Kiev 1996
The main purpose of the survey was to study the socio-political attitudes
of the Ukrainian population as well as the socio-economic situation in
Ukrainian society. Other issues related to social and economic processes
were also studied including: the prestige of the President of Ukraine,
Leonid Kuchma, the Supreme Soviet, the Cabinet of Ministers, local
authorities and various political parties and public organizations,
people's attitudes toward the "left-right" problem in politics and social
life, attitudes about different periods of Soviet and Ukrainian history,
and the adoption of a new constitution. The results of the survey
indicate many contradictions in the socio-economic and political
situation in Ukraine.
This report also includes some comparative data from a survey conducted
by the Social Monitoring Centre and the Ukrainian Research Institute for
Youth Problems. This survey, which was conducted last year, used
analogous survey methods, questioned the same number of respondents and
was carried out in the same regions. This comparison allows us to
analyze changes in public opinion in Ukraine.
to the beginning
Briefly, the political situation in Ukraine can be characterized as
beingin transition from totalitarianism to a modern state based on market
principles. Like most post-totalitarian countries, Ukraine is
experiencing a slow and painful process of launching a market economy
while searching for the most effective administrative mechanism to
minimize transition "losses" to society. The development of such
mechanisms is no less important than market reforms, especially during
the formation of the Ukrainian state. The problem is aggravated by the
previous practice of governing during the Soviet period wherein political
institutions sought to control people's private lives entirely. Although
the desire to do so is strong at times, the experience of other
post-totalitarian societies shows that it is impossible to change the
long standing administrative system all at once.
Although much time has passed since Ukraine proclaimed democratic
reforms, many people do not feel than any radical changes have taken
place. It is understandable that after all of the "storms and shocks of
perestroika" and the dramatic events of recent history, most of the
population of Ukraine rejects the idea of rapid revolutionary change.
Only 13% of respondents support radical change by revolutionary means.
The majority (62%) believe that Ukrainian society should be improved by
gradual reformation, i.e. evolutionary change.
Only 3% of those who responded to this question felt that there was no
need for change. We should note that a considerable number of
respondents (one out of five) found it difficult to express an opinion on
this issue. These people probably do not consider this issue important
or are tired of the endless discussions about possible ways to reform
(see Table 1).
To a large extent, the success of democratic reforms depends on people's
support. Democracy as an abstract ideal or concept is very attractive to
Ukrainians. Many scholars note that adherence to democratic principles
both in every day life and at the social level is a key aspect of
Ukrainian public mentality.
This can probably explain the fact that despite all of the difficulties
of the transition period and the economic decline often associated with
political change, most citizens of Ukraine prefer to live in a
democratic, civil state. Most of them imagine this type of state as one
political change, most citizens of Ukraine prefer to live in a
democratic, civil state. Most of them imagine this type of state as one
in which there are free elections to the most important bodies of power,
all citizens have equal rights, political and civil rights are
guaranteed, and citizens are respected and their human dignity is
protected.
Ninety four percent of those interviewed considered respect for citizens
an important sign of democracy. At the same time, 65% think this
characteristic is "very important." The long history of totalitarianism,
has produced the desire for the protection of social rights and respect
for citizens. Thus, such democratic characteristics as equal rights
(94%), protection of society and its citizens from illegal actions (93%),
and bringing up people in the spirit of human dignity (91%) were
mentioned most often as being important. These characteristics are
regarded as the first and most important signs of democracy and were
considered either "very important" or "important" for most of the
population.
At this same time, such classical indicators as free elections and
political rights appeared to be less important for many citizens. For
example, only 67% considered free elections important for democracy,
while only 35% of these considered them very important.
As to such significant characteristics as political rights, 69% regarded
them as important signs of democracy (while only 29% of these respondents
considered political rights to be "very important"). Moreover, some
respondents considered free elections and political rights insignificant
for democracy (11 and 16%, respectively).
This distribution of priorities can probably be explained by
disappointment in the efficacy of free elections as a means of forming
political bodies which are accountable to society. At the same time,
political rights without economic or administrative support are often
perceived as something abstract.
The current political regime in Ukraine can be described as a
transitional one, combining the main components of democratic and
totalitarian political systems. Continued evolution towards democracy
will depend on the degree to which economic and political reforms meet
people's expectations of life in a democratic society based on market
will depend on the degree to which economic and political reforms meet
people's expectations of life in a democratic society based on market
principles.
The survey data show that the problem of global political choice persists
and that there is still no clear preference for the democratic model. The
idea of democracy in the context of equal civil rights, providing legal
protection for minorities and effective measures against state tyranny,
is more widely accepted. Thus 87% of those interviewed would prefer to
live in a society where civil rights are not violated and the state
guarantees that they are upheld. Seventeen percent believe that civil
rights can be limited only in the interest of the state. Most
respondents (78%) share the opinion that the state must respect the
rights of ethnic and religious minorities that reside in Ukraine. Only
18% of those who answered the question assume that the rights of
minorities may be limited to benefit the majority.
At the same time, attitudes towards the economic basis for democratic
change differ considerably. Respondents were asked about possible state
intervention into various spheres of social life, particularly the
economy. Is Ukrainian society ready to live under conditions whereby the
economy is regulated by the market? An analysis of the data shows that
it is not. Almost half of the respondents (48%) said they preferred to
live in a country where the state regulates the economy and establishes
prices and salaries. About 29% did not have an opinion on this matter.
