

1 Sustainability Science and Engineering  
2 Martin A. Abraham (Editor)  
3 © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

477

# 5 Sustainable Design Engineering and Science: 7 Selected Challenges and Case Studies

9

10 S.J. Skerlos<sup>a</sup>, W.R. Morrow<sup>a</sup>, J.J. Michalek<sup>b</sup>

11

12 <sup>a</sup>*Environmental and Sustainable Technologies Laboratory (EAST), Department of*  
13 *Mechanical Engineering, The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, Ann Arbor, MI, USA*

14 <sup>b</sup>*Optimal Design Laboratory (ODE), Department of Mechanical Engineering, The*  
15 *University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, Ann Arbor, MI, USA*

17

19

## 21 1. Introduction

23 As an instrument of sustainable development, *sustainable design* intends to  
24 conceive of products, processes, and services that meet the needs of society while  
25 striking a balance between economic and environmental interests [1]. By def-  
26 inition, the benefits of sustainable design are publicly shared, and to achieve  
27 them individual designers must place their decisions into a context larger than  
28 any single company, and even larger than the society or generation within which  
29 the design functions. It is therefore difficult to define sustainable design in an  
30 operational sense, and thus sustainable design is easy to ignore, especially in the  
31 fast paced and competitive process of bringing design artifacts to market.  
32 Complicating sustainable design further is the fact that environmental impacts  
33 depend on the consequences of specific stressors, rather than on which product  
34 or process causes the stressor (e.g. the atmosphere is indifferent to a kg of CO<sub>2</sub>  
35 saved by changing the design of a refrigerator versus changing the design of a  
36 television). Owing to these characteristics, sustainable design requires consistent  
37 and well-coordinated implementation to be achieved in a meaningful way.

38 Given the challenge of coordinating the complex trade-offs between econom-  
39 ic, societal, and environmental factors influenced by design, it can be expected  
40 that governments interested in operationalizing sustainable development will  
41 begin to directly legislate the feasible space of options available to designers.  
This has been the approach in the EU, where the last few years alone have seen

1 the proliferation of Directives on Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment  
(WEEE) [2], Restrictions on Hazardous Substances (RoHS) [3], and End of Life  
3 Vehicles (ELVs) [4]. For instance, according to RoHS, the new electrical and  
electronic equipment cannot contain lead, mercury, or cadmium after July 1,  
5 2006, *except* for listed applications (e.g. leaded glass in CRTs) where substi-  
7 tution via design changes or materials is technically or scientifically impracti-  
cable, or where their substitution would cause environmental, health, and/or  
9 consumer safety impacts larger than their use [3]. Such regulations attempt to  
level the competitive playing field for environmental improvement, and to re-  
duce the need for companies to make subjective and isolated judgments re-  
11 garding the sustainability of design decisions.

While prescriptive environmental directives such as RoHS and WEEE intend  
13 to simplify sustainable design, they do not necessarily achieve its objectives. For  
example, eliminating a toxic substance from a product, such as mercury from  
15 fluorescent lamps, might lead to greater use of incandescent lamps that consume  
more energy, which on balance could have a negative impact on the environ-  
17 ment [4]. In industrial cleaning machines, reduced use of detergents might typi-  
cally lead to increased water temperature and hence higher energy  
19 consumption, which on balance could have a negative impact on the environ-  
ment [4]. In the design of fuel cell vehicles, selecting materials on the basis of  
21 recyclability could ultimately lead to vehicles of larger mass, and consequently  
increased emissions associated with hydrogen production, which on balance  
23 could have a negative impact on the environment [5].

The need to coherently resolve such trade-offs among environmental at-  
25 tributes, and between environmental attributes and product performance, pro-  
vides the rationale for the European Commission's (EC) recent proposal for a  
27 framework Directive to set *eco-design* requirements for energy-using products.  
Eco-design is the focus as it is estimated that over 80% of all product-related  
29 environmental impacts are determined during the product design stage [4]. With  
government entities now targeting the design process, it is becoming imperative  
31 that companies and their designers understand the environmental and economic  
implications of their design options. Moreover, the impending consideration of  
33 such eco-design legislation will require companies to become actively engaged in  
the broader development of environmental product policy, not as a matter of  
35 environmental altruism, but as a matter of maintaining competitive position.

Against this backdrop, it is an interesting and perhaps ironic observation to  
37 note that those who apply knowledge of science toward fulfilling society's needs  
through technological invention and selection (e.g. engineers and designers)  
39 rarely have a quantitative understanding about society's preferences, business  
decisions, economics, and the environmental impact of technological decisions.  
41 In other words, it is rare for engineers and designers to have the ability to

1 systematically address the trade-offs inherent to sustainability. Unfortunately,  
 2 this is more than just an educational shortcoming. At present, there is a clear  
 3 need for a comprehensive body of knowledge and quantitative approaches that  
 4 integrate engineering, economic, societal, and environmental science models  
 5 toward a holistic definition of sustainable design.

6 For the purpose of this text, we define *design as a creative decision-making*  
 7 *process that aims to find an optimal balance of trade-offs in the production of a*  
 8 *product or service that best satisfies customer and other stakeholder preferences.*  
 9 The artifact can be a product, manufacturing process, or service, with typical  
 10 trade-offs including those between performance characteristics (e.g. light weight  
 11 versus high strength), manufacturing capability, cost, safety, time-to-market,  
 12 degree of customization, and the often contradictory preferences of different  
 13 stakeholders. In our view, *sustainable design* only adds specific focus to design:  
 14 *design, with particular attention paid to life-cycle trade-offs between functional*  
 15 *performance, economic success, and the establishment of healthy social and en-*  
 16 *vironmental systems.* In other words, sustainable design is a consideration of the  
 17 balance between public and private interests in the course of satisfying customer  
 18 and other direct stakeholder interests.

19 In this chapter, we focus on the following challenges to sustainable design:

- 21 1. Understanding Incentives and Inhibitors to Sustainable Design (Section 2)
- 22 2. Establishing Targets, Metrics, and Strategies for Sustainable Design (Section
- 23 3)
- 24 3. Accounting for Variability in Product-User Interactions (Sections 3 and 4)
- 25 4. Evaluating Alternative Technologies for Sustainability Characteristics (Sec-
- 26 tion 4)
- 27 5. Estimating the Market Value of Sustainable Design Attributes (Section 5)
- 28 6. Developing Market-Conscious Policies to Encourage Sustainable Design
- 29 (Section 5).

31 Figure 1 serves as a framework for organizing these challenges in a manner  
 32 that suggests a flow of abstract societal values regarding sustainability into  
 33 products and services with economic, environmental, and societal consequences.  
 34 Various influences are listed in one of the many possible progressions from  
 35 values to artifact, including the designer's perceptions of technical and envi-  
 36 ronmental alternatives (Challenges 2–4) and the implementation of societal  
 37 values as regulatory and market variables (Challenges 5 and 6). Influenced by  
 38 the designer's perceptions, and against the backdrop of current market con-  
 39 ditions, the company will optimize its design decisions and set them into action,  
 40 thus affecting the balance of factors in the sustainability triangle.

41 In this chapter, we begin by providing an overview of business incentives and  
 inhibitors to sustainable design (Section 2). This is followed by a brief review of




Fig. 1. Framework for conceptualizing sustainable design challenges described in this chapter.

sustainable design processes and metrics (Section 3). In these introductory sections, we focus primarily on environmental aspects of sustainable design, although issues of corporate social responsibility and trade-offs between societal and environmental variables are mentioned. The introductory sections are followed by two case studies, which highlight specific trade-offs that arise in sustainable design applications. The first case study (Section 4) provides an overview of economic, environmental, and societal aspects of mobile telephone production, use, and remanufacturing. The second case study (Section 5) provides a quantitative methodology for the evaluation of sustainable design policies related to automotive fuel efficiency. The two case studies are starkly different in approach. While the first takes a high-level and empirical view of existing mobile phone design and remanufacturing activities, the second takes a mathematical approach toward modeling the impacts of environmental policy options on engineering design. By presenting both case studies in this chapter, we contrast the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches as they apply to sustainable design.

## 2. Selected incentives and inhibitors to sustainable design

### 2.1. Incentives for sustainable design

In the ideal situation, sustainable design decisions would spontaneously self-assemble in the marketplace. For this to happen, sustainable design would need to create more business value than could be captured by designs not considered

1 sustainable. But how can sustainable design add value for companies? Here we  
2 define three categories of value created by sustainable design: *adding positive*  
3 *value*, *eliminating negative value*, and *creating negative value for competitor firms*.  
4 Each of these categories is discussed below.

5

#### 2.1.1. Adding positive market value

7 *Inspiring innovation.* Sustainable design need not be considered an additional  
8 constraint for producers, especially if the sustainability perspective can encour-  
9 age the designer to search a previously unexplored region of the design space,  
10 leading to a breakthrough design. Examples of environmentally inspired break-  
11 through innovations include hybrid power train systems for automobiles, novel  
12 production facilities and methods (e.g. [6]), and advanced renewable electricity  
13 generation systems (e.g. [7]).

14 *Increasing market share or consumer willingness to pay.* According to [8], only  
15 about 15% of US consumers will consistently pay more (up to approximately  
16 22% more) for products perceived as being environmentally friendly. These  
17 customers tend to exist in niche markets, such as the organic food market,  
18 which has recently been growing by 25% per year in the US [9]. Similar ex-  
19 amples are currently difficult to find in North America.

20 *Development of new markets for environmentally conscious products.* This route  
21 to capturing environmental market value is exemplified by the discipline of  
22 industrial ecology [10], where resource cycling is investigated with the aim of  
23 converting waste from one product or process into an input for another in-  
24 dustrial activity. This simultaneously creates market opportunities while ad-  
25 dressing significant environmental problems. Toward this end, economically  
26 successful examples of recycling and remanufacturing are on the rise. In fact,  
27 one report has estimated that the US remanufacturing industry exceeds \$53  
28 billion per year in annual revenue and employs almost a half million individuals  
29 spanning 46 major product categories [11]. However, due care must be taken in  
30 evaluating the environmental characteristics of reused or remanufactured prod-  
31 ucts, since such products need not be environmentally superior to manufactur-  
32 ing new products (see Section 4).

33

#### 2.1.2. Removing negative market value

35 *Reducing production costs.* The pollution prevention literature is replete with  
36 examples describing how the redesign of manufacturing processes has inspired  
37 simultaneous reductions in production costs and pollution. Some of the most  
38 common examples exist in the Green Chemistry literature, where large cost  
39 savings in chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturing have been observed [12].  
40 As one example, Dow Chemical claims to have reduced emissions of targeted  
41 substances by 43% and the amount of targeted wastes by 37%, primarily  
through green chemistry innovations. In this case alone, a one-time investment

1 of \$3.1 million is now saving the company \$5.4 million per year [13]. Other  
2 profitable pollution prevention examples come from diverse areas such as  
3 membrane filtration recycling of industrial fluids [14,15], novel metal finishing  
4 technologies [16,17], and alternative integrated circuit production methods  
5 [18,19].

6 *Minimizing regulatory losses and avoiding litigation.* Pollution prevention in-  
7 vestments by US companies are small relative to investments made toward  
8 compliance with EPA regulations, which amounted to 2.1% of GDP in 1990  
9 (approx. \$241 billion in 2003 dollars) [20]. While it has been estimated that \$1  
10 invested in complying with EPA regulations returns \$10 to \$100 in terms of  
11 ecological and health benefits [21], it is widely accepted that the current US  
12 regulations fail to address pressing sustainable design issues such as excessive  
13 resource consumption (e.g. petroleum), the proliferation of toxics in the envi-  
14 ronment (e.g. the disposal of electronic waste), and the accumulation of green-  
15 house gases (e.g. CO<sub>2</sub>) in the atmosphere. With respect to each of these issues,  
16 the US is lagging in sustainable design policy drivers relative to Europe and  
17 Japan, both of which have been more progressive in eco-design-oriented leg-  
18 islation.

19 *Minimizing damage to public image.* Since the development of the Toxic Re-  
20 lease Inventory, public reporting of environmental emissions has driven many  
21 companies to reduce the amount of pollution they produce. Moreover, com-  
22 panies such as Exxon, Union Carbide, and Nike learned the hard way that  
23 public image related to environmental and corporate social responsibility (CSR)  
24 issues can directly affect profitability. Now such issues are a key component of  
25 public image management for large companies across a wide range of industries  
26 ranging from oil and chemical production, to consumer electronics, to the au-  
27 tomotive industry [8]. In fact, the need for accountability and visibility with  
28 respect to CSR issues has been an influential driving force behind corporate  
29 backing for initiatives such as the United Nations Global Compact program  
30 [22].

31 *2.1.3. Increasing negative market value for competitors*

32 *Strategic utilization of legislation for competitive advantage.* Sustainable design  
33 can create negative value for competitor organizations when it facilitates the  
34 development of government policies that favor organizations in a relatively  
35 strong sustainable design position. For example, at the time of debate over the  
36 Montreal Protocol, DuPont and ICI were major producers of ozone-destroying  
37 chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and held patents on costly CFC substitutes. While  
38 initially resistant, DuPont and ICI eventually supported the Montreal Protocol,  
39 which served to increase the value of the companies' proprietary technologies  
40 [23]. For similar reasons, it has been occasionally observed that larger com-  
41 panies, with a greater capacity to manage sustainability issues, are more sup-

1 portive of stringent health and environmental protection than smaller and/or  
environmentally weaker companies.

