The idea of the sovereignty of Estonia has a certain link to the
re-identification process of all people in Estonia. This process has
particular features for Estonians, for Russians and for many others with
different ethnic origins. In this paper, we compare only two groups -
Estonians as the majority and Russians as the dominant minority.
The so-called "Russian problem" emerged with other problems of the
transition period. Economic changes affected primarily Russian people
working in large military plants or factories which had tight connections
with Russia. It was understable that these people would fear for their
future in an independent Estonia, because this meant, first of all, that
the preferental treatement previously accorded them (higher wages, social
benefits, free housing, etc.) would not be in the interest of the new
Estonia. Moreover, these industrial people, mostly Russians and other
Russian speaking non-Estonians, had been integrated into the Soviet
ideological system. Ever since the beginning of the independence
movement, there has been a visible shift in the national identities of
Estonians and of Russians in Estonia.
Estonia was quick to define itself as a European nation,
independent of Russia and connected with the West politically and
culturally. For Russians, the new situation became an identity vacuum
which entailed the need to redefine their personal and collective
identities. On the other hand, one major finding (noted in this paper)
concerns the diverse reactions to the change in sovereignty. According to
the sociological data collected by EMOR (a public opinion research
center) in May 1990, an absolute majority of Estonians (96%) supported
the idea of an independent Estonia, while only 26% of Russians supported
the same idea. [See Chart 1,
"Changing Attitutes
towards Estonia Independence".] This was the reason for the real
disharmony between Estonians and Russians.
From the beginning of the Estonian sovereignity movement (1988-1991),
minorities policy has been a matter of great importance. It is very
important to underline that the policy had more political than ethnic
roots, although the tension between different groups did increase during
the movement. This sociological fact is supported by the results of
many surveys and opinion polls.
As it is generally known, in the independence referendum (March 3, 1991),
the majority of the non-Estonian population voted against Estonian
independence. By the estimation of Prof R.Taagepera, approximately 30% of
all non-Estonians voted for Estonian independence. Another 30% of the
non-Estonians did not bother to participate and can be counted as
neutral, and 40% voted against independence (18).
However, when these people voted against Estonian independence, they did
not vote against Estonians but against the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and in favor of maintaining the status quo.
The main reason for controversy between Estonians and Russians was the
idea of Estonia's future political status. Political tension appeared
actually between the two language groups: Estonian-speaking and
Russian-speaking. The tension was thus somewhat higher during the
secession movement, when Estonian-speakers supported independence from
the Soviet Union but Russian-speakers supported the maintenance of the
status quo. The dissension between these groups is therefore based on
social identification rather than historical hostility or contemporary
ethnic intolerance. The focus of the complicated problems is not ethnic
as much as ideological and political.
We can summarize the conclusions with this curious fact: even though
there was a majority of Russians who did not support Estonian
independence in 1988-1991, only 2% of the Russian people intended to
leave the republic in December 1994 (according to a sociological study by
EPG) (2).
Therefore, the national identity of Estonian Russians has visibly altered
since the beginning of the independence movement. This process has
obviously brought about many social problems, many of which have been
closely connected to identification. Let us characterize these in more
detail.
to the beginning
Comparing the main features of Estonians and Russians, one can find that
during the Soviet period the central idea of collective identity was
constructed differently. For Estonians, identity was mainly cultural
(ethnic), while for Russians, mainly national (Soviet citizenship).
Another factor is the differing conceptions of the future economy among
Estonians and Russians at the beginning of the transition. For example,
the idea of renewed socialism was still principally accepted by most of
Estonian Russians, while most Estonians saw no future for a socialist
economic system at all, according to research in four Estonian cities in
autumn 1990. Only 15% of Russian respondents had the similar negative
position about socialism in the economic and social spheres (1). The breakdown of the socialist system was thus one
of the factors having impact on the identity crisis of many Russians in
Estonia.
Estonians and Russians experienced the disintegration of the Soviet Union
in different ways. With the appearance of the new ideology of "perestroika,"
Estonians recognized the great opportunity for separating from the Soviet
Union and restoring their national identity. Most Russians in Estonia
were disappointed at the loss of their accepted (Soviet) identity. One
central dilemma facing Estonia's Russians was that their perceived
identification with the Soviet state was significantly stronger than
their self-definition in terms of Russian ethnic culture.