Only one third of respondents preferred a model where the economy is
regulated by the market and the state does not interfere.
We can assume that economic difficulties and a rapid decrease in material
status is in part responsible for people's disillusionment with the
possibility of improving their situation through market reform. This is
why they would like to return to the times when economic relations were
regulated by those in power and the population had minimal but stable
social guarantees and confidence in the future. It is also an
explanation for why many Ukrainians accept democratic political values,
but do not support the material basis for democracy.
This is also revealed in the respondents' attitudes towards the state's
role in providing social protection. Although 69% of respondents stated
that they were ready to live in a society in which one's material status
depends on personal ability and work, they are not opposed to the state
that they were ready to live in a society in which one's material status
depends on personal ability and work, they are not opposed to the state
being responsible for a "normal life." Almost two thirds of the
respondents (59%) prefer to live in a country where the state provides
absolutely everyone with a certain standard of living.
Thus there is still a strong desire for the state to interfere with the
economy by fixing prices and salaries and for the state to provide a
certain standard of living. These are symptoms of a totalitarian
consciousness. These symptoms can be a considerable obstacle to further
radical reform since the population is not sufficiently ready to speed up
reforms. The symptoms include a fear of risk, a lack of personal
initiative and a lack of responsibility for one's own material status and
family well being.
This situation makes it difficult to predict how the present political
regime will evolve. The evolution will be conditioned first of all by
internal factors such as the current authority's ability to stop
declining production, its ability to stabilize the financial system,
improve the standard of living for the majority of the population, solve
the most acute problems in the economic and political spheres in
accordance with the will of the people, and achieve positive changes in
the social and economic spheres.
In the absence of such improvements, we believe that the idea of the
civil market model will not be accepted. The alternative is a return to
totalitarianism. Even now, part of the population thinks that a return
to socialism is possible under certain conditions. This view was held by
every sixth respondent (25% of all interviewed), while every fifth
respondent did not express an opinion on this matter. However, most of
the population (54%) did not think that a return to socialism was
possible (including 22% who are absolutely sure of this fact) (see Table 2).
The clear division of executive, legislative and judicial power is one of
the most important indications of democracy. Here we should stress that
most participants in the survey accept the idea of such a division and
would like to live in a state in which the functions and responsibilities
of each branch of power are legally defined. The idea of such social
organization is supported by 64% of respondents. At the same time, 36%
of each branch of power are legally defined. The idea of such social
organization is supported by 64% of respondents. At the same time, 36%
would prefer a single strong political power. Strong power supporters
are found equally in all age groups. Thus we can conclude that the
desire to live under a strong power does not represent nostalgia. It is
possible that such a desire results from increasing confrontation among
the different branches of power, the rapidly declining prestige of local
legal bodies, and the obvious weakness of the public prosecutor system,
police and other power structures. There is a strong possibility that if
the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches
continues, the willingness to accept some kind of totalitarian regime
will grow. To find a ruler for such a regime would not be difficult.
to the beginning
Fifty-seven percent of the respondents felt that there were "more good
things" ("more stability") during the Brezhnev period. This is a
response to current everyday problems that accompany the transition.
Given a considerable decline in the standard of living, people have lost
hope that independence would bring rapid social and economic benefits.
The second most numerous group (33%)is that which assessed the Khrushchev
period as positive. This was a period when Stalinism was purged and
attempts were made to develop a more democratic system and reform the
economy. Many people spoke highly of Khrushchev's personality and his
political actions.
The percentage that considered the period of national independence as
having brought "more good things" is much smaller (15%). This can also
be explained by nostalgia for the past "zastoi" times. The percentage
that view the independence period as having "more bad things" varies by
nationality (56% of Ukrainians, 70% of Russians, and 61% of other
nationalities). The percentage of those with positive attitudes towards
the sovereign years is almost twice as large for Ukrainians than for
other ethnic groups (18 and 9 percent respectively).
There are different reasons for the relatively small percentage
reflecting those who had a positive attitude towards Stalin (12%). Most
of the responses result from the idea that only unpopular repressive
command-administrative methods can change the situation for the better.
The relatively small number of people who sympathize with totalitarianism
or revolutionary dictatorship indicates that the society is managing to
balance between conflicting political forces that are on the fringes of
socio-political life. That a significant number of respondents have a
positive opinion towards the "thaw" of the Khrushchev period and the
period of perestroika (38% of all respondents) -- indicates a certain
level of democratic consciousness as well as the inclination towards
democratic change and a society based on democratic principles.
Most citizens associate the past with a totalitarian single-party system,
the main body of which was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU). Therefore, it is logical that, in addition to other factors,
people's attitudes towards a political party depend on what elements of
historical consciousness and memory are reflected in the party's program
and its political orientation.
Upon receiving their liberty, the citizens of Ukraine found themselves
faced with a difficult problem, the problem of choice. The market system
requires that everyone define his or her own attitude toward the ongoing
changes. It demands a strong sense of individuality and the ability to
make resolute decisions. This type of personality could not develop
under the totalitarian system.