3 *Strategic utilization of product attributes for competitive advantage.* Changing  
the system of societal valuation by altering consumer perception and education  
5 regarding the sustainability attributes of products can create opportunities for  
profit. For instance, between January 2003 and January 2004, US sales of the  
7 Toyota Prius increased by 82% as consumers became more comfortable with  
the technology. Toyota not only profited from the increased sales, but also from  
9 the sales of hybrid technology patent rights to Ford and Nissan [24,25]. More  
generally, this concept is beginning to take hold as indicated by growing at-  
11 tention being paid to programs, such as the Eco-Label program in the EU [26]  
and the Swedish Environmental Products Declaration program [27], that are  
13 predicated on the notion that eco-friendly attributes can be used strategically by  
corporations to gain competitive advantage.

15

## 17 2.2. *Inhibitors to sustainable design*

19 Numerous factors can serve to overcome the incentives listed above, precluding  
the manifestation of sustainable design. While some barriers are technological,  
21 many of the greatest challenges are products of the economic system itself [28].  
Perhaps most importantly, sustainable design characteristically requires one  
23 firm or entity to pay its costs, while the benefits are widely shared. Since the  
designer's traditional stakeholders receive only a small fraction, and in some  
25 cases none, of the benefits of sustainable design, deciding who and how much to  
pay for sustainable design is a complex endeavor.

27 For example, private preferences that individual US consumers have for  
larger vehicle size and faster acceleration are well captured in the market, while  
29 public preferences that the same individuals may have for greater environmental  
protection, human health, and sustainability are not as easily captured. Since  
31 any individual is both a private player in the market and a member of society,  
inherent conflicts of interest exist that must be resolved in a fair and equitable  
33 manner. Incorporation of public value in the marketplace is usually achieved by  
direct incentives or regulations imposed by elected government officials (e.g.  
35 through tightened corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, with  
some government policies being more economically efficient than others (see  
37 Section 5). Naturally, such decisions extend beyond trade-offs between envi-  
ronmental protection and performance into issues of vehicle safety, production  
39 cost, dependence on foreign oil, and consumer preference. A committee of the  
National Academy of Sciences recently concluded that such trade-offs can only  
41 rightly reside with elected officials, and that the trade-offs themselves are in-  
herently difficult to quantify [29].

1 The example of automobile costs and benefits also makes clear that at points  
 2 of optimum economic efficiency, where total costs to society are minimized [28],  
 3 some pollution and resource consumption still exists. As suggested by Fig. 2a,  
 4 the benefits associated with sustainable design (e.g. reduced pollution) have  
 5 diminishing returns and increasing costs, such that when the point of minimum  
 6 total social costs is reached, dollars invested in pollution prevention are best  
 7 spent in other arenas where the marginal “benefit” to the environment (as  
 8 valued by society) exceeds the marginal costs to society. While quantifying the  
 9 costs of sustainable design is relatively straight forward, it is extremely difficult  
 10 to quantify the benefits. The undervaluation of benefits skews the optimum  
 11 point in Fig. 2 toward excess pollution. Quantifying the benefits of sustain-  
 12 ability has been a growing topic of interest in the field of natural resource and  
 13 environmental economics. While much progress has been made toward this end  
 14 in the field of contingent valuation and behavior methods, the limitations of the  
 15 methods are also now well established [28]. Moreover, even if the benefits could  
 16 be quantified precisely, the fact remains that while individuals pay the costs to  
 17 achieve sustainable design, they only receive a small fraction of the benefit [30].

18 Beyond trade-offs between public and private value, a number of other in-  
 19 hibitors to sustainable design are inherent to the US economic system. Such  
 20 inhibitors that have been discussed in the literature include: technology and  
 21 infrastructure cycle times that are either too fast (e.g. electronic equipment) or  
 22 too slow (e.g. manufacturing facilities) [15,31], emphasis on short-term profits  
 23 driven by quarterly reporting cycles [32], financial structures biased against  
 24 prevention-based investments [33], difficulties valuing non-financial assets [28],  
 25 financial discounting [34], and lost opportunity costs related to sustainability  
 26 investments [21]. While these are significant inhibitors to sustainable design,  
 27 they are not insurmountable. As recent EU directives are demonstrating, bar-




Fig. 2. (a) Pollution level at minimum total cost to society; (b) Undervaluation of pollution costs to society; (c) Resultant level of pollution observed at equilibrium when pollution costs are undervalued.

riers to sustainable design can be removed through government actions requiring businesses to adhere to design targets.

3

### 5 3. Targets, metrics, and strategies for sustainable design

7 The basic challenge of sustainable design can be summarized by the old business management adage: “if you do not measure it, you do not manage it.” Ultimately, governments bear the bulk of responsibility for managing sustainable design, and recent EU directives on RoHS, WEEE, and ELVs are a reflection of this responsibility. The EU approach to the management of sustainable design is conceptually similar to Fig. 3.

13 Figure 3 is an idealized approach to establishing quantitative sustainable design targets. The approach has a scientific component in that life cycle impact assessment is utilized for quantifying environmental impact magnitudes and uncertainties as inputs to a political decision-making process. Government then facilitates a discussion among stakeholders, industry, and the general public toward establishing sustainability objectives for society as a whole. It is these sustainability objectives for society that are to be met by establishing tangible design targets for specific products. Partitioning society’s overall objectives into sustainability targets for specific product categories is a total cost minimization problem (Fig. 2), which must account for performance, societal, economic, and environmental aspects of the products to be regulated. In the words of the

25

27

29

31

33

35

37

39

41




Fig. 3. Overview of high-level considerations in the development of sustainable design targets.

1 European Commission [4], simultaneous consideration of these factors is needed  
2 to assure that proposed sustainability targets do not result in “unacceptable loss  
3 of performance or utilities to customers”. Once established, a competitive en-  
4 vironment must be created where companies can pursue these sustainable design  
5 targets without fear of economic loss, as discussed in Section 5.

### 7 *3.1. Targets, metrics, and processes for sustainable design*

9 After product targets for sustainability are developed, specialized tools are  
10 needed at the product design level to predict the environmental stressor profile  
11 associated with different design options and to compare them with established  
12 targets. Such tools are particularly important since designers would suffer in  
13 their work if taxed by the need to generate stressor profiles from scratch for each  
14 design option. Existing sustainable design tools are used for the following pur-  
15 poses: (1) to create awareness about potential environmental impacts and possi-  
16 ble mitigating design strategies (e.g. checklists, guidelines, and case studies),  
17 (2) to provide the ability to rank or score the environmental performance of a  
18 product with respect to a limited number of environmental aspects (e.g. tool-  
19 boxes or advisor software tools), or (3) to perform a life cycle assessment  
(LCA).

21 The 2003 Sandestin Conference on Green Engineering, in addition to several  
22 other initiatives, has led to the development of useful principles that serve as a  
23 starting point for sustainable design [35,36]. From here, experience-based  
24 checklists and guidelines are often developed by companies, in most cases  
25 pointing out what not to do or suggesting how sustainability principles can be  
26 specifically utilized in a given application. Sustainable design guidelines and  
27 checklists are currently in widespread use throughout the consumer electronics,  
28 appliance, and automotive sectors of the economy (e.g. [37–39]). Some examples  
29 of guideline-based and case study resources tailored to specific life cycle stages  
30 include: material selection (e.g. [9,40]), assembly and disassembly (e.g. [41–43]),  
31 packaging and transport (e.g. [44]), recycling (e.g. [41,45]), and remanufacturing  
(e.g. [46–48]).

33 With the large number of guidelines found in typical checklists, it is almost  
34 certain that they will conflict, either with each other or with other performance  
35 attributes of the design. Typical conflicts may arise for example between mass  
36 and recyclability (e.g. using polymers versus metals in automotive applications),  
37 reusability and energy consumption (e.g. reusing an old refrigerator versus  
38 producing a new energy-efficient one), and between toxic chemical use and  
39 energy consumption (e.g. using mercury-containing compact fluorescent lamps  
40 versus incandescent lamps). Without a significant amount of experience or in-  
41 vestigation, and in the absence of product-specific sustainable design targets  
established by government, it is difficult to know, which guideline is the most

1 applicable to the current situation? For instance, it has been suggested that the  
2 EU directive on ELVs is currently biasing design options away from high-  
3 strength, low-weight composite materials, even though this may not be optimal  
4 from the life cycle design perspective.


5 To resolve conflicts between different sustainable design guidelines and to  
6 support innovation, a number of application-specific software tools have been  
7 developed. For instance, Motorola has developed a Green Design Advisor that  
8 stores information regarding component recyclability along with disassembly  
9 information in order to calculate the maximum degree to which products can be  
10 recycled [49]. A similar, but more general End-of-Life Design Advisor has also  
11 been developed at Stanford University [50]. Such software tools are now widely  
12 reported in the consumer electronics sector, where further developments have  
13 extended beyond end-of-life (EoL) considerations into the assessment of prod-  
14 uct and process materials toxicity and energy intensity (e.g. [51]).

15 Application-specific software tools such as these have both the advantage and  
16 disadvantage of requiring less information than a full life cycle assessment (for  
17 details on LCA methodology, see [52]). These tools allow design options to be  
18 quickly ranked and have demonstrated the ability to inspire respectable eco-  
19 design solutions [53]. On the other hand, they tend to lack the transparency of  
20 full LCAs and do not normally capture the environmental characteristics of the  
21 supply chain, which can be rather significant (e.g. in the case of integrated  
22 circuits). Application-specific software tools are also unlikely to account for  
23 situational factors in production, use, and disposal.

24 LCA-based methods are generally considered to provide the most compre-  
25 hensive and reliable product evaluations, although they are intended for existing  
26 activities and are therefore difficult to use in the creative design process. Since a  
27 properly conducted LCA can take several months to perform and cost tens of  
28 thousands of dollars even for a relatively simple product, a number of software  
29 tools have been developed that contain representative environmental emission  
30 and resource consumption quantities for typical engineering materials and  
31 manufacturing processes. Some of the most commonly used tools in the design  
32 of consumer products include EDIP LCV [54], Umberto [55], Simapro [56],  
33 TEAM [57], and GaBi [58]. These software packages generally contain three  
34 components: (1) open frameworks for life cycle inventory development, (2) a  
35 database of representative materials and process inventories, and (3) impact  
36 assessment frameworks for comparing design options.

37 While the inventory methods and data presentations are fairly similar across  
38 existing software packages, the impact assessment methodologies can vary sig-  
39 nificantly. As an example of these differences, the Eco-Indicator 99 (hierarchist)  
40 and EDIP methods were compared in the production of vegetable- versus pe-  
41 troleum-based metalworking fluids (MWFs) [59]. Resource consumption and

1 emissions associated with the production of both MWFs (2000 kg each) were  
 2 assembled into an inventory, which is provided in Fig. 4 in terms of aggregated  
 3 equivalent inventory categories. Figure 4 shows that the vegetable-based MWF  
 4 is superior in some categories, while the petroleum-based MWF is superior in  
 5 others. Since the goal of impact analysis is to resolve such differences, Fig. 5  
 6 shows the conversion of the inventory into single score environmental impact  
 7 results using the Eco-Indicator 99 and EDIP assessment methodologies. Ac-  
 8 cording to the Eco-Indicator 99 methodology, the bio-based MWF is superior  
 9 to the petroleum-based MWF, resulting in a score 60% lower, while the EDIP  
 10 analysis indicates that the petroleum-based MWF is superior, with a score 57%



21 Fig. 4. Comparison of life cycle inventories for the production of 2000 kg of vegetable versus  
 22 petroleum metalworking fluid. GWP: Global Warming Potential (10 kg CO<sub>2</sub>); ODP: Ozone De-  
 23pletion Potential (mg CFC11); A: Acidification (kg SO<sub>2</sub>); E: Energy Consumption (gigajoules);  
 24 SW: Solid Waste (kg); RC: Resource Consumption (100kg); CLU: Cultivated Land Use (1000  
 25 m<sup>2</sup>); P: Pesticides (g).

27

29


31

33

35

37

39




41 Fig. 5. A comparison of life cycle impact scoring results for the production of 2000 kg of veg-  
 42 etable versus petroleum metalworking fluid using the EDIP and Eco-Indicator 99 methodologies.

1 lower. Several categories comprise the key differences in the single score results  
3 from these two methods. In the EDIP analysis, pesticides used in the production  
5 of the vegetable-based MWF account for a significant portion of the final score  
7 due to their chronic and acute toxicity in water. It is the weighting of pesticide  
9 impacts (relative to the weighting of petroleum consumption) that shifts the  
11 final outcome from favoring bio-based MWFs to favoring petroleum-based  
13 MWFs when using the EDIP methodology. Utilization of impact scoring  
15 methods is therefore inconclusive in this application, and a decision based on  
17 any single scoring metric taken in isolation will only serve to propagate the  
19 assumptions used for characterization, normalization, and valuation in that  
21 method.

23 Such issues of interpretation, situationality, and appropriateness associated  
25 with environmental impact metrics complicate their use in design applications  
27 and run counter to their intention to allow the designer to utilize such metrics  
29 comfortably without developing expertise in environmental science. Such com-  
31 plications have also led to a provision in ISO 14042, which discourages the use  
of weighted impact scores for comparative assertions [60]. Therefore, there is a  
growing interest in utilizing the results of life cycle inventory data more directly  
in sustainable design activities. For instance, the Swedish Environmental Man-  
agement Council has promoted the development and distribution of standard-  
ized Environmental Product Declarations (EPDs) [27]. The EPD approach  
establishes product-specific requirements for selected product groups, as well as  
harmonized rules for LCA data collection, calculation, and presentation of the  
results. The EPD metrics are typically expressed within equivalent emission  
categories, similar to Fig. 4. EPD metrics typically include greenhouse gas  
emissions, ozone depletion potential, acid rain forming potential, etc. Taking  
such product declarations one step further, the EPA has suggested displaying  
such metrics in the form of a “nutrition label” (Fig. 6), which provides a fa-  
miliar aesthetic for consumers [61,62]. Figure 6 also illustrates how such an  
environmental inventory database could be used during design to evaluate  
evolving product concepts.