Many Russians recognized the new situation as unpredictable and
uncertain and therefore strenghtened their negative attitudes toward it.
Non-Estonians had to answer questions like: Who are we in the Estonian
Republic? What will be our children's future? Usually, people have to
answer these questions before they move from one state to another, not
after they have lived within the territory for thirty or forty years.
to the beginning
As one can interpret
from the
figures above, most Russians should be characterized by objectively weak
linkages with the territory, state, culture and citizenry of Estonia. But
the sociological polls assure us that Russian people actually feel much
more integrated and connected with the Estonian territory and society,
despite their limited knowledge of the local language and their fragile
connections with Estonian culture. Let us now analyze more carefully three
objective components: place of birth, knowledge of local language and
formation of citizenry of the Estonian Republic. In
1989, the share of first-generation immigrants in Estonia was notably
high: in the urban population - 32%, in the rural population - 11%, and in
the total population - 26% (6). Ethnic Russians
living today in Estonia (436,500 in January, 1994) are not a homogeneous
group. The population includes at least four different subgroups defined
on the basis of the official statistics and sociological studies (7):
The Law on Language adopted by Estonian Parliament in 1989 (revised
in 1995) has been directed to change this situation. Knowledge of
Estonian as the state language was declared to be a required professional
skill for a number of jobs. Language competence is also a prerequisite
for citizenship. This became a great social problem for many Russians. Table 1 shows very small differences in the
changing language competence of Russians.
The results of the sociological research conducted by Richard Rose and
William Maley (September 1993) confirm the same tendency -- the share of
Russian people who can communicate in some way in Estonian is 40% (11).
We consider knowledge of Estonian one of the most powerful factors in
integration: the person who knows the language understands perfectly the
social circumstances of local problems and the Estonian political
situation today. It has been shown by several sociological research
projects in 1990-92 that knowledge of Estonian is the most significant
factor which helps to create a special diasporic identity (Estonian
Russian), in contrast to the former Soviet identity (12). Among the younger generation of Russians (born in
Estonia in 1950-70), knowledge of Estonian is even weaker than among
their immigrant parents. This shows the very weak assimilative impact of
Estonian culture and of the educational system on people living in
monolingual (Russian) circumstances in industrial cities like Tallinn,
Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe and Narva.
The past four or five years have seen a clear change in attitude toward
the Estonian language. Today, the need for knowledge of the local
language is appreciated by the absolute majority of the non-Estonian
population. About 80% of Estonian Russians have accepted the idea that
everybody in Estonia must know the local language, according to the data
of various sociological research projects (1993-1994).
The legal status of resident foreigners and stateless
persons in Estonia is determined by the Law on Aliens (adopted in July
1993) and by the Law of Citizenship (revised version adopted in January
1995). Contemporary Estonian citizenship legislation follows the
principle of jus sanguinis. Estonian citizenship is ascribed on the basis
of descent, like German citizenship (14). Birth and
prolonged residence in Estonia have no bearing on citizenhip status.
Estonian citizenship law allows immigrants and their descendants to remain
foreigners indefinitely. Creation of the new citizenry has been the
most problematic process in Estonia. According to the Law on Citizenship,
people of whatever ethnic origin who have no link with the pre-war
Estonian Republic and who can't restore their citizenship through their
parents or grandparents, have to apply for Estonian citizenship. It has
been very hard for Russian immigrant population to accept this ideology.
Nevertheless, the situation is stabilizing today. Data from the Table 2 show that Estonian citizens of
Russian
origin are growing continuously while the share of Russian citizens among
Estonian Russians is quite stable. The survey in December 1994 showed
problematic figures for the share of Estonian citizens of Russian origin
-- 35%. According to the estimation of specialists, this figure is
obviously exagerated. The explanation may be that people were very sure
that they would get Estonian citizenship in the near future, even though
they had not yet obtained an Estonian passport.