Although there is no apparent "generation conflict" in Ukraine, it should
be taken noted that there are a substantial number of older people in
society who were brought up under a different political system. Through
hard work, these people were assured certain social guarantees. They
have their own vision of the country as an economically developed world
power, Which accounts for their dissatisfaction with the current
situation in Ukraine.
to the beginning
Therefore, individual political self-identification may provide
interesting data. In our study, respondents could identify their
political views based on a ten point scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right).
Centralism was indicated by 5 or 6.
The following is the distribution of our results: 17% referred to
themselves as being on the left, 10.4% on the right, and 17.5% as
centrists.
One goal of the study was to determine the most common political views
held by the population. Our data indicate that 55.6% of respondents
could not identify their own political views, i.e., they are politically
indifferent or ignorant. Every sixth respondent (16.8%) identified his
views as centrist. Thus we may conclude that three quarters of the
citizens do not belong to the left or right and are more or less
apolitical. At the same time, 7.4% of respondents identified themselves
as holding strong leftist views (scores of 1 or 2) and 2.7% as belonging
to the far right (scores of 9 or 10).
The fact that a large number of respondents did not identify their
political views does not mean that Ukrainian society lacks political
culture. Rather it means that people have become tired of the politics
and political populism of recent years.
However, there was no support for the hypothesis that Ukrainian society
is very active in politics. More than one third of those who identified
their political views (39%) considered themselves centrists. Adding
those who are slightly left and right of center, we find that three
fourths (77%) of those who identified their political views are
centrists. It is, therefore, clear why political parties (e.i. social
democrats) and some power structures are so concerned about their
centrist image.
Further, Ukrainian society is not symmetric in its political attitudes.
This is seen in the ratio of those on the left to those on the right
(7%:3%). An even greater difference exists between those on the far left
and those on the far right (5%:2%). This suggests a potential threat by
the left which may try to use its strength to disrupt the current social
stability through violence.
Given the distribution of political ideology, a strong centrist bloc
could suppress those on the extreme left and control those on the extreme
right (assuming the latter act within the limits of the law). This would
be an important factor in maintaining social stability. The general
public mood may result in a victory by the left centrist pragmatic forces
in the next elections, both for the presidency and the Supreme Soviet.
Barring an unexpected change, this will continue to be the trend.
All Ukrainian administrative districts and regions can be divided into
five main groups:
Respondents age 55 and older appeared to be the most politically
oriented. Those located in regional centers with populations of more
than 100,000 are the most politically concerned and active.
Comparing the responses of men and women, one should remember that men
are more interested in political life and are more willing to share their
opinions. 61.4% of women and 46% of men had a poor sense of politics and
could not identify their political opinion.
Centrist political views indicate tolerance within the nation and special
attention should be paid to those holding these views (see Table 3).
The largest number of centrists are located in the Harkiv, Zaporizhya and
Sumy regions (29-31% each). In the Kirovograd and Kyiv regions centrist
views are the least popular accounting for 0.9 and 4.9% respectively.
In terms of other demographic characteristics of the centrist group, it
tends to consist mainly of individuals age 25-44 (18-20%) who live in big
cites and regional centers.
Typical of the citizens of other post-communist nations, Ukrainians have
complicated attitudes towards leftist political forces. Leftist ideas
are supported by older people but are rejected by younger and middle age
people.
Respondents with leftist attitudes can be divided into a number of
groups.
By analyzing the distribution of left-right political attitudes we can
conclude that:
The percentage of adherents to leftist political ideas in the central,
southern or northeastern regions is equal to the percentage of those with
rightist views in Western Ukraine. However, a left tendency is apparent
as the population is much larger in the southern, central and
northeastern regions. Supporters of the left are likely to be older
people residing in the regional centers and large industrial cities of
central and southern Ukraine.
It is also important to note that those on the left and right often have
different concerns and perceptions of social issues. For example, those
with leftist views are more concerned with society's division into rich
and poor, price increases, and relations with Russia. At the same time,
rightists are most worried about a possible communist revival and
Ukrainian membership in the CIS. Currently, those with centrist views
side with those on the right concerning many issues.
to the beginning
Table 4 compares
ratings for the main political institutions in Ukraine.
According to these data, the highest positive rating (the sum of the
responses "completely trust" and "somewhat trust") is for the mass media
and the military, each of which received 53%.
In terms of those in power, the President of Ukraine is the most
trusted. In May 1995, his rating was 31%. The Cabinet of Ministers
(19.4%) and the Supreme Soviet (19%) are almost equally trusted. Local
and Regional authorities enjoy higher trust (29 and 25 percent
respectively).
Typically, commercial structures (banks, private enterprises, etc.) have
approximately the same ratings as political parties and organizations (12
and 10 percent respectively).
Despite inter-confessional conflicts, confidence in religious
organizations is quite high (34%).
On the other hand, 40% of respondents completely distrust rich people,
almost 29% completely distrust political parties, and 27% distrust
managers of large industrial enterprises, the Supreme Soviet and the
police.
Despite the low confidence ratings for all kinds of authorities, only 28%
were in favor of advance elections to the Supreme Soviet, 25% for advance
elections for local authorities and 21% for advance presidential
elections.