With respect to the establishment of quantitative sustainable design targets,  
the proposed Energy using Products (EuP) framework similarly distinguishes  
between actual product *environmental impacts* (e.g. climate change, forest deg-  
radation due to acid rain, ozone depletion, eutrophication, etc.) and product  
*environmental aspects*, which are stressors leading to those impacts (e.g. emis-  
sions of greenhouse gases, emissions of acid substances, emissions of substances  
disturbing the oxygen balance, emission of substances affecting stratospheric  
ozone, etc.) [4]. The proposal, which intends to harmonize environmental reg-  
ulation impacting the eco-design of energy using products across the EU, has  
stated a strong preference for the regulation of environmental aspects rather



15 Fig. 6. Conceptual use of environmental inventory databases to support design and consumer decisions.

17 than impacts. This is because the environmental aspects are more easily measured and controlled by the producer through design (whereas impacts depend on additional factors such as locality, time, and user choices), they can be measured consistently, and they are more transparent in interpretation. Also, for small and medium enterprises with fewer resources, the prediction of environmental impacts may not be feasible, while the measurement of environmental aspects is relatively straightforward.

### 27 3.2. Research opportunities related to establishing sustainable design targets

29 The goal of setting product-level targets and metrics for sustainable design through a process such as Fig. 3 presents a number of opportunities for quantitative research, especially in the areas of industrial ecology, LCA, economic impact analysis, and product performance modeling. With respect to LCA, inventory and impact profiles for different product categories are required, including their supply chains. For example, the inventory profile of the supply chain is particularly important for the case of integrated circuits that are utilized in consumer electronics [63]; however little product-specific information is available in the public domain regarding their environmental profile, as discussed in Section 4.

39 With respect to environmental impact assessment, it can be assumed that the selection of product-level environmental aspects to be targeted by EuP will be based on life cycle impact analyses performed across product sectors, as suggested by Fig. 3. Ongoing research towards establishing cause-and-effect relationships between environmental stressors and impacts, including geographic,

1 temporal, and statistical uncertainty information, will be particularly helpful in  
2 establishing these targets. Such issues have recently been raised in the context of  
3 developing the TRACI life cycle impact assessment method [64]. Quantitatively  
4 modeling the relationship between eco-design options, performance, cost, en-  
5 vironmental emissions, and resource consumption is an issue for engineering  
6 research. This begins with the quantitative prediction of environmental emis-  
7 sions and resource consumption as a function of design variables. As a simple  
8 example, consider the case of modeling the electricity consumption of a refrig-  
9 erator/freezer. Design variables include the volume of the refrigerator/freezer,  
10 its configuration (e.g. side-by-side, top over bottom, etc.), insulation type and  
11 thickness, compressor characteristics, evaporator/condenser characteristics, etc.  
12 Using basic heat transfer equations, material data (e.g. for insulation), and a  
13 limited number of calibration experiments to estimate the efficiency of heat  
14 rejection systems, it is relatively straightforward to predict the steady-state  
15 electricity consumption of different design options as they would be reported  
16 (for instance) on the EnergyGuide label utilized in the US. A modeling ap-  
17 proach is therefore useful for sustainable design, as it can permit the calculation  
18 of eco-efficiency (e.g. cost per unit of environmental emission reduction) asso-  
19 ciated with different design options.

20 Typically, the ability to model steady-state or standardized operational per-  
21 formance (e.g. EnergyGuide ratings) is sufficient for comparison of the relative  
22 environmental impacts of two designs. However, there are instances where the  
23 ability to model subtle and/or dynamic behavior of the product is also useful in  
24 the sustainable design process. For instance, the electricity consumption of a  
25 refrigerator/freezer may actually be up to 30% higher than predicted from the  
26 EnergyGuide label due to factors in use that would not be captured from  
27 steady-state engineering models [65]. In the case of the refrigerator/freezer,  
28 losses associated with opening and closing the door usually account for 5–10%  
29 of the total life cycle energy consumption of the refrigerator [65]. The ability to  
30 predict the effectiveness of design measures intending to reduce losses from the  
31 door opening and shutting would require models and assumptions related to the  
32 convective replacement of cold air in the refrigerator with warm, humid air from  
33 the kitchen, using non-steady-state calculations. While such advanced design  
34 modeling intending to reduce a 5–10% loss may not seem worthwhile, depend-  
35 ing on the product, such design efforts can reduce the overall environmental  
36 impact of the industry significantly. In fact, reducing energy consumption of all  
37 US refrigerators by just 1% would save approximately \$140 million dollars in  
38 energy costs and 1.5 million tons of carbon released to the atmosphere each year  
39 [66]. This carbon savings would exceed the average carbon emission per nation  
40 per year on the African continent [67]. The point is that modeling subtle, sec-  
41 ond-order impacts of design decisions on environmental performance can be

1 important for products with a relatively large environmental impact, and that  
2 are in widespread use.

3 The refrigerator case also demonstrates that while basic engineering modeling  
4 can be useful to reveal the *relative* environmental impact of one product versus  
5 another, rather advanced modeling may be needed to reveal the *absolute* impact  
6 of eco-design changes on the environment. These absolute impacts may have  
7 particular relevance to policymaking. For example, the EPA is currently con-  
8 sidering for the first time in two decades changing the way it reports standard  
9 automotive fuel efficiency to better reflect real-world performance [68]. In filing  
10 a petition to the EPA, the Bluewater Network (San Francisco, CA) argued that  
11 real-world gas mileage could be up to 1/3 lower than calculated using EPA's  
12 current test methods, even though these EPA estimates are already adjusted  
13 downward 22% for highway and 10% for city. They believe that "more ac-  
14 curate estimates of fuel economy would benefit both consumers and those in-  
15 volved in setting national energy policy" [69]. In short, while current fuel  
16 economy estimates provided by EPA are useful in selecting one vehicle over  
17 another on a relative scale, they may understate the actual magnitude of fuel  
18 consumption, and by consequence, they may also understate the benefits of  
19 sustainable design strategies for the automobile.

20 As discussed above, quantitative modeling of technological performance and  
21 emissions can allow design options to be compared with sustainable design  
22 targets at the product concept level. Once this capability is achieved, it is nec-  
23 essary for sustainable design to be seamlessly integrated into traditional design  
24 processes. For example, research in [70] describes the integration of environ-  
25 mental variables and targets into an engineering design process, using a quality  
26 function deployment approach. Within such a framework, it becomes possible  
27 to evaluate trade-offs between cost, functional performance, and environmental  
28 emissions. While it has been shown that such trade-offs can be established on a  
29 quantitative basis, a quantitative prediction of how sustainable design attributes  
30 might impact market performance is much harder to achieve in the analysis, and  
31 has not traditionally been considered as part of the design process.

32 Section 5 describes how mathematical models of consumer preference can be  
33 utilized within a decision-making framework to understand the relationship  
34 between sustainable design attributes and market performance. As a lead-up to  
35 this theoretical treatment, the next section describes empirical observations of  
36 sustainability attributes for the case of mobile phone production, use, and re-  
37 manufacturing. The case study emphasizes the complexity associated with si-  
38 multaneously balancing the economic, environmental, and societal implications  
39 of technological decisions, as well as the challenge of developing metrics for  
40 sustainable design.

41

#### 1 4. Case study: sustainability characteristics of mobile phones<sup>1</sup>

3 In 2002, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) sold over 420 million  
4 mobile telephones worldwide [71]. By 2005, it has been estimated that the  
5 number of discarded mobile phones will grow to more than 500 million [72],  
6 providing the stockpile necessary for the continued acceleration of mobile  
7 phone reuse and remanufacturing (or “re-marketing”) activities. Currently, third  
8 party re-marketers of mobile phones are making significant profits from resell-  
9 ing mobile phones in emerging markets. *But is remanufacturing of mobile phones  
10 consistent with the goals of sustainable design?*

11 This section describes the synthesis of empirical research related to the eco-  
12 nomic, environmental, and societal aspects of mobile phone production, use,  
13 reuse, and remanufacturing. The research on economic and societal aspects is  
14 largely literature based, while also including significant input from personal  
15 communications with parties currently engaged in remarketing mobile phones.  
16 The research on environmental aspects is largely LCA based, drawing from  
17 direct observation of mobile phone production and remanufacturing activities,  
18 as well as the literature.

##### 19 4.1. Economic characteristics of mobile phone reuse and remanufacturing

21 Mobile phone reuse and remanufacturing is currently economically attractive  
22 for various reasons. First, mobile phones in advanced markets are not purely  
23 technological objects but trendy or stylistic objects, leading to rapid disposal  
24 rates and a large supply pool of functionally reusable phones. Currently, only  
25 third-party “remarketers” are involved with the reuse-oriented treatment of  
26 obsolete phones, serving a market estimated to represent less than 1% of the  
27 annual OEM market share [74,75]. A scan of clearinghouse websites such as  
28 Ebay also indicates a large but informal activity in discarded mobile phone  
29 resale. According to a major mobile phone re-marketer in the US, 2003 sales of  
30 discarded mobile phones were expected to reach 4 million. For that company,  
31 processing of discarded mobile phones follows Fig. 7, with about a 90/10 dis-  
32 tribution between direct phone resale and remanufacturing operations for the  
33 over 300 phone models claimed to be profitable to resell.

35 At first, handset OEMs may consider third party remarketing as a threat to  
36 their market share. However, taking into account that the majority of remar-  
37 keted handset users are first-time customers, originally not able to afford to

---

39 <sup>1</sup>The results described in this section are derived from research conducted between the Technical  
40 University Berlin (TUB) and The University of Michigan (UM). The TUB participants included  
41 Professor Guenther Seliger, Ph.D. Candidates Bahadir Basdere and Marco Zettl, and M.S.  
graduate Aviroot Prasitnarit. The UM participants included Professor Steven J. Skerlos, Ph.D.  
pre-candidate W. Ross Morrow, and M.S. graduate Aaron Hula.




Fig. 7. Remanufacturing process flow diagram for the organizational re-marketing of discarded phones.

mobile telephony, but tending to change to new handsets later on, market shares could be expected to increase in medium-term. In fact it has been shown in [76] that flourishing second-hand sales can lead to accelerated sales of virgin product. Obviously, remanufacturing conducted by handset OEMs themselves carries the potential for increased process efficiency relative to the operations of third parties, due to reduced technical and logistical barriers. Especially for the

1 European market, where WEEE makes handset OEMs responsible for take-  
back and EoL treatment of phones by 2006, reuse and remanufacturing with  
3 OEM participation would have economic and technological advantages.

4 Driving the growth of remanufacturing operations is an increasing demand  
5 for mobile communication, especially in emerging markets (EMs). Despite their  
6 low purchasing power, sales of mobile phones (both new and reused) are grow-  
7 ing rapidly. At present, the majority of remarketed phones are distributed to  
8 EMs in Africa and South America. Distributing these mobile phones in devel-  
9 oped markets (DMs) would offer some potential for profits also, although the  
10 bulk of sales currently exist in EMs. Interestingly, it has been found that the  
11 attractiveness of the second-hand mobile phone market is rising in DMs, espe-  
12 cially in European countries such as Germany. Supported by recent changes  
13 in legislation, such as the new warranty law, which grants customers a 1- to 2-  
14 year warranty for used products purchased, there is impending competition of  
15 remarketed mobile phones with new ones, creating real, albeit slight, compe-  
16 tition for OEM market share.

17

#### 19 4.2. *Environmental characteristics of mobile phone production and reuse*

21 It is widely known that mobile phones have a potentially hazardous EoL profile:  
22 land filled or incinerated mobile phones create the potential for environmental  
23 release of heavy metals or halocarbon materials from batteries, printed wiring  
24 boards (PWBs), liquid crystal displays, plastic housings, wiring, etc. Over the  
25 past few years, OEMs have been particularly active in pursuing environmental  
26 improvements, which has resulted in a number of life cycle investigations related  
27 to mobile phones. For example, the Ericsson 2001 Sustainability Report claims  
28 that mobile phone production accounted for 10% of CO<sub>2</sub> releases for the com-  
29 pany that year [77]. In [78], an LCA of the Phillips Fizz and Genie phones  
30 suggests that the manufacturing stage accounts for 77–79% of the phones' life  
31 cycle environmental impact, as assessed using the Eco-Indicator 95 method.

32 Useful cross comparisons of publicly reported mobile phone LCAs such as  
33 these are not possible, not only due to different reporting units, but also due to  
34 the use of differing LCA boundary scopes, inventory categories, or use of ag-  
35 gregated impact metrics. For instance, while the Ericsson life cycle assessment  
36 included overhead activities such as travel and commuting, they did not include  
37 integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing [77]. IC manufacturing was explicitly in-  
38 cluded in the Philips study [78]. For mobile phones, such scope variations can be  
39 of particular importance, especially with respect to the inclusion of IC com-  
40 ponents. This is due to the large quantity of energy and emissions necessary to  
41 produce ICs [63], as well as the number of ICs utilized per phone (which can  
exceed 40).

#### 1 4.2.1. Emissions inventory: mobile phone production

Prasitnarit (2003) describes an LCA of a mobile phone with the scope definition shown in Fig. 8. Total emissions and energy use over material acquisition, manufacturing, use, and EoL stages were estimated using a mixture of database information (primarily for material acquisition and EoL phases) and direct process measurement (primarily for manufacturing and use phases). The life cycle inventory of over 400 materials was included in the material acquisition phase. Only a small number of low concentration metals and chemicals in the phone were not included [79]. In the investigation, the manufacturing process energy and emissions were directly measured. This included manufacturing of the display PWB, the main PWB, chip shooting and placing, reflow, screen printing, assembly, and testing. IC-related energy and emissions were not directly measured, but were taken from the literature.