As one can see from Table 2, the share of
Russian citizens diminished from February 1993 to December 1994. There
are at least two explanations. One is remigration, which was relatively
high in this period -- some people who are Russian citizens moved to the
territory of the former Soviet Union. 20,000 people emigrated from
Estonia from 1993 to 1994: 2,500 to the West and 17,500 to the republics
of the former Soviet Union. Supposedly most of them were Russian (16).
The second explanation: people first took Russian citizenship because the
application procedure is much easier, and because it allows them to cross
the Russian border to communicate with relatives and friends in Russia.
Now they have changed their decision and hope to also get Estonian
citizenship.
As it has been recently declared by the Russian Embassy, 90,000 Estonian
residents received Russian citizenship by March 1996. Analyzing both
citizenship statistics and sociological data, we can conclude that when
applying for citizenship, people very often do not make a political
decision about their state affiliation but choose the option which is the
most convenient for everyday life (getting visas, etc.).
There are only about 5-7% (maximum 30,000 persons) of native
(autochthonous) Russians who have been living for at least three
generations in Estonia, according to the last census and calculations by
Kalev Katus (8).
For the autochthonous ethnic minorities of Estonia the process of
re-identification occurred naturally and simultaneously. New generations
of Estonian Russians, including immigrants, should have accept the
identity and status of ethnic minority. According to the surveys
(1992-93) less than half of them acknowledge this status (9).
to the beginning
The sociological polls show that most of the immigrant Russians today
understand the Estonian state and territory as having a certain
integrity. 16% of Russians demand a special territorial status separate
from Estonia for the North-East. The statement that this region is
Russia's domain was supported by only 3% of Russian and less than 1% of
Estonian respondents (see Table 3).
According to Table 3, respondents consider greater administrative and
territorial autonomy to be necessary for Narva, a town on the
Estonian-Russian border. At the same time, the share of those who think
that Narva belong to Russia is diminishing. Therefore, we can conclude
that an absolute majority of Russians consider Estonia indivisible. It
also means that they recognize the need to integrate.
One hypothesis for why the identity of Russians is not shifting rapidly
points to both their weak connections with Estonia through ownership and
private property in Estonia and their strong emotional ties with Russia.
It has been often argued that Russians and Estonians have different
economic positions, unequal opportunities for economic success, and
therefore unequal bases for an Estonian-centered identity.
Private ownership and property possession today (3-4 years after the start
of privatization) is one of the indicators of people's future social
status. Table 4 confirms that, in
general, there
are no principle differences in ownership patterns between Estonians and
Russians after a few years of privatization. The percentages of Estonians
and Russians who have no land, house, car, etc. are almost the same --
22-23%.
It must be underlined that private property dimensions in Estonia today
are not comparable to Western countries. One is not rich if he/she has a
private house or if he/she is an owner of a large flat. For example, there
is no correlation between the respondents' income and ownership of a
private house (p=0.04). Private houses given back to former owners are, of
course, not modern and in very bad condition. Stock shares still have
close to no real value, and most of them are possessed for privatization
certificates. The market for immovable property is still very small and
insignificant in Estonia. In the future, of course, possession of
immovable property may become a serious factor of social inequality
between those with restored property (mainly Estonians) and those without
immovable property in Estonia (mostly Russians and other Soviet period
immigrants).
The answers of Russians living in central and south Estonia (right column
in Table 4) is extracted to
show that living
conditions and private ownership of Russian respondents depends also on
the region of residence. Russians in central and south Estonia live in
small towns and rural districts. Their life-styles and patterns of
consumer behavior are closer to those of Estonians. Therefore, life
conditions and life-style highly correlate with type of town (big or
small, industrial center or not).
What is the prognosis for the personal economic and social status of
Russian people in Estonia?
Table 5 shows that there are differences
according to ethnic origin in respondents' evaluation of their own social
and economic status. We suggest that these differences may be influenced
by different standards of "higher" and "lower" social class definitions
for Estonians and Russians. But even if it is so, Russians do not
consider themselves as socially "marginal" much more than Estonians do.
The index of deprivation is a complex economic indicator of the economic
position of Russian and Estonian respondents.
It is constructed on the basis of seven indicators:
(See Chart 3: Bar Graph - Attitudes of Estonians and
Russians toward each other and toward other ethnic groups.)
