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Last Updated: June 10, 2005

Windows Public Key Infrastructure and Certificates

Overview

The following Windows Certificate Authority (CA) servers provide support for Public Key services in the UMROOT Windows forest. The first server is a "root CA" server, and the second server is a subordinate, "issuing CA" server. The single role of the root CA is to authorize other CA's in the forest. The role of subordinate CA servers is to issue certificates to authorized requesters within the U-M Windows forest.  In Windows, the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is integrated with the Active Directory, so most Windows services requiring certificates will use Active Directory to locate the available CA's. Sometimes a list pops up listing all available CA's. Be sure to choose the "UM Windows UMROOT Issuing CA" for certificate requests, rather than the "UM Windows root CA".

CA Name DNS address Comment
UM Windows root CA pki01.adsroot.itcs.umich.edu Only used to set up new issuing CA's.
UM Windows UMROOT Issuing CA pki02.adsroot.itcs.umich.edu Use this CA server for certificate requests.

Windows Certificates vs third-party Certificates

Please note that certificates issued by these CA's are not designed for applications external to the U-M Windows forest, since the UM Windows root CA is not recognized as being authoritative by commercial Certificate Authorities. A web server that provides SSL based service is a common example of a service that would require an certificate issued by a trusted commercial CA, since most modern web browsers will verify certificates issued by the major commercial CA's, but will not recognize a certificate issued by the Windows UMROOT forest CA unless the computer running the browser is a member of the forest.  In general, if the audience for a certificate includes principals outside of the Windows UMROOT forest, a third-party commercial certificate is more appropriate than one generated by the Windows UMROOT forest Certificate Authority.
 

Public CA Certificate and CRL Information

The following public web site provides access to CRL (Certificate Revocation List) and AIA (Authority Information Access) data for the UMROOT forest CA's. This CRL and AIA information is also published in Active Directory. Some PKI clients do not have access to Active Directory, but can use this secondary distrubution point.

  http://certinfo.adsroot.itcs.umich.edu:33066/certinfo

Specific files of interest follow:

  1. Issuing CA certificate chain
  2. Root CA certificate
  3. Issuing CA certificate
  4. Root CA Certificate Revoction List (CRL)
  5. Issuing CA Certificate Revoction List (CRL)

Requesting a Certificate

Windows "authenticated users" may use the following web page to:

  1. Request a Certificate
  2. View the status of a pending certificate request
  3. Download a CA certificate, certificate chain, or CRL

  https://pki02.adsroot.itcs.umich.edu/certsrv/

If the type of certificate you are requesting is not available via the listed web page, please contact your Windows domain administrators, or w2k-support@umich.edu.
 

Certificate Types and Availability

The following table provides a list of potential certificate types supported by the Windows CA servers.  The "Availability" column lists groups allowed to enroll for a particular certificate type.   To extend the availability of certificates across the forest, we have adapted a security group naming convention to facilitate customized certificate enrollment scenarios.

Enrollment for selected certificate types is controlled by membership in a universal security group with the following naming convention:

forest-cert-CertificateType-Permission

For example:  forest-cert-user-enroll; forest-cert-workstation-autoenroll

Domain administrators may create security groups that can be added to these top-level universal groups, permitting authorized principals across the forest to request designated certificate types.  The suggested format for domain-level security groups is similar to the one listed above, with the word "forest" replaced by the applicable domain.  By following this strategy, domain administrators only have to create a single security group per certificate type, and can control the availability of certificate types within their domain without further requests to the Windows PKI administrators.

domain-cert-CertificateType-Permission

For example:  lsa-cert-user-enroll; bus-cert-workstation-autoenroll

Domain administrators should submit requests for extended certificate enrollment capabilities to w2k-support@umich.edu.
 

Certificate Type Availability
Administrator none
CA none
CAExchange none
CEPEncryption none
ClientAuth Domain Users, forest-cert-clientauth-enroll
CodeSigning none
CrossCA none
CTLSigning none
DirectoryEmailReplication Enterprise Domain Controllers (enroll, autoenroll)
DomainController Enterprise Domain Controllers
DomainControllerAuthentication Enterprise Domain Controllers
EFS Domain Users; forest-cert-efs-enroll
EFSRecovery none
EnrollmentAgent none
EnrollmentAgentOffline none
ExchangeUser none
ExchangeUserSignature none
IPSECIntermediateOffline none
IPSECIntermediateOnline Domain Computers; forest-cert-ipsecintermediateonline-enroll
KeyRecoveryAgent none
Machine Domain Computers; forest-cert-machine-enroll
MachineEnrollmentAgent none
OfflineRouter none
RASAndIASServer RAS and IAS Servers
SmartcardLogon none
SmartcardUser none
SubCA none
User Domain Users;  forest-user-user-enroll
UserSignature Domain Users;  forest-cert-usersignature-enroll
WebServer forest-cert-webserver-enroll
Workstation Domain Computers; forest-user-workstation-enroll