Fig. 8. Boundaries considered in mobile phone life cycle inventory of [79].

1 The results of the investigation showed that mobile phone production ac-  
 3 counts for almost all of the non-energy-related emissions in the life cycle. It was  
 5 also found that the ICs, display module, and main PWB accounted for nearly  
 7 three-quarters of the energy consumed in the production phase. Not including  
 IC manufacturing, the production stage itself consumed approximately 250 MJ  
 of energy, which was over two times the amount of energy consumed by the  
 normal use of the mobile phone estimated over 2 years.


#### 9 4.2.2. Emissions inventory: mobile phone use and remanufacturing

11 *Use Phase.* In [80], a model was developed to help understand the effect of  
 13 mobile phone user habits on energy consumption. The model considered ef-  
 15 ficiency losses during charging, as well as in call and standby power consump-  
 17 tion. Table 1 lists the three representative use scenarios that were considered. As  
 19 observed in Fig. 9, significant variation in energy consumption (expressed as  
 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in different electricity grid situations) arises due to variation in  
 user behavior. Although this variation is large, even in the worst case the use  
 phase energy consumption per year is below 20% of the energy consumed  
 during phone production (without including ICs). Further, a “typical” charger

Table 1

Profiles of charger use as modeled in [80]

Profile	Charger Use Behavior
1	Charger always left in wall socket
2	Charger left in the socket while phone is charging overnight; removed during day
3	Charger is left in socket only for amount of time needed to recharge the battery



41 Fig. 9. CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per year for reused phone with different charging and electricity grid profiles.

1 profile (e.g. Profile #2) over 1 year has the same energy consumption as the  
 2 production of only six of the “typical” ICs investigated in [73]. For reference,  
 3 the phone considered in [78] had ~ 40 ICs.

4 *Remanufacturing and redistribution.* Apart from a relatively small quantity of  
 5 emissions from cleaning operations and packaging, emissions from remanufac-  
 6 turing processes and distribution are almost entirely associated with energy  
 7 consumption associated with the use of electricity. In the remanufacturing op-  
 8 erations listed in Fig. 7, the top three energy consuming activities are: sorting  
 9 (driving a conveyor belt), battery testing and reconditioning (e.g. using a Cad-  
 10 ex<sup>®</sup> C7000 series analyzer), and software updating (standard PC usage). The  
 11 total amount of process energy consumption per remanufactured phone has  
 12 been estimated to be between 0.8 and 1.6 MJ, with the variation almost com-  
 13 pletely dependent on the method and amount of battery testing and recondi-  
 14 tioning, as over 90% of energy consumption during remanufacturing occurs in  
 15 the testing, charging, and reconditioning of batteries [31].

16 After remanufacturing, shipping the restored mobile phones to emerging  
 17 markets is typically accomplished by air transport owing to large distances  
 18 (ranging from 5000 to 13,000 km), relatively small volumes, and the urgency of  
 19 transactions (due to volatility in the second-hand market). Especially for re-  
 20 manufacturing, this air transportation represents a dominant energy consump-  
 21 tion and emissions activity. For example, the estimates presented in Table 2 are  
 22 based on an assumed mobile phone mass of 100 g, and a CO<sub>2</sub> release of 1110 g/  
 23 ton \*km for air travel according to [81]. It is seen that distribution to EMs can  
 24 release an amount of CO<sub>2</sub> that is at least an order of magnitude higher than the  
 25 remanufacturing process, but still insignificant relative to the production phase.

26 Once a mobile phone is resold, the environmental impact of its “second life”  
 27 is likely to be greater than the impact of its “first life”. In EMs such as those in  
 28 South America, Central Asia, and Africa, there is not typically an infrastructure  
 29 to properly handle toxic battery and circuit board materials that remain after  
 30 the phones are discarded. Moreover, since remanufactured batteries generally  
 31 hold less charge than new batteries (80–100% of original capacity), higher en-  
 32 ergy consumption per unit service will occur in the second life. The associated  
 33 environmental emissions may be compounded further where power generation

35 Table 2  
 36 CO<sub>2</sub> release for air transportation between New York and target markets overseas [12]

EM	Distance	CO <sub>2</sub> Released	Percent of Remfg.	Equivalent Use Duration
	(km)	(g)	(%)	(days)
Bombay	12,536	1400	1140	31
Rio de Janeiro	7757	900	740	360


1 and distribution systems of EMs are relatively inefficient and/or more depend-  
 2 ent on polluting energy-generation technologies than in DMs.

3 Consideration of electricity grid technology leads to Fig. 9, which highlights  
 4 such situational factors among different use-profiles of remanufactured mobile  
 5 phones (transmission line losses not included in the analysis). For instance, Fig.  
 6 9 shows that India and China are likely to have among the highest CO<sub>2</sub> emis-  
 7 sions for remanufactured mobile phones on a per day basis. Brazil, on the other  
 8 hand, has the lowest proportion of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions since most of its electricity is  
 9 generated from hydroelectric sources. For Brazil, reduced environmental impacts  
 10 due to less CO<sub>2</sub> release are traded off against the environmental impacts  
 11 associated with the use of large amounts of hydroelectric power.

12 Another situational issue to be considered with the diffusion of remanufac-  
 13 tured mobile phones to EMs is the heightened pressure that this creates for base  
 14 stations and a supply chain for both auxiliary and replacement components.  
 15 Compared to a remanufactured mobile phone sold in a market closer to pur-  
 16 chase saturation, a mobile phone sold in an EM would create a disproportion-  
 17 ately higher demand for new base stations and supply chains. In other words, a  
 18 mobile phone in a DM generally creates less “infrastructure demand” than one  
 19 in an EM.

#### 21 4.2.3. Emissions inventory: summary

22 Fig. 10a illustrates a summary inventory profile for the mobile phone of [79],  
 23 highlighting relative contributions of each life cycle stage. Fig. 10b compares the  
 24 production, use, and EoL energy consumption for two of these phones under  
 25 the following three scenarios: (1) both phones are manufactured and disposed at  
 26 landfill without recycling or remanufacturing, (2) both phones are manufac-  
 27 tured and completely recycled (even though 100% recycling is neither econom-



37 Fig. 10. (a) Relative contribution of life cycle stages for the mobile phone in [78]. E: energy  
 38 consumption (MJ); GG: greenhouse gas emissions (kg CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent); EA: emissions to air (kg  
 39 dichlorobenzene [DCB] equivalent); EW: emissions to water (kg DCB equivalent); A: total acid-  
 40 ification potential (kg SO<sub>2</sub> equivalent); PO: total photochemical oxidant creation potential (kg  
 41 ethane equivalent); HT: human toxicity potential (kg DCB equivalent). (b) Energy consumption  
 comparison for two mobile phones under single use and disposal (SU), recycling (RC), and  
 remanufacturing (RM) scenarios.

1 ically nor technically feasible), and (3) one phone is manufactured as new, and  
2 the other identical phone is restored as new from a discarded phone of the same  
3 model. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is evident from Fig. 10b that a remanufac-  
4 turing pathway has by far the least energy consumption. This is because the  
5 remanufacturing pathway, unlike recycling, avoids repeating manufacturing  
6 steps with characteristically high-energy consumption and environmental emis-  
7 sions.

8 While these results are encouraging for remanufacturing, it should be noted  
9 that reduced environmental impact is only achieved if the remanufactured  
10 phone replaces the production of a new one. However, the vast majority of  
11 remanufactured mobile phone customers are first-time users in EMs, for whom  
12 the low cost of the remanufactured mobile phones serves as a conduit for entry  
13 into the market. Consequently, new use-phase, transportation, and EoL envi-  
14 ronmental impacts are created by remanufacturing where they did not exist  
15 before, adding to the overall environmental impact of the mobile phone indus-  
16 try. *The mobile phone example therefore highlights a disconnect between realizing*  
17 *the narrow goal of remanufacturing, and achieving the broader goal of lowering*  
18 *global environmental impact in the context of sustainability.* Currently, in the case  
19 of mobile phones, remanufacturing is creating new users and is increasing envi-  
20 ronmental impact without significantly reducing the production of new  
21 phones. Since the environmental impact of the cell phone industry is currently  
22 increasing due to the cell phone remanufacturing activity, it must be asked  
23 whether cell phone remanufacturing is consistent with the goals of sustainable  
24 design. For this reason, the societal dimension of cell phone remanufacturing is  
25 explored in Section 4.3.

#### 27 4.3. Societal characteristics of mobile phone use in ems

28 The importance of telephony as a requisite for economic development is well  
29 established. In fact, telephony has been described as a basic human need, which  
30 is implied by the fact that the function of the telephone (two-way conversation  
31 over distance) has not changed over the past 100 years [82]. In addition, it is  
32 widely recognized that modern economic development can only occur if there is  
33 a communications infrastructure to support it. Telecommunication is a critical  
34 part of a modern economy, along with a steady supply of electricity to power  
35 factories, good roads, rail systems, ports, and a steady financial system that can  
36 support the supply chain [83]. For this reason, and due to the close relationship  
37 between telecommunications, information systems, democracy, education, and  
38 job creation, the United Nations has placed a high priority on expanding com-  
39 munications systems within the poorest countries, such as those in Africa [84].  
40 Although 80% of mobile phones are currently found in the more developed  
41 nations, the 1990s saw the number of subscribers in EMs grow faster than

1 anywhere else [84]. The rapid expansion of mobile phone use in EMs is largely  
2 due to the fact that a mobile phone network can be up and running much more  
3 quickly and inexpensively than a fixed one.

#### 5 4.3.1. *Anecdotal evidence of mobile phone benefits in ems*

6 There exist a number of examples, which highlight the role of mobile phones in  
7 improving lives for individuals living in EMs. For example, groups of small  
8 farmers in remote areas of Côte d'Ivoire share mobile phones so that they can  
9 follow hourly fluctuations in coffee and cocoa prices. This means that they can  
10 choose the moment to sell their crops when world prices are most advantageous  
11 to them. A few years ago, they could only have found out about market trends  
12 by applying to an office in the capital, Abidjan. Even then their deal making was  
13 based on information from buyers, which was not always reliable [85].


14 A study conducted by Bayes (2001) observed the effects of mobile phones on  
15 rural villages in Bangladesh [86]. Bayes' study found that the introduction of  
16 mobile phone services led to improved law enforcement, communication during  
17 natural disasters, and the ability to call doctors for health-related information.  
18 In addition, the phones helped families keep in touch with relatives living far  
19 away, strengthening family bonds. The study also described positive effects of  
20 mobile phones with respect to the empowerment of women, and suggested that  
21 the services from mobile phones can most greatly benefit poor members of the  
22 community. These examples, while not discussing the potential negative impacts  
23 of mobile phones on developing societies, provide some of the context and  
24 justification for their rapid diffusion into developing countries.

25

#### 26 4.3.2. *Quantitative metrics of mobile phone societal impacts*

27 Although the incorporation of economic and environmental metrics with met-  
28 rics for societal development has been recognized as a critical need in sustain-  
29 ability evaluation and life cycle assessment [87,88], quantifying the benefits of  
30 expanding mobile phone utilization in EMs remains difficult. Thus far, societal  
31 indicators have not been incorporated into decision-making frameworks be-  
32 cause, even more so than environmental metrics, societal impact metrics are  
33 subjective, confounded with other causal variables, and situation-dependent  
34 [88]. However, it is also generally agreed that subjective indicators are needed in  
35 societal policymaking because objective indicators only provide part of the in-  
36 formation needed to understand the decision context [89].

37 To quantify if and to what extent expanded mobile phone use might foster  
38 accelerated societal development, one can begin by analyzing the statistics of the  
39 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The annual UNDP Human  
40 Development Report provides measurements of various indicators of progress  
41 in specific categories under six main areas. Under the category of "Technology:  
Diffusion and Creation" there are estimates of the number of fixed telephone



11 Fig. 11. (a) Human Development Index (HDI) vs. number of mobile/fixed line phones per 1000  
 13 people based on data from [90]. (b) Semi-log plot of HDI versus total teledensity based on [89].

15 lines and mobile subscribers per 1000 people for numerous countries that can be  
 17 cross-compared with the human development index (HDI) reported by the  
 19 UNDP. Such an analysis shows that countries rated with a “high” HDI (e.g.  
 21 Sweden, USA, Singapore) had an average of 556 fixed telephone lines and 487  
 23 mobile users per 1000 people, while countries with a “low” HDI (e.g. Nigeria,  
 25 Ethiopia, Bangladesh) had an average of eight telephone lines and three mobile  
 27 users per 1000 people. The effect of telephony on development is not explored in  
 29 the report, but the correlation between telephone access and development can  
 be clearly seen [90].

23 A plot of HDI versus number of fixed and mobile phone users per 1000  
 25 people is shown in Fig. 11 [90]. A logarithmic-type relationship can be seen:  
 27 lower teledensity exists in countries with lower HDIs, and higher teledensities in  
 29 countries with higher HDIs. The slope of this curve decreases significantly as  
 teledensity increases. Put simply, expanding phone access in less developed  
 countries has a higher positive correlation with HDI than expanding phone  
 access in more developed countries, which has little correlation with HDI.

### 31 4.3.3. *Situational differences in the ethics of pollution*

33 For cases such as cell telephone remanufacturing where net environmental im-  
 35 pact is increasing, but where societal development benefits exist, it seems ap-  
 37 propriate to factor-in the potential for increased HDI (or other similar-  
 39 intending metrics) in the context evaluating sustainability. For instance, the  
 41 global warming potential (GWP) associated with providing 50 MJ of electricity  
 to power a mobile phone in an EM for a year might be compared with the  
 equivalent GWP of an activity that might be less correlated with increasing HDI  
 (e.g. watching a high-end, 190 W flat screen television for 73 h). Is one GWP  
 emission more appropriate or acceptable than the other? If so, how can such  
 ethical metrics be built into LCA frameworks? Moreover, what are the ethical  
 implications of making discarded mobile phones available to countries not able

1 to handle the waste, and who have not been offered technical assistance or  
2 financial aid in this regard?