Regarding the mass media, it is important to note that the positive
rating still exceeds 50%. This rating was based on the responses of
Ukrainians using at least one form of mass media. Naturally, the vast
majority of respondents watch Ukrainian television programs (95%),
Russian television programs (92%), listen to Ukrainian radio (88%), or
read Ukrainian newspapers (87%). Thus, most respondents use the
Ukrainian mass media. At the same time, two-thirds listen to Russian
radio programs and read Russian newspapers. Somewhat more than one third
of those surveyed watch or listen to other foreign television or radio
programs, or read other foreign newspapers.
In terms of trusting the media, 60% of respondents completely or somewhat
trust Ukrainian radio, 56% trust Ukrainian newspapers and magazines, and
60% trust Ukrainian television. At the same time, 51% trust Russian
television, while 45% trust Russian newspapers, radio and magazines.
Despite numerous complaints by some political forces about the
westernization of the mass media, the survey indicates that non-Russian
foreign television is trusted by 47% of respondents, 50% trust foreign
radio, and 41% print media. Therefore, claims that Ukrainian air time
has sold out to "imperialists from the West" were not supported.
to the beginning
It is, therefore, important to examine the peculiarities of the current
political situation and the genesis of political attitudes which form the
core of Ukrainian mass political consciousness. Here it is important to
remember that the fact that key elements of the totalitarian bureaucratic
system remain untouched considerably hampers both economic reform and
political transformation. These elements include an abnormally large
state sector within the economy and the continued functioning of the
Communist Party within politics. A typical aspect of the historical
consciousness of some citizens is that they still think that
communist-socialist forces can solve their problems. This can be seen in
such statements as, "it was no worse then than it is now," "at least you
could get a free education," or "we didn't have this much crime," etc.
Those who sympathize with right radical organizations such as the SNPU,
UNA-UNSO, OUN, KUN, VPO or DSU believe that only this type of
organization (assuming they come to power) can provide prosperity and rid
society of the remnants of totalitarianism. In any case, a threat either
from the left or from the right may bring about a period of serious
problems.
The question, though, is whether those in power regard political parties
and blocs as links between the state and the people considering that only
1% of the population "completely trust" and 9% "somewhat trust" such
organizations.
People's interest in political parties, movements, and specific political
events depends more and more on how these things affect everyday life.
There is an increasing tendency for people to stop thinking that social
and political structures, especially political parties, can improve their
lives. Thirty-eight percent of respondents do not associate any
political party with the possibility for improvement. (See Chart 3).
This has caused a rift in the mass political consciousness. Although the
majority of people believe that political organizations should exist,
they refuse to personally participate in the political process.
One reason for this political indifference is the inability of political
parties and movements to move beyond the old propaganda approaches.
Political organizations should be able to find solutions to problems
based on a new set of public priorities.
It is therefore natural that 34% of respondents do not expect any new
party or bloc to be able to radically change the economic or political
situation.
The most important peculiarity of the situation is that more respondents
connect their hopes with the communists and socialists (17%) than with
any other political group. This raises the question as to whether the
lack of new political parties and the lack of social influence of the old
parties explains the waning support for political parties in general in
addition to the increasing indifference toward political life.
Interestingly, in explaining why they support a given party, the majority
of respondents could not say anything about the remaining political
parties or blocs.
to the beginning
Respondents were asked to name the three most influential politicians in
Ukraine. A total of 50 names were mentioned. Sixty seven percent could
not name anyone (CHECK THIS). Chart 4
compares the distribution of
responses with those obtained by the Social Monitoring Centre in June
1995. The names of those mention by less than 2% of respondents are not
included as they are not statistically significant.
These figures show that the ratings for President L. Kuchma remain high.
The popularity of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, O. Moroz, has
increased somewhat. The rating of Prime Minister E. Marchuk is much
higher. At the same time the popularity of such well know leaders as L.
Kravchuk, V. Chornovil, V. Pinzenyk, and V. Lanovyi has decreased.
In any country, the president appears as the legitimate policy maker
reflecting national and state unity and protecting state interests. It
is therefore important to explore attitudes towards the "First Person" of
the state and determine people's expectations of him.
Confidence in the president has changed somewhat during the last year. In
June 1995, 43% of those interviewed expressed faith in L. Kuchma (the sum
of the positive responses "completely trust" and "somewhat trust") while
only 33% currently trust the president.
Of the leaders of the different branches of power (L. Kuchma, O. Moroz
and E. Marchuk), Kuchma's actions elicited the strongest opinions among
respondents. Only one out of four of those interviewed hesitated when
evaluating the president's activities. People had the most trouble
evaluating the actions of Prime Minister Marchuk (more than 40%
hesitated). Almost one sixth (17.6% ) of respondents think that Kuchma
will change the situation for the better. Forty three percent think that
nothing radical will happen. Fourteen percent think that the situation
will change for the worse. Fourteen percent also think that Moroz will
make the situation worse while 10% feel that way about Marchuk.
We are therefore justified in saying that almost one fifth of the
population of Ukraine has strong positive feelings towards Kuchma. 21.4%
think that advance presidential elections are needed and 17% feel that
only a new person in this position could improve the situation.
