS. THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY LIES IN LINKING PROGRESS IN DEFUSING UNITED STATES/SOVIE T TENSIONS TO SOVIET RESTRAINT IN EXPLOITING TENSIONS ELSEWHERE.

I HAVE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH THIS APPROACH.

-- FOR ONE THING, IT ASSUMES THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE LOCKED IN A ZERO-SUM GAME, WHERE GAINS TO ONE EQUAL LOSSES TO THE OTHER. WE SHOULD NOT SO CONCENTRATE ON PREVENTING SOVIET GAINS AT ALL COSTS THAT WE LOSE
opportunities to improve our own relations with the Third World.

Moreover, this approach places the United States in a defensive foreign policy posture. Instead of initiating creative, forward-looking policies, we find ourselves perpetually predicting where the next trouble spot will be, and finding some appropriate carrot-and-stick with which to induce the Soviets to stay out.

Finally, this approach provides at best a temporary palliative. For many years, the Soviets and their surrogates have been prevented from interfering in potentially troubled areas by conservative anti-communist regimes in developing nations. We have been closely identified with some of those regimes -- some of which repress dissent and maintain class distinctions in ways repugnant to our own constitutional values. But, as we have learned to our sorrow, if local economic, political and social problems are ignored, they will eventually explode, without any assistance from the Soviets. When they do, the bulwarks of anti-communism and anarchy on whom we rely may be brought down from within.

This is not to say that the concept of linkage is invalid. On the contrary, linkage can be a useful concept, particularly when applied directly to American/Soviet relations. For example, it makes eminently good sense to act so as to
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This is not to say that the concept of linkage is invalid. On the contrary, linkage can be a useful concept, particularly when applied directly to American/Soviet relations. For example, it makes eminently good sense to act so as to
demonstrate that the Soviets cannot enjoy the fruits of normal and good relations and at the same time behave in a way unacceptable to the community of states.

I question the application of the concept of linkage to problems that do not really raise East-West questions — such as the rise of nationalist movements in colonial areas, revolts against repressive dictators, or the demand for changes in the economic, political, and social structure of countries.

We cannot afford to follow the course of Procrustes, that ancient villain of Greek mythology who, you will recall, either stretched or cut off his victim's limbs in order to fit them into his infamous bed. We cannot afford to distort the size and scope of Third World problems, rooted in essentially local causes, to fit the model of a global struggle for power between East and West. We cannot afford to be identified with the enemies of progress in the developing world.

Historian Barbara Tuchman once made the following observation:

"The contest with communism is indeed serious but, as we should have learned by now, the opponent is
DIVIDED AND DISPARATE, NOT SOLID, AND THE COMBAT
WILL BE LOST IF WE ARE NOT MORE SOPHISTICATED
ABOUT CONDUCTING IT IN LOCAL TERMS."

THE QUESTION WE MUST ANSWER, THEN, IS HOW DO WE CONDUCT THE STRUGGLE TO
ERADICATE THESE LOCALLY, STABILIZING INFLUENCES IN THE THIRD WORLD?

OUR EFFORTS NEED NOT BE LIMITED TO FINDING INCENTIVES THAT WILL KEEP
THE SOVIETS OUT TEMPORARILY. WE CAN CHOOSE AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY—
ATTACK AND ROOT OUT THOSE DESTABILIZING FACTORS THAT TEMPT THEM TO COME
IN IN THE FIRST PLACE.

I SUPPOSE ONE REASON THAT WE SHY AWAY FROM THIS LATTER APPROACH IS THAT THE
PROBLEMS WE WOULD HAVE TO RESOLVE ARE UNQUESTIONABLY LONG TERM, ELUSIVE,
DIFFICULT, AND FRUSTRATING. AMERICANS, WE LIKE QUICK, SIMPLE AND DIRECT
SOLUTIONS! WITH LANDING A MAN ON THE MOON, WE LIKE TO BELIEVE THAT WE
CAN RESOLVE THE MOST COMPLEX PROBLEMS IF ONLY WE SET OUR MINDS TO ITS
RESOLUTION.