3 As yet, the state of the art is unprepared to discuss such questions quanti-  
4 tatively in the context of sustainable engineering. Discussion of such issues has  
5 recently begun to appear in the literature (e.g. [91]), and will be important to  
6 consider with respect to decision-making for sustainable development. Correl-  
7 ative analysis between HDI and expanded use and consumption can help in  
8 such analyses, but naturally these analyses need to be accompanied by research  
9 aimed at understanding if such correlations between expanded access to te-  
10 lephony (e.g. through expansion of mobile phone use) and HDI are truly causal  
11 in nature.

12 In summary, with respect to the balance of sustainability factors, the recent  
13 growth of mobile phone reuse and remanufacturing is a case where the eco-  
14 nomic and societal benefits are positive, while the short-term environmental  
15 impact is negative due to increased energy consumption and the potential for  
16 toxics release at EoL associated with the currently observed flux of second-hand  
17 mobile phones toward developing countries. Although growing concern over  
18 the latter issue is being voiced in the press [72], it remains to be seen whether  
19 developed countries exporting discarded electronics will take steps to limit the  
20 EoL impact of electronic waste in developing countries. Even if such action were  
21 to be taken, a new discussion would begin regarding how to minimize toxics  
22 release from electronic waste at minimum cost to contributing governments and  
23 international organizations. In short, the question would turn to one of max-  
24 imizing the “eco-efficiency” of the environmentally targeted intervention.

25

27

## 28 **5. Case study: eco -efficiency, public policy, and vehicle design<sup>2</sup>**

29

30 The core concept of eco-efficiency is to maximize the societal and environmental  
31 benefits of a design decision or policy, while minimizing its economic cost and  
32 negative impact on individual consumer preferences. The need for developing  
33 eco-efficient government policies arises when (1) the economic drivers described  
34 in Section 2 are not strong enough to achieve the self-assembly of environ-  
35 mentally conscious actions in the marketplace (e.g. environmentally conscious  
36 disposal of electronic waste), or (2) if a societal decision-making process such as  
37 described in Section 3 concludes that the environmental or societal conse-  
38 quences of a particular activity are too large to be considered acceptable (e.g.

39

40 <sup>2</sup>This section summarizes research conducted as part of the Antilium project (<http://antilium.umich.edu>) at The University of Michigan. The research was performed by Postdoctoral  
41 Research Fellow Jeremy Michalek and Professors Panos Y. Papalambros and Steven J. Skerlos.  
The research is described in detail in Michalek et al., 2004 [93].

1 the consumption of gasoline by automobiles). In this section, we consider two  
2 basic questions related to the eco-efficiency of government policies: (1) What are  
3 the impacts of environmentally conscious policy alternatives on engineering  
4 design and business decisions, and (2) how can the relative eco-efficiencies of  
5 sustainable design policies be quantified? To highlight how such questions can  
6 be addressed from a mathematical modeling perspective, we consider the case of  
7 automotive fuel economy and emissions.


8 In recent years, the environmental burden created by automotive emissions  
9 has been increasing in the US due to falling average fuel economy and an  
10 increase in total vehicle miles traveled [92]. Reversing this trend will require a  
11 balance between reducing vehicle emissions, meeting consumer mobility de-  
12 mands and preferences, and minimizing added vehicle costs (since alternatives  
13 to gasoline engines, such as diesel, hybrid, fuel cell, and electric systems are  
14 currently more expensive to manufacture than traditional gasoline systems).  
15 Government policies can provide incentives to bring these alternative choices  
16 into the market, but the problem of quantifying the impact of specific govern-  
17 ment policies on engineering design and business decisions is as yet not well  
18 studied.

19 In the development by Michalek et al. [93] that is summarized in this section,  
20 the paradigm of Fig. 12 is applied to quantify the impact of fuel economy and  
21 emission policies on design decisions of competing automotive companies. The  
22 links between engineering and business decisions, including models of cost and  
23 demand, are at the core of the investigation. Each of these considerations is  
24 represented by a separate analysis model, and their interactions are captured  
25 within an integrated design decision model. By performing a series of optimi-  
26 zation routines with respect to the local perspective of each producer, one can  
27 explore the effects that vehicle emission policies have on consumers, manufac-  
28 turers, and the design decisions that a particular policy encourages.

29 Section 5.1 provides a conceptual overview of a basic modeling paradigm,  
30 which intends to capture all of these factors within the context of a market  
31 simulation. Section 5.2 discusses specific mathematical models that were devel-  
32 oped to analyze the impact of environmental policies on design decisions, with  
33 particular attention paid to the strengths and weaknesses of individual models  
34 used in the market simulation. Section 5.3 reviews the results of the modeling  
35 approach and provides a discussion regarding the calculation of eco-efficiency.

### 37 *5.1. Quantitative models of economic and environmental design characteristics*

38 Fig. 12 illustrates the interplay of engineering design decisions, cost drivers,  
39 demand forces, and government policy in determining the environmental impact  
40 of a consumer product. Ultimately, the engineering design determines the over-  
41 all cost and environmental characteristics of the product, as well as the extent to



27 Fig. 12. Conceptual model of the interaction between producer, consumer, and public policy  
29 impact.

31 which consumers demand the product. In addition, business decisions such as  
33 price and production volume have a major influence on both the costs and  
35 revenue generated by a specific design. Government policy, as mentioned in  
37 Section 3, also plays a role in influencing design by restricting the feasible space  
39 of options and by changing producer cost structures through penalties and  
41 incentives.

37 Consumer preference is the key driver for the revenue generated by a specific  
39 design, while also playing a major role in determining environmental impact  
41 through the way in which products are used. In the automobile case, variability  
in environmental impact caused by consumers arises mostly due to differences  
in fuel economy during highway versus city driving, as well as distances traveled

1 led. Auxiliary functions such as the use of air conditioning also have a sub-  
2 stantial, but situational, influence on automotive fuel consumption and emis-  
3 sions.

4 Although Fig. 12 is intuitive and conceptually simple, the development of a  
5 meaningful model for the system at an appropriate level of detail is complex.  
6 For some of the sub-models, such as the calculation of manufacturing cost, the  
7 model forms can be simple, but necessary data to support them may be difficult  
8 to obtain. In other cases, such as the modeling of demand, commonly utilized  
9 model forms may be straightforward, yet lacking of a cause-and-effect meaning,  
10 particularly when based on observed choice data from the market. Moreover,  
11 preference for a specific product is not only a function of performance char-  
12 acteristics, which vary in relative importance to consumers over time, but also of  
13 price, which is perceived differently as a function of time-dependent economic  
14 conditions. Also, data for demand models as a function of the product char-  
15 acteristics relevant for a specific study can be difficult to find and expensive to  
16 collect, and due to the dynamics of consumer preference as a social phenom-  
17 enon, such models are difficult to validate in the traditional scientific sense,  
18 since the market cannot be manipulated in the context of a controlled exper-  
19 iment. In the case of environmental and health impact, inventory data may be  
20 lacking, and the impacts of specific factors may be so confounded by other  
21 variables that casual relationships may require decades to establish.

22 Predicting vehicle performance characteristics such as acceleration, fuel econ-  
23 omy, and emissions as a function of detailed vehicle design decisions is also  
24 challenging. Vehicle performance must be considered during sustainable design,  
25 as it is a key parameter in influencing consumer preference that, in turn, deter-  
26 mines which products are bought and how they are used. While the complex  
27 chemistry of combustion can be modeled from fundamental scientific principles,  
28 such models are too complicated to be run over a full driving cycle and may not  
29 be able to capture heterogeneities in temperature, pressure, and airflow in the  
30 engine that have a major influence on the quantity and nature of vehicle emis-  
31 sions. Empirical measurements of automotive emissions are widely available,  
32 but are only useful to engineering design when put into a model context as a  
33 function of design variables.

34 The next section describes how the separate analysis models of Fig. 12 can be  
35 developed and integrated within the context of game theory toward an analysis  
36 of how government fuel economy policies impact engineering design decisions in  
37 a competitive market. We consider that each producing firm chooses engineer-  
38 ing design decisions, production volume, and selling price for each vehicle in its  
39 product line with the aim of maximizing profit. We also consider that the  
40 engineering design decisions of each producer not only impact the decisions of  
41 competitors, but the decisions of competitors also impact the decisions of the

1 producer. Furthermore, government penalties are imposed on specific vehicles  
 2 proportional to the quantity of emissions produced or fuel economy attained.  
 3 Individual consumers in the market choose among alternatives by maximizing  
 4 benefit (utility) to themselves, considering their own preferences as captured in  
 5 the model. By considering the self-interested decisions of producers and con-  
 6 sumers in the market, based upon real observations of the marketplace, the  
 7 potential success of environmentally conscious policymaking can be evaluated.

## 9 5.2. Overview of specific analysis models and optimization framework

### 11 5.2.1. Profit model

12 To start, each producer  $k$  decides on a set of products  $\mathcal{J}_k$  to produce including  
 13 design decisions, prices, and production volumes. Specification of the design  
 14 topology  $\tau_j$  (engine type, diesel or gasoline) and design variables  $\mathbf{x}_j$  (engine size  
 15 and final drive ratio) determine the product characteristics  $\mathbf{z}_j$  (fuel consumption  
 16 and acceleration) that are observed by the consumer. Vehicle topology  $\tau_j$ , design  
 17 variables  $\mathbf{x}_j$ , and production volume  $V_j$  of each product in  $\mathcal{J}_k$  together deter-  
 18 mine the total cost  $c_k$  to producer  $k$ . Consumers make purchasing choices  
 19 among the set of all products  $\mathcal{J} = \cup_k \mathcal{J}_k$  based on the product characteristics  $\mathbf{z}_j$   
 20 and price  $p_j$  of each product, resulting in an overall demand  $q_j^r$  for each product  
 21  $j$  calculated by the demand model. Each producer  $k$  attempts to maximize its  
 22 profit  $\Pi_k$  (defined as revenue minus cost) by making the best possible design,  
 23 pricing, and production decisions according to Eq. 1:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{25 maximize } \Pi_k = \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_k} q_j p_j \right) - c_k \\
 & \text{27 with respect to } \left\{ \tau_j, \mathbf{x}_j, p_j \right\} \forall j \in \mathcal{J}_k \quad (1) \\
 & \text{29 subject to engineering constraints.}
 \end{aligned}$$

31

### 33 5.2.2. Engineering performance model

34 In the Michalek et al. (2004) study, the scope is limited to the small vehicle  
 35 market segment and the following variables: (1) engine type  $\tau$ , either a gasoline  
 36 or diesel, (2) engine size  $x_1$ , taken as a scaling of the baseline engine size ranging  
 37 from 0.75 to 1.50, and (3) the final drive ratio  $x_2$ , taken in the range of 0.2–1.3.  
 38 Each producer in the market selects the engine type, the engine size, and the  
 39 final drive ratio on the basis of profit maximization. Using the engineering  
 40 model ADVISOR [94], these producer decisions are mapped to product char-  
 41 acteristics  $\mathbf{z}$ , upon which consumer purchasing decisions are based. In this case,  
 it is assumed that the relevant performance criteria  $\mathbf{z}$  consist of the vehicle gas

1 mileage  $z_1$  (in mpg) and the time for the vehicle to accelerate from 0 to 60 mph  
 2  $z_2$  (in seconds). It is also assumed that vehicles only differ by engine design:  
 3 specifically, the default small car vehicle parameters in ADVISOR are used in  
 4 all simulations (based on the 1994 Saturn SL1), and only the engine variables  $\{\tau,$   
 5  $x_1, x_2\}$  are changed. The EPA Federal Test Procedure (FTP-75) driving cycle is  
 6 used to compute the performance and fuel economy characteristics for all ve-  
 7 hicle simulations.

### 9 5.2.3. Consumer demand model

10 The consumer demand model is based on discrete choice analysis (DCA), which  
 11 presumes that consumers make purchasing decisions on the basis of the *utility*  
 12 value of each product option. Utility  $u$  is measured in terms of an observable  
 13 deterministic component  $v$ , which is taken to be a function of the product  
 14 characteristics  $\{z_1, z_2\}$ , and a stochastic error component  $\varepsilon$ . The probability  $P_j$   
 15 of choosing a particular product  $j$  from the set  $\mathcal{J}$  is calculated as the probability  
 16 that product  $j$  has a higher utility value than all alternatives,

$$17 \quad p_j = \Pr(v_j + \varepsilon_j \geq v_{j'} + \varepsilon_{j'}; \forall j' \in \mathcal{J}). \quad (2)$$

18 Various probabilistic choice models follow the DCA approach, including the  
 19 widely used logit [95] and probit [96] models. The logit model, which was origi-  
 20 nally developed by McFadden to study transportation choices, is utilized here  
 21 and has been used extensively in the marketing literature. Only recently the logit  
 22 models have begun to be applied to engineering design problems [97].

23 The logit model assumes that the unobserved error component of utility  $\varepsilon$  is  
 24 independently and identically distributed for each alternative, and that  $\varepsilon$  follows  
 25 the double exponential distribution (i.e.  $\Pr[\varepsilon < \alpha] = \exp[-\exp(-\alpha)]$ ). Assuming the  
 26 double exponential distribution for  $\varepsilon$  terms in Eq. (2), the probability  $P_j$  of  
 27 choosing alternative  $j$  from the set  $\mathcal{J}$  takes the form,

$$28 \quad p_j = \frac{e^{-v_j}}{\sum_{j' \in \mathcal{J}} e^{v_{j'}}}, \quad (3)$$

29 where each utility function  $v_j$  depends on the characteristics  $\mathbf{z}_j$  and the price  $p_j$   
 30 of design  $j$ . Given a functional form for  $v_j(\mathbf{z}_j, p_j)$  and observed choice data, a  
 31 model fitting procedure is performed to arrive at  $v_j(\mathbf{z}_j, p_j)$ . Given the empirical  
 32 nature of  $v_j(\mathbf{z}_j, p_j)$ , the model must be developed and interpreted carefully.