Only 6% of respondents believe that the presidency should be abolished
altogether. These are primarily people over the age of fifty who live in
the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Lugansk regions.
The data we obtained indicate that Ukrainian society is prepared to
support further economic reforms instituted by the president's team.
Almost one fifth of respondents believe that order can come to Ukraine
only by means of the political will and power of President Kuchma.
Fifteen percent think that Kuchma should assume complete control over the
country (although in December 1994 28% of respondents held this view).
Thirty five percent feel that the president does not have enough power to
influence the situation. Thus we can conclude that almost half of those
interviewed believe that the president's power should be strengthened.
At the same time, 60% of respondents believe that the president's
ordinances do not really have any effect as they are simply not
fulfilled. Twenty three percent of respondents believe that the
president has too much power.
People living in different regions have different estimations of the
scope of the president's power. Regions in which it is considered
insufficient are mainly located in western Ukraine: Ivano-Frankivsk
(60%), Rivno (57%), Zhitomyr, Lviv, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi (50% each).
A considerable number of those interviewed expressed a lack of confidence
(the sum of the negative responses "somewhat distrust" and "completely
distrust") in the Cabinet of Ministers (54%), regional authorities (54%)
and local authorities (54%). These data indicate that the president
should be more concerned with the effectiveness of the various levels of
the executive body, and less concerned with the distribution of power.
We may also add that the strengthening of the executive system at the
local level would be supported by the electorate as only 7% of
respondents believe that the situation will be improved only when the
local Soviets have complete executive and legislative power in the
country.
It is also worth noting that support for President Kuchma also varies by
region (see Chart 5).
Only in the Kirovograd region is there extreme distrust of the
president. In three regions, Lugansk, Donetsk, and Crimea, one third of
those interviewed completely distrust the president. The smallest
percentage of respondents who completely distrust Kuchma is in the
western part of the country (Ternopol, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions).
Attitudes towards the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine are also worth
examining. Nineteen percent of respondents trust the Supreme Soviet (the
sum of the responses "completely trust" and "somewhat trust"). A much
larger percentage distrust it - 59% (the sum of the responses "somewhat
distrust" and "completely distrust"). One out of six respondents did not
express an opinion. In the Ternopol region, every second person
distrusts the Supreme Soviet. In the Ternopol region, one of every two
people did not trust it and in the Vinnytsya, Donetsk, Rivno, Herson,
Lugansk and Zakarpatie regions one third of respondents did not trust
this body. The lowest percentages were found in the Cherkassy, Poltava,
Dnipropetrivsk and Harkiv regions (17-18% each) and in the Kyiv region
(14%).
People estimate the power of the Supreme Soviet to be quite high. Fifty
one percent of respondents said that the Supreme Soviet had enough
power. Only 8% thought that the Supreme Soviet has insufficient power
and 3% believed it has no power at all. At the same time only 6%
supported the idea of giving the Supreme Soviet more power while four
times as many respondents (23%) thought that advanced elections to the
parliament might improve the situation.
The electorate's attitudes towards the Supreme Soviet can also be gleaned
by responses to the question, "Can the situation be improved if a new
Supreme Soviet were elected?" Almost half of the respondents think that
a new parliament would work the same way as the old one." Ten percent
believe it would be worse (the sum of responses "may be worse" and
"definitely worse"). However 20% of respondents think that the new
parliament would work more effectively.
The level of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers is quite low. The
data show that only 19% have faith in the cabinet (the sum of responses
"completely trust" and "somewhat trust"). The percentage of those who
distrust the cabinet is much higher - 54% either somewhat distrust or
completely distrust the cabinet. This rate is higher than that of the
president but lower that that of the Supreme Soviet. Further, 20% of
respondents believed that the cabinet should be reformed.
to the beginning
The method for adopting a new constitution is the subject of many heated
arguments. In the current context, it is important to determine people's
opinions about the model of the state. In order to do so, our survey
asked people to evaluate indicators of both the liberal democratic model
and the centralized autocratic model. The data, which are presented in a
comparative table, show that the liberal model received much more
approval. (see Table
5).
A certain contradiction can be observed in these answers. It is this
contradiction which explains the way people think about the economy today
in Ukraine. Almost twice as many people believe that the state should
control prices and salaries than believe that the state should not
interfere with the economy (probably a reflection of people's desire to
improve their material status). At the same time, 70% claimed that their
material status depends solely on their work and abilities.
It is commonly understood that the opposing forces in the debate on
constitutional adoption are the communists and the national democrats.
The communists propose submitting the following issues for a national
referendum: SB1social protection and the conservation of social
gains, the expediency of the presidency (??????), national symbols,
language status, and membership in the "voluntary union of independent
nations (????).
The citizens of Ukraine are even more radical (see Chart 6). Many of
them (39%) think that not only the key elements, but all of the text of
the constitution should be submitted to a national referendum. Fourteen
percent believe that there should be a special constitutional assembly.
Only 4% think that the new Constitution can be adopted by the Supreme
Soviet and 2% have not decided how they feel about this issue.
Because of the extreme differences of opinion on this issue among some
parliamentarians, political parties, and individual leaders, the process
has been very difficult. We can not exclude the possibility that the
adoption itself may cause considerable tension within the country. That
is why it is so important to diffuse the situation and examine the
experience of state make in other countries. For example, if we take
into consideration the fact that only three of the thirty eight members
of the European Union have single chamber parliaments, having a two
chamber parliament seems like a good idea. This is the position of
President Kuchma and his supporters.