Chart 3 shows the respondents' attitudes toward people with different
ethnic origins. It is somewhat surprising that Estonians and Russians
characterized each other as "easy or very easy to live and work together
and find mutual understanding."
Results of the research in 1994 and 1996 (Table
7) also confirm that both Estonians and Russians have had mostly
positive experiences in their interactions and foresee positive relations
in the future.
To be sure that these results reflect the complexity of people's
attitudes, we
created an "index of conflict," constructed on the basis of the following
indicators:
to the beginning
The results were fundementally different: the absolute majority of
Estonians feel unsafe and fear the specter of provocations from Russia.
The absolute majority of Russians do not see any future danger from
Russia.
(See Chart 5: Index of "Russian
Danger")
We can make one of our general conclusions here, based on several
sociological studies in the last six or seven years:
Jürgen Habermas wrote: "The identity of a political community, which
may not be touched by immigration, depends primarily upon the
constitutional principles rooted in a political culture and not upon an
ethnical-cultural form of life as a whole. That is why it must be
expected that the new citizens will readily engage in the political
culture life specific to their country of origin. The political
acculturation demanded of them does not include the entirety of their
socialization" (22).
Many theorists suggest that the new European integration is a matter of
identity (23), but that European integration does
not necessarily demand the close integration of people, shared culture or
homogenity. It is, firstly, a political body that is needed, a political
Europe. It is not only the formation of political institutions, but also
a normative, political integration. What is needed is the development of
political identity. The national level remains the focus for cultural
identity and community.
However, Europe has abandoned the idea of the traditional mono-national
nation-state. As several social theorists (Karl R. Popper, Jürgen
Habermas) have pointed out, instead of an acknowledgement of pure
nation-state principles, Europe needs the realization of protection of
ethnic, cultural and lingual minorities. The European image and the real
European identity of Estonia can be demonstrated by the acceptance of this
ideology. This is the only way for a small state like the Estonian
Republic to survive and keep its own identity while integrating into the
European cultural, political and security system.
to the beginning
It is a task for social researchers to find out what sort of impact the
contemporary Estonian citizenship policy has. Does it bring along a
segregative effect, where differences between Estonian and Russian
citizens increase even more and the real integration process is postponed?
Or may be it bring about increasing integration, impelling the real steps
of integration? In addition, it is very important to find an answer to
the question: can we treat the citizen policy as selective for loyal and
non-loyal persons? What basic issue or identity core will be the main
consolidating factor for Estonians and for Russians?
2. The sociological data have been collected by the
authors with ARIKO MG (Tallinn) and Research Institute of Russians In
Near Abroad (Moscow). In November-December 1994, a study was carried out
among a representative sample of the Russian and Estonian population
(interview with 941 Russian and 911 Estonians).
3. Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. Die Konstruktion nationaler
Identitäten in vergleichender Perspektive. In: Nationale und
kulturelle Identität. Herausgegeben von Bernhard Giesen. 2. Aufl.-
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991, pp.21-38.
4. Ole Weavers, Morten Kelstrup. Europe and its nations:
political and cultural identities. In: Identity, Migration and the New
Security Agenda in Europe. Ed. by Ole Waever and other. London: Pinter
Publishers, 1993, pp. 61-92.
5. György Csepely. Structures and Contents of
Hungarian National Identity. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1898, p.120.
6. Lembit Tepp. In- and out-migration of Estonia. Estonian
Statistics. Monthly of Statistical Office of Estonia, No.9, 1994,
pp.25-36; Reference Book of Population Statistics. Statistical Office of
Estonia. No. 3, 1994, pp.14-27.
7. Aksel Kirch, Marika Kirch and Tarmo Tuisk. The
Non-Estonian Population Today and Tomorrow. A sociological Overview.
Tallinn: 1992, pp. 8-9.
8. Kalev Katus, Luule Sakkeus. Foreign-born Population in
Estonia. Tallinn: Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre,
1991.
9. Marika Kirch and Aksel Kirch. Ethnic Relations:
Estonians and Non-Estonians. Nationalities Papers (Special Topic Issue).