33 In Michalek et al. (2004) investigation, the utility model developed by Boyd  
 34 and Mellman is used [98]. This model, originally developed using vehicle pur-  
 35 chase data from 1977, was found to be the best logit model available in the  
 36 public literature that included engineering design variables and an appropriate  
 37 level of detail for the study. Although several other variables are included in the  
 38 demand model (e.g. vehicle style, noise, and reliability), these variables are  
 39  
 40  
 41

1 assumed equal across vehicles in the Michalek et al. (2004) investigation [93].  
 The utility equation developed by Boyd and Mellman is

$$3 \quad v_j = \beta_1 p_j + \beta_2 \left( \frac{100}{z_{1j}} \right) + \beta_3 \left( \frac{60}{z_{2j}} \right), \quad (4)$$

5 where  $\beta_1 = -2.86 \times 10^{-4}$ ,  $\beta_2 = -0.339$ ,  $\beta_3 = 0.375$ ,  $p_j$  is the price of vehicle  $j$ ,  
 7  $z_{1j}$  is the gas mileage of vehicle  $j$  in mpg, and  $z_{2j}$  is the 0–60 mph acceleration  
 time of vehicle  $j$  in seconds [98].

9 In [92], Eq. (4) is applied to the small car sub-market (assumed population  $s$   
 to be 1.57 million people based on [99]), with the recognition that this could  
 11 introduce error since the equation was developed based on the entire car mar-  
 ket. Using the logit model, the demand  $q_j$  for product  $j$  is

$$13 \quad q_j = sP_j = s \frac{e^{-v_j}}{\sum_{j' \in \mathcal{J}} e^{-v_{j'}}}, \quad (5)$$

17 where  $v_j$  is defined by Eq. (4).

While the Boyd and Mellman demand model is adequate for a preliminary  
 19 analysis, it does introduce several sources of error that highlight the need for  
 additional research:

21 The model is fit to purchase data from 1977 to 1978.

The model utilizes purchase data only: Consumers who choose not to pur-  
 23 chase vehicles were not studied. Thus, the model can only predict *which* vehicles  
 consumers will purchase, not *whether* they will purchase. The size of the pur-  
 25 chasing population is treated as fixed, independent of vehicle prices (i.e. there is  
 no outside good).

27 The model is an aggregate model, and therefore it does not account for  
 different segments or consumer groups.

29 The use of the logit model carries with it a property called *independence from*  
*irrelevant alternatives* (IIA), which implies that as one product's market share  
 31 increases, the shares of all competitors are reduced in equal proportion [100].  
 For example, a model with the IIA property might predict that BMW competes  
 33 as equally with Mercedes as with Chevrolet. In reality, different vehicles attract  
 different kinds of consumers, and competition is not equal. In this investigation,  
 35 predictive limitations of the IIA property were mitigated since the model is  
 applied only to the small car market (a relatively homogeneous market) rather  
 37 than to the entire spectrum of vehicles.

#### 39 5.2.4. Cost model

The total cost to manufacture a vehicle  $c^P$  is considered to be the sum of two  
 41 parts: the investment cost to set up the production line  $c^I$  and the variable cost  
 per vehicle produced  $c^V$ . The variable cost is composed of the engine cost  $c^E$  and

1 the cost to manufacture the rest of the vehicle  $c^B$ , so that  $c^V = c^B + c^E$ . The cost  
 2 to manufacture  $q$  units of a vehicle with engine type  $\tau$  and design variables  $\mathbf{x}$  is  
 3 then calculated as

$$5 \quad c^p(\tau, \mathbf{x}) = c^I + qc^v(\tau, \mathbf{x})c^I + q(c^B + c^E(\tau, \mathbf{x})). \quad (6)$$

7 In Eq. (6), it is assumed that  $c^B = \$7500$  and  $c^I = \$550$  million per vehicle  
 8 design.  $c^B$  is estimated based on data for the Ford Taurus [101], and  $c^I$  is based  
 9 on an average of two new product lines described in the literature [102].  $c^E$  is  
 10 determined based on regression of established engine cost data for diesel (com-  
 11 pression ignition) and gasoline (spark ignition) engines. Finally, the total cost to  
 12 producer  $k$  is calculated as the sum of the production cost of each vehicle in  $k$ 's  
 13 product line and the regulatory cost  $c^R$ :

$$15 \quad c_k = \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_k} c_j^p \right) + c_k^R. \quad (7)$$

17

### 19 5.2.5. Environmental policy models

20 Three specific producer penalty scenarios are considered here: CAFE standards,  
 21 a hypothetical use-phase CO<sub>2</sub> emission tax, and a hypothetical quota system for  
 22 producing a minimum percentage of diesel vehicles. To start, the current CAFE  
 23 standard for cars ( $z_{\text{CAFE}} = 27.5$  mpg) is used, and two different penalty charges  
 24 are explored. The first penalty charge is the current standard:  $\rho = \$55$  per ve-  
 25 hicle per mpg under the limit, and the second is a hypothetical double-penalty  
 26 scenario. The total regulation cost  $c^R$  incurred by design  $j$  is therefore  $\rho q_j(z_{\text{CAFE}}$   
 27  $- z_{1j})$ , where  $\rho$  is the penalty,  $q_j$  is the number of vehicles of type  $j$  that are sold,  
 28 and  $z_{1j}$  is the fuel economy of vehicle  $j$ . In this investigation only a single market  
 29 segment is utilized even though CAFE applies to all passenger vehicle markets  
 30 in which the producer operates.

31 A CO<sub>2</sub> valuation study from the literature [103] is utilized to estimate the  
 32 economic cost to society associated with environmental damage caused by the  
 33 release of a ton of carbon dioxide in the use-phase. A CO<sub>2</sub> tax per vehicle sold is  
 34 calculated as  $v d \alpha_M / z_1$ , where  $v$  is the dollar valuation of a ton of CO<sub>2</sub>,  $d$  the  
 35 number of miles traveled in the vehicle's lifetime,  $\alpha_M$  the number of tons of CO<sub>2</sub>  
 36 produced by combusting a gallon of fuel, and  $z_1$  the fuel economy of the vehicle.  
 37 For this investigation, it is assumed that  $d = 150,000$  miles,  $\alpha_M$  is  $9.94 \times 10^{-3}$   
 38 tons CO<sub>2</sub> per gallon for gasoline or  $9.21 \times 10^{-3}$  tons CO<sub>2</sub> per gallon for diesel  
 39 fuel, and  $v$  is taken from [103] to range from \$2/ton to \$23/ton, with a median  
 40 estimation of \$14/ton.

41 A quota regulation was also modeled to force alternative fuel vehicles into the  
 market, as was attempted for electric vehicles in the California market [104].

1 Here, the quota policy is to levy a large penalty cost for violation of a minimum  
 2 diesel to gasoline engine ratio quota. For the quota case, the regulation cost is  
 3 modeled as

$$5 \quad c_k^R = \max(0, \rho(q_k^{SI} - (1 - \phi)(q_k^{SI} + q_k^{CI}))) \quad (8)$$

6 here  $\rho$  is the penalty per vehicle over quota (\$1000),  $\phi$  the minimum diesel  
 7 percentage required by the quota (here,  $\phi = 0.40$ ),  $q_k^{SI}$  the total number of  
 8 gasoline engines sold by producer  $k$ , and  $q_k^{CI}$  the total number of diesel engines  
 9 sold by producer  $k$ .

### 11 5.2.6. Simulated oligopoly competition

12 Substituting Eqs. (2)–(8) into Eq. (1) yields the following profit objective for  
 13 each producer:

$$15 \quad \Pi_k = \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_k} q_j p_j \right) - c_k = \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_k} q_j (p_j - c_j^v) - c^I \right) - c_k^R. \quad (9)$$

16 To account for competition in the design of vehicles subject to government  
 17 regulations, game theory is used to find the market (Nash) equilibrium among  
 18 competing producers. In game theory, a set of actions is in Nash equilibrium if,  
 19 for each producer  $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$ , given the actions of its rivals, the producer  
 20 cannot increase its own profit by choosing an action other than its equilibrium  
 21 action [105]. It is assumed that this market equilibrium point can provide a  
 22 reasonable prediction of which designs manufacturers are driven to produce  
 23 under various regulation scenarios, even though Nash equilibrium does not  
 24 model preemptive competitive strategies by producers. In order to find the Nash  
 25 equilibrium point for a set of  $K$  producers, the decision variables of each pro-  
 26 ducer  $k$  are optimized to maximize the profit of that producer  $\Pi_k$  while holding  
 27 the decisions of all other producers constant. This process is then iterated,  
 28 optimizing all producers  $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$  in sequence until convergence, yielding  
 29 the Nash equilibrium for  $K$  producers, where  $K$  is set to the largest value that  
 30 yields positive profit for the producers. Additional details can be found in [93].  
 31

32

### 33 5.3. Results and discussion

34

35 The results of the investigation are summarized in Table 3. For each regulation  
 36 scenario, Table 3 lists the maximum number of producers  $K$  that yield a positive  
 37 profit Nash equilibrium and the market share per producer. Owing to the use of  
 38 an aggregate demand model, each producer makes the same decisions (i.e. pro-  
 39 duces the same designs) at market equilibrium, so Table 3 summarizes the  
 40 decision variables, product characteristics, costs, and profits for a typical pro-  
 41 ducer in each scenario.

1 Table 3  
 Model predictions yielded by market simulation under various policy scenarios

3

5

		Regulation type								
		None	CO <sub>2</sub> tax			CAFÉ	SCAFE	Quota		
			Low	Med.	High					
7	No. Producers (-)	$K$	10	10	10	10	10	10	5	
	Market share (%)	$q/s$	10	10	10	10	10	10	11.9	8.1
	Engine type (SI/CI)	$M$	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	CI
9	Engine size (-)	$b_M x_I$	127.9	127.7	114.3	110.3	113.3	88.4	127.9	98.0
	FD ratio (-)	$x_2$	1.28	1.28	1.28	1.27	1.28	1.29	1.28	0.88
	Price (\$)	$p$	12,886	13,031	13,719	14,259	13,058	12,772	13,372	16,083
	Gas mileage (mpg)	$z_1$	20.2	20.3	21.8	22.4	22.0	25.5	20.2	29.8
11	Accel. Time (s)	$z_2$	7.46	7.46	7.93	8.10	7.97	9.29	7.46	7.84
	Investment cost (\$) <sup>a</sup>	$c_I$	550	550	550	550	550	550	550	550
	Var. cost/vehicle (\$)	$c_2$	9,001	8,999	8,878	8,844	8,869	8,670	9,001	11,713
13	Reg. cost/vehicle (\$)	$c_R/q$	0	147	956	1,530	304	217	0	0
	Profit (\$) <sup>a</sup>	$\Pi$	60.5	60.5	60.5	60.5	60.5	60.5	276	6.5

15 <sup>a</sup>In millions of dollars.

17 It is found at equilibrium that each producer manufactures only a single  
 19 design rather than a product line (except in the quota case) due to competition  
 21 and the existence of substantial investment cost. This result may have been  
 23 caused by factors such as neglecting the possibility of commonality among  
 25 designs, and the use of an aggregate model for demand that ignores consumer  
 heterogeneity. Table 3 also indicates that producers accrue equal profits in all  
 regulation scenarios (except the quota case), and all incurred costs are passed to  
 the consumers at equilibrium. This is because the demand model assumes a fixed  
 car buying population (there is no option not to buy) and does not consider the  
 utility of outside goods.

27 The Michalek et al. (2004) study lists a number of important caveats that are  
 29 useful to consider when using observation-based demand models as the basis for  
 sustainable design analysis. For example, the demand model used here (Eq. (5))  
 31 predicts a preference for vehicles with faster acceleration. Therefore, a vehicle  
 that dramatically sacrifices unmeasured characteristics such as maximum speed  
 33 for a slight improvement of acceleration time will be preferred according to the  
 model. However, in practice a consumer would observe the unmeasured lim-  
 35 itations during a road test, especially if the limitations are extreme. To account  
 for this issue, each optimum vehicle design was tested to ensure the vehicle's  
 37 ability to follow the standard FTP driving cycle and achieve a speed of at least  
 110 mph on a flat road. All vehicle designs in the study passed this test [93]. The  
 example highlights the importance of thoughtful modeling and of remaining  
 39 cognizant of the limitations inherent to quantitative modeling approaches when  
 simulating market competition.

41

### 1 5.3.1. Base case

3 The first case considered in [93] is the no regulation case ( $c^R = 0$ ), which provides a baseline comparison for results obtained under different regulatory policies. In the absence of regulation, the model predicts 10 producers in the  
5 small car market. Each producer manufactures a single vehicle with the design variables, product characteristics, and costs shown in Table 3. The resulting  
7 vehicle has a spark ignition engine with a fuel economy of 20.2 miles per gallon.