The question of citizenship and ethnic background are being solved in a
civilized way in Ukraine. Individuals with Ukrainian citizenship should
all be equal regardless of their nationality, religion, or political
views. A Ukrainian is first and foremost a citizen of Ukraine, not a
person of a certain nationality.
The most important point, however, is that the idea of Ukrainian self
rule can not be confined to state symbols including the constitution, but
must include the appropriate socio-economic base. M. Grushevskiy stated
that the Ukrainian national idea was not destroyed by Bolshevik bayonets,
but by the inability of the state Duma to institute socio-economic
policies that would satisfy the masses.
Today, the future of the national idea, and in fact the state itself,
depends primarily on economic reforms, people's attitudes towards them,
and people's material well-being. Ukraine is following a peculiar but
civilized path from the administrative model to a bureaucratic society.
This path differs in many respects from the path chosen by neighboring
countries.
to the beginning
Most respondents were not disturbed by possible dependence on Western
credits (only 10% mentioned this as a factor) or the lack of elite
concerned with the nation (10%). In our opinions, the importance of
these factors is underestimated by the population
Most of those who believe that Ukraine should not be a member of the CIS
are ethnic Russians as opposed to ethnic Ukrainians. More of them had
incomplete secondary, secondary or vocational education as opposed to
partial or complete university education. Most live in small towns and
villages, not in big cites.
Chart 8
presents data which show that the percentage of opponents of
CIS membership varies by region. Most CIS supporters were found in the
eastern, southeastern and central regions. The percentage of supporters
in western Ukraine was much lower.
Respondents' ethnicity should also be taken into account when analyzing
attitudes towards the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. In total,
about 30% of respondents were worried about the relationship between
Russia and Ukraine. However, Russians constitute almost half of this
group (42%), as opposed to Ukrainians who account for only 25%. This is
also an issue which worries older people more than the youth. Only 14%
of respondents age 18-19 expressed concern about this issue, while 35% of
the 50-59 age group was concerned.
The largest percentage of those worried about the current relationship
between Russia and Ukraine was found in the Harkiv (45%), Donetsk (44%),
Dnipropetrovsk (41%) and Odessa (41%) regions, as well as in Crimea
(41%). In the following regions, however, the rates were much lower:
Hmelnitsk (20%), Cherkassy (11%), Rivno (10%), Ivano-Frankovsk (7%) and
Ternopol (6%).
It is clear that Russian TV plays an important role in how people
perceive the problem. Russian TV was trusted by 46% of those who
answered the question, although the level of trust is much lower in
certain regions.
to the beginning
The data indicate that people actively support the idea that current
reform should be directed towards creating a market economy. Only 13%
think that the reforms should be terminated as they are ineffective and
11% are categorically in favor of returning to a socialist economy. At
the same time, there are somewhat more of those who prefer methods of
socialist planning as instruments of economic improvement. Eighteen
percent are in favor of discontinuing privatization of state enterprises
and 16% would return those enterprises already privatized to the state.
Market principles are much more popular. Almost two-thirds of those
questioned generally support the idea of further reform. As to specific
methods, support is not as strong. Only one-third believe that the
country needs to establish the most favorable conditions for private
business. Seventeen percent are for the more rapid privatization of
state enterprises. Only one-fifth of respondents support the
introduction of a new currency (grivna).
Such contradictions in the data can be explained by people's
understanding of the market economy and how it is formed. Twenty-two
percent of respondents believe that market reforms should be accompanied
by various social protection measures. What these measures should be is
not asked specifically in the survey, but there are several questions
which shed light on this issue. Forty-eight percent of respondents
answered "yes" to the question, "Do you want to live in a state that
controls prices and establishes salaries?," while 28% answered "no" to
this question and 22% could not answer at all. More than half of the
respondents would prefer to live in a country in which the state provides
a "normal life" to everyone and only one-fifth of the respondents were
against this idea. Two-thirds of Ukrainian adults feel that the state
should be more responsible for providing a "normal level" in order to
change the situation for the better.
These data show that Ukrainian society continues to have strong
paternalistic attitudes towards the state despite support for a market
economy and reforms in principle. This can also be seen in the data
concerning Ukrainians' attitudes towards social justice.
One out of two citizens of Ukraine (52%) believes that the division
between rich and poor is unjust while only 31% believe that it is natural
for society. Six percent are not worried about this problem while 11%
did not have an opinion.
People's attitudes towards social justice is correlated with their
material level. The higher the respondent perceives his or her income,
the less likely he or she is to support equality. At the same time,
one-quarter of those with lower than average material status and one
fifth of those with low material status believe that the division between
rich and poor is normal for every society.
to the beginning
The share of those with stabilized or increased income is tending to
grow. However, the percent of those for whom income has decreased
remains twice a large as that of families with increased income for the
whole period of the transition. In February 1996, only 2% said that
their material level increased considerably and 9% said that it "somewhat
increased." Thus, only one in nine families has seen financial
improvement during the transition period.