BUT SOME PROBLEMS WE CANNOT RESOLVE AT ALL. IT IS BEYOND OUR POWER, FOR
EXAMPLE, TO DISSIPATE ETHNIC NATIONALISM, RELIGIOUS DISPUTES, AND SIMILAR
HATREDS THAT SPAN CENTURIES. WE CAN TRY TO DEFUSE SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS
BY PROMOTING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS. WE HAVE ACTIVELY SOUGHT TO DO
SO IN ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA. WE ARE TRYING TO DO SO IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

We can assume that we distance ourselves from those double

force which
But such solutions are difficult to achieve. They are necessarily based on fragile alliances among the distrustful. Unless these political arrangements achieve both popular and international consensus, they are doomed to fail. And unless the economic and social problems that excite ancient rivalries are dealt with effectively, events will undermine political solutions, no matter how well-intentioned the parties.

But we can take the offensive against rising Soviet influence in the Third World. And we can succeed — if we will fight on our terms, with our own weapons, and not with the weapons of repression, secrecy, militarism, and fear.

We have many potent weapons in our arsenal:

— our values

— our economic strength

— our generous contributions, both material and human, to the resolution of the world's problems

— and a proven record that we do not seek to make satellites of other nations.

Nonetheless, we cannot attack these problems alone. We must join together with our allies, and with the developing nations from whose improvement we will benefit, in a historic enterprise. We must, as partners, make a massive
AND SUSTAINED ATTACK ON THESE PROFOUND PROBLEMS. IN SO DOING, WE MUST VIEW OUR EFFORTS IN THEIR PROPER LIGHT — AS DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS WELL AS CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS— AND THEN MAKE A NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO ERADICATE THE INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SOVIET EXPANSIONISM THRIVES BEST.

I CANNOT PRETEND THAT THE APPROACH I PREFER WILL BE SIMPLE OR PAINLESS.

IT IS A LONG-TERM SOLUTION. WE CANNOT EMBARK UPON IT UNLESS WE ARE WILLING TO STAY THE COURSE UNTIL OUR TASK IS COMPLETE. IT WILL BE MANY YEARS BEFORE WE REACH THE GOAL.

IT IS A FRUSTRATING SOLUTION. THERE WILL BE SETBACKS IN THE BEGINNING. WE WOULD DELUDE OURSELVES, FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE THOUGHT WE WERE SUDDENLY LIKELY TO ACQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS THAT HAVE TRADITIONALLY TURNED TO THE SOVIETS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. WE PREFER TO ENCOURAGE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO DISPUTES, EVEN IN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETIES, RATHER THAN BE A SUPPLIER OF WEAPONS, THAT WILL NEVER SIT WELL WITH THOSE WHO, CHAFING UNDER REPRESSION AND FACING ELITIST INTRANSIGENCE, HAVE COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE VICTORY IS TO FIGHT FOR IT.
But in the long run it is the only possible solution.

For it is the only solution that eliminates the problem.

I quoted before from Adlai Stevenson's Godkin Lectures, which he delivered in 1954. I want to close with another passage from the same work. It is a prophetic passage from this book.

Even now, a quarter century later, Stevenson points to the clearest and most hopeful path to a future where peace and freedom can flourish for all mankind:

"I have tried to point out," said Stevenson, "that much of the world in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East is on the way -- somewhere -- trying to telescope centuries into decades, trying to catch up with the Western industrial and technological revolutions overnight and under much more difficult circumstances. And they are trying to accomplish this mighty transformation by the methods of consent, not coercion. A policy based just on anti-communism and military potency is not in the spirit of this great movement of the 20th century and will win few hearts. The challenge for us is to identify ourselves with this social and human revolution, to encourage, aid and inspire the aspirations of half of mankind for a better life, to guide these aspirations into paths that lead to freedom. To default would be disaster."