### 9 5.3.2. CAFE

11 Table 3 shows that the CAFE standard succeeds in increasing resulting vehicle design fuel economy to 22.0 mpg with roughly a half-second increase in 0–60  
13 acceleration time and a \$172 increase in vehicle price. The vehicle production cost drops by \$132 per vehicle relative to the baseline case due to the smaller  
15 engine size; however, regulation costs are approximately \$304 per vehicle. The CAFE standard is not attained at equilibrium because, unlike the real automobile market, the model does not capture intangible costs to companies who  
17 do not meet the CAFE standard. According to the model there is significant risk for a company that would attempt to produce a vehicle at 27.5 mpg, since its  
19 market share would be captured by more powerful, less fuel-efficient competitor vehicles. This is a direct consequence of Eq. (4), which shows that consumers  
21 receive more utility from improvements in acceleration than they do from improvements in fuel economy. Making matters worse, for a given power train  
23 technology there is a negative trade-off between acceleration and fuel economy. In fact, for the gasoline engine favored by producers in the modeling results, a  
25 regression between  $z_1$  and  $z_2$  through the optimal designs in Table 3 (an estimate of the Pareto surface) yields,  
27

$$z_2 = az_1^2 + bz_1 + c, \quad (10)$$

29 where  $a = 0.0159$ ,  $b = -0.380$ , and  $c = 8.64$  ( $R^2 = 0.99$ ).

31 Given that Eq. (10) expresses the relationship between fuel economy and acceleration, one can utilize Eq. (4) to calculate the change in vehicle price  $p$  that  
33 would be necessary to maintain constant utility to the consumer as the fuel economy  $z_1$  is increased:

$$35 \frac{\partial p}{\partial z_1} = \frac{1}{\beta_1} \left( \frac{100\beta_2}{z_1^2} + \frac{60\beta_3(2az_1 + b)}{(az_1^2 + bz_1 + c)^2} \right). \quad (11)$$

37 Using the baseline engine from the no regulation scenario as the evaluation point for Eq. (11), it is observed that the producer must *lower* the asking price  
39 by \$136 per mpg increase in fuel economy to maintain equal utility to the consumer. This result provides a quantified expression of a trend currently  
41 observed the US: In many cases higher fuel economy actually brings with it

1 reduced utility to individual consumers, a fact which is consistent with the  
 2 observation that the average fuel economy of the US fleet is in decline. While a  
 3 vast number of attributes are not considered in Eq. (11), Table 4 suggests that  
 4 many desirable attributes, like acceleration, are negatively correlated with fuel  
 5 economy.

### 7 5.3.3. "Strict" CAFE

9 As shown in Table 3, a fuel economy of 25.5 mpg is achieved by the strict CAFE  
 10 standard, with a consumer vehicle price \$114 less than the baseline case. The  
 11 0–60 acceleration time, however, is approximately 1.8 s higher. Perhaps sur-  
 12 prisingly, this "strict" CAFE policy *reduces* regulatory costs for each producer.  
 13 The reduction in regulatory costs follows from the fact that under the previous  
 14 CAFE model (remembering that unmodeled "reputation and image" costs as-  
 15 sociated with CAFE violations are not captured), it is profitable for manufac-  
 16 turers to violate CAFE and pay the penalty in order to increase market share by  
 17 selling powerful vehicles. However, when CAFE penalties are increased sub-  
 18 stantially, producers are forced to meet the standard in order to stay in business.

19 Table 4

20 Sample List of desirable automobile features and their relationship to lower fuel efficiency

Desirable Feature for Consumers	Engineering Solution	Impact on Vehicle
23 Engine Performance		
25 Quiet engine compartment	Add padding and deadener	Adds weight, material
26 Strong engine performance	Robust design, larger engine size	Adds weight, material
27 Passing power	Robust mounts, larger engine	Adds weight, material
28 Ride, handling, and braking		
29 Quick, safe braking	Robust brake design	Adds materials
30 Quiet ride during highway driving	Add padding and deadener	Adds materials
31 Quiet ride over harsh bumps	Add padding, better shocks	Adds materials
32 Power steering with minimal effort	Always-on fluid pump	More power, fluids used
33 Comfort and convenience		
35 Front leg/foot room	Move engine, lengthen vehicle	Adds material
36 Headroom	Taller vehicle	Adds material
37 Side mirror controls	More electronics	Increased current draw
38 Well lit gauges and instruments	Add materials	Increased current draw
39 Ability to watch movies; internet	DVD player, WIFI, Bluetooth	Increased current draw
40 Navigation system	More electronics	Increased current draw
41 High-quality and powerful stereo	Powerful amplifier and speakers	Increased current draw
42 Heated/cooled seats	Add electronics and content	Increased current draw
43 Adjustable with controls	Add electronics and content	Increased current draw

1 In this case there is little danger of losing significant market share to a com-  
2 petitor who sells more powerful engines because none of the producers can  
3 afford to sell such engines; therefore all of the producers design smaller, less  
4 expensive engines. As such, the strict CAFE standard serves to remove risks  
5 associated with producing more fuel efficient vehicles by increasing the penalty  
6 for deviation from the CAFE standard 27.5 mpg. The desired eco-efficient result  
7 is achieved. Company profits are unaffected, vehicles are less expensive, and fuel  
8 economy is increased. However, as Table 4 indicates, consumers and society at  
9 large lose out on benefits associated with the engineering design characteristics  
10 that reduce fuel economy (e.g. acceleration). Here we see the trade-off between  
11 desirable attributes as perceived by individuals acting in the marketplace and  
12 individuals acting as members of society, with preferences for resource conser-  
13 vation, lower air pollution, and reduced life cycle carbon dioxide emissions, as  
14 expressed by their support for government regulations on fuel economy.

15

#### 5.3.4. *Use-phase CO<sub>2</sub> emissions tax*

17 It is seen in Table 3 that the use-phase CO<sub>2</sub> emissions tax is a considerably less  
18 eco-efficient policy than the CAFE standards. As the tax increases, producers  
19 do tend to design smaller, more fuel-efficient engines. However, the low val-  
20 uation penalty (\$2/ton) has little impact on fuel economy relative to the baseline  
21 case, with the only notable effect being added regulation costs that are passed  
22 on to consumers. The median valuation (\$14/ton) has a larger impact, increas-  
23 ing fuel economy by 1.5 mpg, while the high valuation (\$22/ton) adds only slight  
24 additional improvement in fuel economy relative to the median level (0.6 mpg)  
25 at a substantial added regulation cost per vehicle (\$540) relative to the median  
26 tax level. The results suggest not only that the use-phase CO<sub>2</sub> emissions tax is  
27 less eco-efficient than CAFE standards, but that it is also dangerous as a policy  
28 approach: In this policy, vehicle prices increase, performance is lower, and fuel  
29 economy is increased only marginally. Therefore it would appear that there are  
30 no major winners with this policy. Based on these results, the policy might only  
31 be expected in practice to lower the demand and sales of vehicles relative to  
32 other modes of transportation or market segments not subject to the tax (e.g. in  
33 the current CAFE standards, more lax standards exist for light trucks relative to  
34 automobiles).

35

#### 5.3.5. *Quota*

37 Although diesel engines have higher fuel economy than gasoline engines for  
38 equivalent acceleration performance, the model predicts that they are only  
39 manufactured under the quota policy (which bears similarity with the current  
40 situation in the US small car market). Additionally, the model predicts that  
41 under the quota policy only the minimum number of diesel vehicles is produced  
to exactly meet the standard. This is due to the higher costs associated with

1 producing diesel engines, and the greater profitability of gasoline engines  
2 prompting producers who are forced to sell diesel engines to also produce as  
3 many gasoline engines as allowed.

4 The diesel engines produced in this scenario have a fuel economy 9.5 mpg  
5 higher than the baseline (no regulation) scenario. This is achieved at a sub-  
6 stantial increase in diesel vehicle price relative to the baseline spark ignition  
7 vehicle (\$3197). However, only a small reduction in vehicle acceleration relative  
8 to the no regulation case is observed (0.38 s). On the other hand, for a 150,000  
9 mile life of the vehicle, the 29.8 mpg diesel vehicle consumes ~ 2400 fewer  
10 gallons of fuel, which means that at fuel prices above \$1.33 per gallon, the initial  
11 cost of the vehicle is recovered over its life (not accounting for time-based  
12 discounting). This suggests that the quota policy is a reasonably eco-efficient  
13 approach, albeit one that could not spontaneously self-assemble in today's  
14 market place. Consistent with these observations, Sullivan et al. (2004) has  
15 recently suggested that the increased adoption of diesel engines into US vehicles  
16 is worthy of consideration for its potential to economically reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emis-  
17 sions produced by the vehicle fleet [106].

### 19 5.3.6. Analysis of eco-efficiency for selected policies

20 Eco-efficiency in the context of policy evaluation implies that a re-evaluation of  
21 the balance between private and public value is occurring with the aim of  
22 simultaneously minimizing environmental impact and the costs to society nec-  
23 essary to achieve the reduction in environmental impact. To capture this trade-  
24 off, Fig. 13 attempts to illustrate the performance of the individual policies as a  
25 function of both their public and their private values. On the vertical axis, the  
26 change in utility relative to the no regulation case is given. Utility as calculated  
27 by Eq. 4 is utilized because it captures trade-offs between key attributes in a  
28 manner related to private value (although it does not express private value  
29 directly). On the horizontal axis, the change in fuel economy resulting from each  
30 policy relative to the no regulation case is given (expressed as percentage). This  
31 relative improvement in fuel economy is the core intent of the policy, although  
32 like utility, it is not a direct expression of value. Ideally, the public and private  
33 value of the specific policies would be estimated directly, in which case plots  
34 such as Fig. 13 could provide a direct measure of eco-efficiency that could be  
35 compared across applications as necessary for the systematic development of  
36 sustainability targets across industries (see Section 3).

37 In Fig. 13b, the trade-off between public and private value is expressed by the  
38 set of non-dominated policies, which are the policies for which no alternative  
39 policies achieve higher fuel economy without sacrificing utility or vice versa.  
40 Given the definition of the origin as the reference no regulation case, from  
41 which deviations in utility and fuel economy are defined, it is evident that  
42 policies in Quadrants II and III, which result in inferior fuel economy, would




Fig. 13. Change in utility versus percentage change in fuel efficiency relative to baseline no-regulation case. (a) Definition of four quadrants in trade-off analysis. (b) Quadrant IV policies.

not be of interest to policymakers. Also, Quadrants I and II contain no feasible designs because the base no regulation (free market) case results in the design with highest feasible (private) utility. In other words, consumers asked to choose their most preferred design while paying only the cost to manufacture that design will choose the same design as that produced by the unregulated market. Thus, viewing the set of non-dominated policies as a (Pareto) trade-off curve between private and public preferences, we see that the unregulated free market yields an extreme point on this trade-off curve such that private preferences (utility) are valued exclusively over public preferences (mpg improvement), while non-dominated policy alternatives allow exploration of the best alternative policies as modeled in the investigation. It can be seen in Fig. 13b that the Pareto set of non-dominated policies include the no-regulation case, the low CO<sub>2</sub> taxation case (which is much the same as no-regulation case), the CAFE standard, and the Strict CAFE standard. Depending on the interpretation of "acceptable utility loss to consumers" (recall Section 3), one of these policies would be best under the modeling assumptions and scope of the model.

#### 5.4. Remarks on policy-driven eco-design and eco-efficiency analysis

This section has described an optimization framework to analyze the impact of fuel economy regulations on the design decisions made by automobile manufacturers from an eco-efficiency perspective. It was observed that government policies are necessary to provide incentives for producers to design alternative

1 fuel vehicles (e.g. diesels) that cost more to produce. Without a regulatory  
 3 standard, producers cannot afford to make smaller, less expensive, and more  
 5 fuel-efficient engines. Under the modeling assumptions, it is observed that some  
 7 policies can result in cost savings for all parties (e.g. CAFE) and do not affect  
 profitability within the market segment. On the other hand, certain regulations  
 can also lead to higher costs, diminishing returns, and little environmental im-

9 Such results indicate that the cost-benefit characteristics of policy alternatives  
 11 can be modeled in a realistic and quantitative way, and that a holistic integra-  
 13 tion of costs, performance, consumer preference, and competition can facilitate  
 15 the selection of effective policies, while helping to determine how policy pa-  
 17 rameters should be set. Additional investigations that combine engineering,  
 marketing, and policy models with models of changing consumer preferences  
 and driving habits could be used to predict trends regarding the diffusion of  
 alternative fuel vehicles into society, possibly avoiding costly investments in  
 products that are unlikely to achieve wide acceptance, and helping to focus  
 resources and incentives toward sustainable design solutions that will make the  
 most impact.

19

## 21 **6. Summary and conclusions**

23 The very need for sustainable design research implies that an imbalance exists  
 25 between private value captured in the marketplace and its consequential impacts  
 27 on societal and environmental systems. It also implies an imbalance between the  
 incentives and inhibitors to sustainable design outlined in this chapter (Section  
 29 2). Specifically, the chapter has discussed six challenges to sustainable design for  
 which academic research, performed in conjunction with industrial partners and  
 governments, could have a major impact:

- 31 1 Understanding incentives and inhibitors to sustainable design
- 32 2 Establishing targets, metrics, and strategies for sustainable design
- 33 3 Understanding variability in product-user interactions
- 34 4 Evaluating alternative technologies for sustainability characteristics
- 35 5 Estimating the market value of sustainable design attributes
- 36 6 Developing market-conscious policies to encourage sustainable design

37

39 When sustainable designs do not spontaneously self-assemble in the market-  
 41 place, corrective action is generally left as the responsibility of governments,  
 who can either (1) create market conditions that allow sustainable designs to  
 proliferate on their own, (2) restrict the feasible space of options available to  
 designers, or (3) establish tangible sustainable design targets with which indi-

1  
2 individual products must comply. Each of these approaches requires a profound  
3 understanding of the relationship between engineering design options, market  
4 costs and revenues, available alternative technologies, and societal and envi-  
5 ronmental impacts. Research needs in these areas have been outlined in Section  
6 3.