That the social price for market reforms is higher than was expected at
the beginning of the reforms can be seen in the data on people's self
perception of their material status
(see Chart 9).
During the short period of transition, society was not simply divided
into rich and poor. There has been pauperization on a large scale. In
the beginning of 1996, almost two-thirds of respondents categorized
themselves as being at various levels of poverty. One-third of
respondents considered their material level as lower than average,
one-quarter considered it low, while 12% thought it was very low compared
to the statistically average level in Ukraine.
Material self-perception largely depends on such factors as age,
education, gender and social status. Women are usually more critical of
their social status than are men. The youth and those age 29-39 are the
"safest" group. We should point out, however, that the material
situation of young people depends on their parents' well-being.
Pensioners, especially those who are 60 years and older, are in the most
difficult situation. Half of them estimate their material status as low;
28% described it as lower than average.
Employment does not appear to affect poverty. More than half of the
employed perceived their material level as low or lower than average.
This included 80% of workers and technical specialists with university
education, and 59% of specialists in the field of science, art and health
care with university or secondary vocational education (see Table 7).
The data paint a portrait of the poor that is difficult to interpret.
The unemployed are not only members of unprotected social groups. A
large number of the unemployed are highly qualified workers who in most
industrial countries comprise the working class. The Ukrainian poor are
mainly people who had average incomes in the beginning of the 1990s.
In Ukraine, poverty is accompanied by a general decline is social
conditions. This has led to increasing concern about acute social
problems, in addition to one's own standard of living (see Table 8). More than
half of the respondents were worried about problems associated with
getting an education, and more than half with the drinking of a member of
their family. The latter problem indicates the problem of an increase in
the use of alcohol. Almost half of the respondents confessed that they
have a problem within their family (e.g., relationship with other family
members, lack of free time, housing conditions, stress, etc.)
An index ranging from "0" (do not worry at all) to "4" (very worried) was
calculated to determine respondents' anxiety level. An anxiety level
ranging from 0-4 was then calculated for different social groups. A
rating higher than 2 indicates that the problem is quite serious.
An analysis of the data indicates that the most acute problems are low
income, health problems and poor living conditions. More than half of
the adult population does not see any way out of their situation. It is
important to keep in mind that the perception of a problem often depends
on age, education, social status and material status. However, the
problem of low income worries not only the poor but also those who
perceive their material level as average or high. Eighty-eight percent
of those who perceived their material status as average worry about their
income. Among those with higher than average and high incomes, income is
a concern for 63 and 40% respectively.
All socio-demographic groups are characterized by a general
dissatisfaction with their lives. To measure this dissatisfaction, we
used a ten-point scale where "1" equaled general dissatisfaction with
one's life while "10" indicated general satisfaction. The average of
3.44 for the adult population is significantly below average for this
scale.
Respondents cited sever factors that worried them, including: "the slow
degradation of our society," "high rent," "no chance to educate my
children," "increasing alcohol and drug use," "bad attitude towards
pensioners and veterans of the Second World War," "loss of contact with
relatives living in other CIS countries," "the desperate situation among
old people," "increasing prices for public services," "alimony is too
high," "irregular salaries," "when they show parliament sessions on TV I
just turn it off! I can not understand why the Government spends so much
on this show."
The current state of society is characterized by the prevalence of
pessimistic attitudes towards life's prospects. One-fifth of respondents
stated that they expected life to get worse in the future while the
remaining respondents either did not have any opinion or did not expect
any changes at all.
Some rhetorical questions were added by the respondents such as, "How can
I raise my grandchildren in the spirit of respect for honest work if my
35 years of service does not give me a normal pension?" or "How can you
bring your kids up in the spirit of human dignity if only drug pushers
and prostitutes live well?"
to the beginning
PRINCIPLES OF SAMPLE SELECTION
This was a multistage representative sample. In the first stage, Ukraine
was divided into all of the administrative regions, the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Kyiv. In addition, the administrative
districts within each region, Crimea and Kyiv city were selected. The
second stage provided settlements within each district.
In the final stage, respondents were selected by random sample. This
selection was based on the route method which was used for apartment
selection and finding appropriate respondents from each selected
household according to the following interconnected quotas gender x age
x education.
The sample is representative of the Ukrainian population 18-64 years of
age according to the following indicators: administrative region
(oblast), gender, age, and type of settlement. Education and nationality
were used as control variables.
A special computer program developed by the Ukrainian Institute for Youth
Problems was used to determine the location of the Ukrainian population
age 18-64. After that, the necessary number of respondents for each
administrative region was calculated taking into account the region's
share of the population as a whole. In 18 regions, this number was
increased to 100 respondents in order to obtain statistically significant
data. The second stage provided the selection of administrative
districts. This selection took into account some indicators of the
districts' economic, social, and cultural development in addition to some
other factors. Different types of settlements were selected within each
district at the second stage. Finally, there was a random selection of
respondents within each settlement.
All settlements were divided into the following groups:
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
This study was conducted by a research team at the Social Monitoring
Centre, a unit of the National Institute of Strategic Studies in Kyiv.