Vol. 23, No.1, March 1995, p.45.
10. Samuel P.Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations?
Foreign Affairs. vol. 72, No.3, Summer 1993, pp.101-105.
11. Richard Rose and William Maley. Conflict or
Compromise in the Baltic States? RFE/RL Research Report. Vol.3, No. 28,
15 July 1994, p.32.
12. Aksel Kirch. Russians as a Minority in Contemporary
Baltic States. Bulletin of Peace Proposals. vol. 23, No. 2, June 1992,
pp. 205-212; Marika Kirch and Aksel Kirch. On Estonian Russian and
Separatism. Security Dialogue. vol. 25, Nr.1 March 1994, pp.112-114.
13. Rein Ruutsoo. The Perception of Historical Identity
and the Restoration of Estonian National Independence. Nationalities
Papers (Special Topic Issue). Vol. 23, No.1, March 1995, p.168.
14. Rogers Brubaker. Citizenship and Nationhood in France
and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, pp.75-84
15. Nationalities in the Baltic States. A Survey Stady.
Ed. by Richard Rose, William Maley, VILMORUS, LASOPEC & EMOR. Studies in
Public Policy (No. 222). Centre for the Study of Public Policy.
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1994, p.52.
16. Statistical Yearbook. 1994. Statistical Office of
Estonia. Tallinn: 1994, p.79.
17. Data from the Estonian Department of Citizenship and
Migration.
18. Rein Taagepera. Estonia. Return to Independence.
Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993, p. 194.
19. Juhan Kivirähk. From the Singing Revolution to
the referendum of independence. Emor Reports. Vol.1, No. 1,
July-September 1991, Tallinn: 1991, p. 13.
20. Changing Identities in Estonia. Sociological Facts
and Commentaries. Ed. by Marika Kirch and David D. Latin, Tallinn:
Akadeemia Trükk, 1994, p. 37.
21. Robert Hettlage. Diaspora: Umrisse einer
soziologischen Theorie. Österreichische Zeitschrift f. Soz-ie. 16
Jhg., H 3, 1991, p.11.
22. Jürgen Habermas. Staatsbürgerschaft und
nationale Identität. Überlegungen zur europäischen
Zukunft. Erker-Verlag: 1992, pp.32-33
23. Elemer Hankiss. In Seach of a Paradigm. Eastern
Europe...Central Europe...Europe. Daedalus. Vol.119. No.1, Winter 1990,
pp. 183-214; Rein Ruutsoo. The Transformation of Estonia into a
Nation-State. The Search for a New Identity. The Baltic States at a
Crossroads. Publications of Dept. of Sociology, University of
Jyväskylä, No.5, Jyväskyla, 1993, pp. 95-105.Short Introduction to the Emerged Social Problems
Estonia, like the two other Baltic states, restored its independence
peacefully during a short period of power vacuum in the former Soviet
Union. This paper analyzes shifts in ethnic and national identity, social
problems and complicating factors relevant to the process of
post-socialist transition in this newly independent state.IDENTIFICATIONAL DIVERSITY IN ESTONIA BEFORE 1991
We proceeded from the conception of S. N. Eisenstadt (3) and O.Wævers-M.Kelstrup (4)
concerning the phenomena of ethnic (cultural) and political identity.
Political identity is mainly seen as a "sense of political community," of
sharing a political project, while ethnic identity is the cultural,
organic sentiment of being part of a larger family and deriving one's
identity and meaning in life ultimately from the community. Each type of
identity can operate at different levels. This means that "national"
identity can include both the ethnicity/culture-bound and the state-bound
aspects.BASIC FACTORS FOR THE NEW IDENTITY ARCHITECTURE
G. Csepeli wrote, "...national identification must be treated as an
integral part of the total transformation of socialist society into a more
democratic and open society allowing for greater autonomy in the field of
politics, economics and culture" (5). The necessity to
change various identity components (including the regime identity) was
especially remarkable for Russian people who innocently immigrated to
Estonia during the Soviet period. Thus, in analyzing identity
alterations, we must not look only to the ethnic aspect but also to
identity deriving from connection with territory, state, social groups,
religion, and local affiliations. Demographic background and links with Estonia
territory
963,281 Estonians lived in Estonia at the beginning of
1989, according to the last Soviet census. This was less than that of the
1934 census, before the Second World War, when there were over 990,000
Estonians. If we take 856,000 as the number of Estonians after the war
(1945), then in the years 1945-89, the number of Estonians had increased
by 22 per cent. At the same time, the percentage of Estonians among the
population has constantly decreased (from 97% to 61.5% in 1989).