The survey, "Socio-Political Attitudes of the Ukrainian Population:
entre, a unit of the National Institute of Strategic Studies in Kyiv. The
survey, "Socio-Political Attitudes of the Ukrainian Population: February
1996," was administered in all 24 administrative regions of Ukraine, Kyiv
city and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea between February 1 and
February 12, 1996. A representative nationwide sample was polled with
individual respondents having been randomly selected using a route map.
The sample was representative based on the age and gender of the
respondents while nationality and education served as control variables.
In total 3,082 individuals 18 years of age and older were interviewed.
The standard deviation is 1.0 - 1.8% while the authenticity rate
(confidence interval???) is 95% and the variable correlation (error rate)
is 0.1 - 0.5. The validation covered 20% of respondents.2. DEMOCRACY OR TOTALITARIANISM?
Social health should be analyzed according to economic, social and, no
less importantly, political criteria. Politically, social health is the
estimation of the stability of power and the ability of those in power to
control the processes of society as well as the population's satisfaction
with its ability to participate in and control the political system.3. THE HISTORICAL PAST AND PRESENT DAY UKRAINE:
NOSTALGIA OR REJECTION?
Contradictions in the character of political innovations, as well as
those in the social sphere during the transition period resulted in
different reactions among different age groups of the population. These
reactions often result from a social consciousness which was formed or
deformed under totalitarianism. Therefore, it might be helpful to look at
how people evaluate the past as we analyze people's current values and
priorities. We looked at how people evaluated their lives and their
surroundings according to the corresponding political periods (see Chart 1).4. THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT
The terms "left" and "right" are often used when analyzing individual
political views, party programs or the overall situation in the country.
The results of nationwide and local elections or referendums on certain
political issues can serve as indicators of political preferences along
the left-right scale. However, given the character of our political
culture in which social and political structures are less important than
individual personalities, we can not conclude that the distribution of
political forces is representative of the views held by the public.
The distribution of "right" political ideas varies by region as well. In
the Ternopil and Lviv regions the number of those on the right is 37.4
and 32.4% respectively. In Rivno and Ivano-Frankivsk regions 25-26% of
respondents are on the right. The fewest respondents supporting the
right are found in the Chernivtsi, Sumy and Volyn regions as well as in
the city of Kyiv 10-13%). In other regions, no more than 9% of
respondents support the right.5. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN STATE AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS
Post-totalitarian political psychology is characterized by increasing
negativism. People have negative perceptions of most political
institutions. Interestingly, this negativism is reflected in voting
procedures wherein people are asked to cross out the name of the person
they are voting against, rather than indicating the candidate they want
to vote for.6. POLITICAL PREFERENCES AMONG UKRAINIANS
It is logical that attitudes towards a given political party, bloc or
organization depends significantly on which elements of historical
consciousness are reflected in it's platform.7. THE POLITICAL OLYMP IN UKRAINE
During the past few years the political Olymp has formed in Ukraine.
Since then, some state, political and public leaders have ascended to it
(or left it), but the structure has remained the same. Here we should
note that public opinion of the main political figures in Ukraine is
based on different criteria than, for example, what journalists use to
choose "man of the year."8. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF POWER
Politically, Ukraine combines elements of parliamentary, presidential and
soviet rule. This raises the question of who defines the course of
politics and political policy in Ukraine?9. THE NEW CONSTITUTION: WHAT SHOULD IT SAY AND HOW
SHOULD IT BE ADOPTED?
There are many reasons why Ukraine needs a new constitution including the
need to formalize the state model and to determine the civil rights and
duties of Ukrainian citizens.10. THE BIGGEST THREATS TO INDEPENDENCE
Most respondents were certain that increasing corruption at all levels is
a great threat to Ukrainian independence. This factor was cited by 62% of
respondents. Half of respondents think that the lack of real economic
reforms is a big threat. A considerable number of respondents (42%)
believe that social disconnection is a threat -- people don't feel like
they are really citizens. More than one-third of respondents mentioned
the weakness of state bodies as a dangerous factor.11. UKRAINE AND THE CIS
As indicated in Chart 7,
Ukrainians' attitudes towards the CIS have
remained virtually unchanged between March 1995 and February 1996.12. PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE CURRENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC
SITUATION IN UKRAINE
The main questions concerning public opinion about the current
socio-economic situation are: to what degree are the ideas of radical
reform popular among different social groups, what kind of market model
do people expect, and does the present economic reality meet these
expectations?13. MATERIAL LEVEL AND PEOPLE'S PERCEPTIONS
The macroeconomic stabilization which Ukraine achieved in 1995 had some
positive influence on living standards. This is indicated by the
decreasing percentage of families in which incomes have fallen over the
past four years. In 1994, 74% of respondents claimed that their income
had fallen during the four years preceding the interview. In February
1996 the number had dropped to 64% (see Table 6).14. EXPLANATION OF SAMPLE SELECTION FOR THE SURVEY
"SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION: FEBRUARY 1996"
This study focused on the Ukrainian population age 18-64.
Quotas were determined based on the proportion of the population living
in different types of settlements according to official statistics. At
the final stage, respondents were selected using a "route map." The
settlement was divided into several zones according to the level of
development [one store zone, medium store zone (up to three stores), and
high zone as well as by distance from the center. A route was laid out
for each zone reflecting the structure of a given settlement.
Respondents were selected in their households by quotas for: gender x
age x education.