One can be sure that
each group has a different relationship with Estonian territory and
culture.Pure knowledge - one of the main social problems
of Estonian Russians
Throughout the Soviet period, the separation of the two population
groups: Estonian-speaking people (Estonians, Finns, Ingerians, local
Jews, Latvians etc.) and Russian-speaking people (Russians, Ukrainians,
Byelorussians, Tatars, Poles, Jews from Ukraine or Russia, etc.) were a
voluntary segregation based mainly on different communication languages
(Estonian or Russian) but not on ethnic origin. Relations between these
two languge groups were cool but not antagonistic. (It is better to say
that there was pure communication between these two groups). For many
Russians the language and cultural barriers are existing up to today.The Citizenship Problem
The formation of the new
citizenry is also a great social problem connected with problems of
identity. Minority status and social problems connected with
this position
The restoration of Estonian independence brought along another principle
change: Russians became an ethnic minority in the Estonian Republic.
However, most of the Estonian Russians are completely unaware of their
new minority identity. This shift of identity from being the leading
nationality in one of the world's most powerful states to a minority
group in a small republic created a crisis of self-identificational.CHANGING ATTITUDES AND ESTIMATIONS TOWARDS ESTONIA
Our last survey, in March 1996, was designed to research the new
economic, cultural and political situation of Russian people living in
Estonia and the connection of the changes with their ethnic and social
identities. The data processing started in April, and we have here the
first results to compare with former surveys.
The data in Table 6 confirm that the
complex
indicator of economic positions and self-evaluations are quite similar
for Estonians and Russians. Personal relations between Estonians and Russians
The nature of relations between Estonians and Russians is very importrant
in all the processes of the transformation, for social stability and for
rapid integration of a large portion of unintegrated peoples. Several
sociological research projects (1992-93) showed that most people in
Estonia have never perceived a high level of tension between ethnic groups
and have felt no animosity in relations on a personal level. Therefore, we
propose that the character of Estonian-Russian relations may promote the
identity shift and solutions to the main social problems.
Chart 4: Index of Ethnic Conflict shows a
very positive tendency: fewer and fewer people have intolerant attitudes
toward other ethnic groups in Estonia. In general, we can conclude that
ethnic conflict is not a recourse on the personal level. It does not
mean that there are no factors creating instability and conflict in
Estonia. We consider the main factors of instability external. THE MAIN COMPLICATIONS CORRELATED WITH IDENTITY
ISSUES
The main differences between Estonian and Russian respondents were their
attitudes toward Russia. Complications arise from asking questions about
Russia: can Russia become a danger to the Estonian state? Is it risky or
safe for the people of Estonia to live in Russia's neighborhood?
to the beginning
WHAT ABOUT THE IDENTITY ARHITECTURE IN FUTURE?
Estonian people have to survive two integration processes:
(Future Perspectives - European identity?)
It is correct to mention that the Russian diaspora in Estonia was "in its
nature not only a dynamic process, but also a cultural behaviour" (21). Today, most Russians have recognized an ethnic
identity rather than a Soviet cultural identity. The most positive
scenario will be for the former national (i.e. Soviet) identity or the
absence of political identity to be replaced by an "Estonian-Russian"
"hyphenated" identity (i.e. ethnic Russian but citizen of Estonia).QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES FOR THE FUTURE
Estonia's problem remains how to assure the members of its relatively
large non-citizen population will not be outsiders but equal persons
integrated into the society.
to the beginning
Notes and References
1. In September and December 1990, the authors and ARIKO
Consultancy carried out a research project: "The Russians in the social
conditions in Estonia", financed by the Estonian Government (interview
with 470 Russians in Sept. and with 757 Estonians and Russians in Dec.).