7 Once sustainable design is defined in the context of a specific product, it is  
8 necessary to develop tools that facilitate the seamless incorporation of sustain-  
9 ability metrics into the design process. The development of appropriate metrics,  
10 and the establishment of trade-offs with other cost and performance aspects of  
11 the design were underlying themes of the case studies presented in this chapter.  
12 The first case study (Section 4) provided an overview of economic, environ-  
13 mental, and societal factors related to mobile telephone production, use, and  
14 remanufacturing. Empirical observations of current activities revealed the com-  
15 plexity associated with sustainability assessment, as well as the critical impor-  
16 tance of considering the specific circumstances and drivers surrounding  
17 individual products, activities, or services that are being evaluated.

18 The second case study (Section 5) provided a quantitative framework for the  
19 evaluation of sustainable design policies related to automotive fuel economy.  
20 This case study demonstrated the possibility of capturing market forces, tech-  
21 nology realities, and environmental considerations within a model suitable for  
22 policy evaluation. The complexity and data challenges involved with developing  
23 viable quantitative models were demonstrated. The necessary simplifications  
24 required in the model development made the conclusions most valuable in terms  
25 of their trends, and the realistic nature of these trends suggest that the math-  
26 ematical approach developed here would be helpful to consider during the de-  
27 velopment of policies intending to encourage sustainable design.

28 We conclude this chapter by recalling from Fig. 1 the perspective of design as  
29 a flow from abstract societal values to products and services with impacts on the  
30 sustainability triangle. This flow is, at its root, influenced by the knowledge base  
31 of society as a whole. As evidenced by the change in attitude toward safety  
32 design over the past century, ethical systems are evolutionary in nature and can  
33 impact design processes positively. A similar change of heart and practice is  
34 needed in the sustainability realm. However, quantitatively measuring the sus-  
35 tainability of products, processes, and services is a very difficult task and will  
36 remain a primary focus of sustainable science and engineering for years to come.  
37 As the field matures, it will be necessary for researchers and practitioners alike  
38 to provide education to the general public, as well as to engineers, designers, and  
39 policymakers, in order to create the conditions necessary for sustainable design  
40 to flourish.

41

## 1 Acknowledgements

3 The research described in Section 4 was performed in collaboration with Pro-  
 4 fessor Günther Seliger, Dipl.-Ing. Bahadır Basdere, Dipl.-Ing Marco Zettl, and  
 5 Global Production Engineering graduate Aviroot Prasitnarit of the Technical  
 6 University Berlin (TUB). The research described in Section 5 was performed as  
 7 part of the Antilium Project at the University of Michigan in collaboration with  
 8 Professor Panos Y. Papalambros. We are grateful to these colleagues for their  
 9 support and contributions to the results described here, without which this  
 10 presentation would not have been possible. The authors are also grateful for the  
 11 contributions of the following individuals. Section 3: Andres F. Clarens, Steven  
 12 Lauritzen, David P. Morse, and Julie B. Zimmerman; Section 4: Kuei-Yuan  
 13 Chan and Aaron Hula; Section 5: Professor Fred Feinberg, Sarah Bahrman,  
 14 Carl Lenker, Jeron Campbell, and Sneha Madhavan-Reese.

15

17

## References

19

- 21 [1] European Consultative Forum on Sustainability and the Environment, Proceedings of the  
 Sustainability 21 Conference, Helsinki, 1999, [http://www.eeac-network.org/workgroups/docs/proc-sust21\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeac-network.org/workgroups/docs/proc-sust21_en.pdf), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 23 [2] Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003  
 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l\\_037/l\\_03720030213en00240038.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_037/l_03720030213en00240038.pdf), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 25 [3] Directive 2002/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003  
 on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic  
 27 equipment, [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l\\_037/l\\_03720030213en00190023.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_037/l_03720030213en00190023.pdf), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 29 [4] Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework for  
 the setting of Eco-design requirements for Energy-Using Products and amending Council  
 Directive 92/42/EEC, Brussels, 01.08.2003, 453 final 2003/0172, [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2003/com2003\\_0453en01.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2003/com2003_0453en01.pdf), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 31 [5] C. Handleya, N.P. Brandonb, R. van der Vorsta, Impact of the European Union Vehicle  
 Waste Directive on End-Of-Life options for Polymer Electrolyte Fuel Cells, *J. Power  
 33 Sources* 106 (2002) 344–352.
- 35 [6] <http://www.ford.com/en/goodWorks/environment/cleanerManufacturing/default.htm>, ac-  
 cessed 06.26.2004.
- 37 [7] S. Pearce, Another Approach to Wind, *Mech. Eng.* 126 (6) (2004) 28–31.
- 38 [8] J. Ottman, *Green Marketing: Opportunity for Innovation*, J. Ottman Consulting, New  
 York, 1998 [http://www.greenmarketing.com/Green\\_Marketing\\_Book/Chapter02.html](http://www.greenmarketing.com/Green_Marketing_Book/Chapter02.html), ac-  
 cessed 06.26.2004.
- 39 [9] US Department of Agriculture London Embassy, *US Organic Information Consumption*,  
[http://www.usembassy.org.uk/fas/us\\_organic\\_cons\\_u.htm](http://www.usembassy.org.uk/fas/us_organic_cons_u.htm), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 41 [10] B.R. Allenby, T.E. Graedel, *Industrial Ecology*, Prentice-Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, NJ, 1995.
- [11] R.T. Lund, *The Remanufacturing Industry: Hidden Giant*, Boston University, 1996.

- 1 [12] Committee on Science, US House of Representatives Hearing Charter, Green Chemistry  
Research and Development Act of 2004, March 17, 2004, [http://www.house.gov/science/  
hearings/full04/mar17/charter.pdf](http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full04/mar17/charter.pdf), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 3 [13] N. Rajagopalan, V.M. Boddu, S. Mishra, D. Kraybill, Pollution Prevention in an Alumi-  
num Grinding Facility, *Met. Finish.* 96 (11) (1998) 18–24.
- 5 [14] N. Rajagopalan, T. Lindsey, S.J. Skerlos, Engineering of Ultrafiltration Equipment in  
Alkaline Cleaner Applications, *Plating Surf. Finish.* 88 (12) (2001) 56–60.
- 7 [15] S.J. Skerlos, F. Zhao, Economic Considerations in the Implementation of Microfiltration  
for Metalworking Fluid Biological Control, *J. Manuf. Systems*, 22 (2003) 202–219.
- 9 [16] T. Rusk, N. Rajagopalan, T. Lindsey, Investigating Some Factors Affecting First Pass  
Transfer Efficiency, *Powder Coating* 11 (4) (2000) 33–42.
- 11 [17] US EPA Office of Water, Factor 2 Analysis: Technology Advances and Process Changes,  
December 30, 2003, <http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/guide/304m/factor2.pdf>, accessed  
06.26.2004.
- 13 [18] J.M. DeSimone, Practical Approaches to Green Solvents, *Science* 297 (2002) 799–803.
- 15 [19] J.A. Behles, J.M. DeSimone, Developments in CO<sub>2</sub> Research, *Pure Appl. Chem.* 73 (8)  
(2001) 1281–1285.
- 17 [20] US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, Envi-  
ronmental Investments: The Cost of a Clean Environment, EPA-230-11-90-083, November  
1990.
- 19 [21] US EPA, Final Report to Congress on Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act: 1970 to  
1990, EPA 410-R-97-002, October 15, 1997, <http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/copy.html>,  
accessed 06.26.2004.
- 21 [22] UN Global Compact program, [www.unglobalcompact.org](http://www.unglobalcompact.org), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 23 [23] G. Gonzalez, Symposium Makes Business Case for Sustainability, *Stanford Report* May 14  
(2003), <http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2003/may14/sustainable-514.html>, accessed  
06.26.2004.
- 25 [24] E. Eldridge, Ford borrows from Toyota's blueprints for new hybrid Escape, *USA Today*,  
Wednesday, March 10, 2004, [http://www.detnews.com/2004/autosinsider/0403/11/autos-  
87820.htm](http://www.detnews.com/2004/autosinsider/0403/11/autos-87820.htm), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 27 [25] D.A. Gross, Hummer vs. Prius: the Surprising Winner, *National Public Radio*, March 1,  
2004, <http://slate.msn.com/id/2096191>, accessed 06.26.2004.
- 29 [26] European Union Eco-Label Program, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ecolabel/in-  
dex\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ecolabel/index_en.htm), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 31 [27] The Swedish Environmental Council, Environmental Declarations Program, [http://  
www.environdec.com/](http://www.environdec.com/), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 33 [28] T. Tietenberg, *Environmental and Natural Resource Economics*, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition, Addison-  
Wesley, Boston, 2003, 72 pp.
- 35 [29] National Academy of Sciences Committee, Committee on the Effectiveness and Impact of  
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, Board on Energy and Environmental Sys-  
tems, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council Effectiveness and Im-  
pact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, National Academies Press,  
2002.
- 37 [30] G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, *Science* 162 (1968) 1243–1248.
- 39 [31] S.J. Skerlos, G. Seliger, B. Basdere, W.R. Morrow, A. Hula, A. Prasitnarit, Evaluating the  
Profit and Environmental Characteristics of Global Mobile Phone Remanufacturing, *Pro-  
ceedings of the Electronics Goes Green 2003 International Congress and Exhibition: Life-  
Cycle Environmental Stewardship for Electronic Products*, Boston, MA, May 19–22, 2003.
- 41 [32] F. Cairncross, *Costing the Earth*, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1991.

- 1 [33] T.C. Lindsey, Diffusion of P2 Innovations, *Pollution Prevention Review* 8 (1) (1998) 1–14.
- 2 [34] P. Bishop, *Pollution Prevention: Fundamentals and Practice*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2000.
- 3 [35] P.T. Anastas, J.B. Zimmerman, Design Through the 12 Principles of Green Engineering, *Environ. Sci. Tech.* 37 (5) (2003) 94A–101A.
- 4 [36] W. McDonough, M. Braungart, P.T. Anastas, J.B. Zimmerman, Applying the Principles of Green Engineering to Cradle-to-Cradle Design, *Environ. Sci. Tech.* 37 (23) (2003) 434A–441A.
- 5 [37] J. Rodrigo, F. Castells, *Electrical and Electronic Practical Ecodesign Guide*, University Rovira I Virgili, Spain, 2002.
- 6 [38] M.S. Hundal (Ed.), *Mechanical Life Cycle Handbook: Good Environmental Design and Manufacturing*, Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, 2001.
- 7 [39] Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development, *Life Cycle Design Guidance Manual*, EPA/600/R-92/226, 1993.
- 8 [40] Hewlett-Packard, HP General Specifications for the Environment (GSE), <http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/gse.pdf>, accessed 06.26.2004.
- 9 [41] VDI 2243, *Konstruieren recyclingerechter technischer*, VDI, 1991.
- 10 [42] G. Boothroyd, L. Alting, Design for Assembly and Disassembly, *Annals of CIRP* 41 (2) (1992).
- 11 [43] P. Dewhurst, *Design for Disassembly*, Boothroyd Dewhurst Inc., 1993.
- 12 [44] Global Development Research Center, *Design for Environment Guidelines on Transportation*, <http://www.gdrc.org/uem/lca/g-tre.html>, accessed 06.26.2004.
- 13 [45] USCAR Vehicle Recycling Partnership, *Preferred Practices*, <http://www.uscar.org/consortia&teams/VRP/preferredpractices.pdf>, accessed 06.26.2004.
- 14 [46] T. Amezcuita, R. Hammond, M. Salazar, B.A. Bras, Characterizing the Remanufacturability of Engineering Systems, *ASME Advances in Design Automation Conference*, Boston, MA, 1995, 271–278, [http://www.srl.gatech.edu/education/ME4171/DETC95\\_Amezquita.pdf](http://www.srl.gatech.edu/education/ME4171/DETC95_Amezquita.pdf), accessed 06.26.2004.
- 15 [47] R. Hammond, T. Amezcuita, B.A. Bras, Issues in the Automotive Parts Remanufacturing Industry: Discussion of Results from Surveys Performed among Remanufacturers, *Int. J. Eng. Des. Automat. Special Issue on Environmentally Conscious Design and Manufacturing*, 4 (1998) 27–46, <http://www.srl.gatech.edu/education/ME4171/Reman-Survey-21Nov96.pdf>, accessed 06.26.2004.
- 16 [48] R. Hammond, B.A. Bras, Towards Design for Remanufacturing: Metrics for Assessing Remanufacturing, *Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Reuse*, in: S.D. Flapper, A.J. de Ron (Eds), Eindhoven, November 11–13, 1996, Eindhoven, The Netherlands, 5–22, <http://www.srl.gatech.edu/education/ME4171/Metrics-paper-19July96.pdf>, accessed 06.26.2004.
- 17 [49] <http://www.motorola.com/EHS/environment/products/>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- 18 [50] C.A. Rose, A. Stevels, K. Ishii, Method for Formulating Product End-of-Life Strategies for Electronics Industry, *J. Electron. Manuf.* 11 (2) (2002) 185–196.
- 19 [51] Fraunhofer IZM/EE Toolbox, [http://www.pb.izm.fhg.de/ee/070\\_services/75toolbox/010\\_Einleitung.html](http://www.pb.izm.fhg.de/ee/070_services/75toolbox/010_Einleitung.html), accessed 06.27.2004.
- 20 [52] Environmental Protection Agency, *Life Cycle Assessment: Inventory Guidelines and Principles*, EPA/600/R-92/245, (1992).
- 21 [53] B. Hoffman, *Design for Environment at Motorola: Integration of Environmental Aspects into Product Design*, <http://www.epa.gov/performancectrack/events/design.pdf>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- 22 [54] *Environmental Design of Industrial Products*, <http://www.ipt.dtu.dk>, accessed 06.27.2004.

- 1 [55] Umberto, <http://www.umberto.de/english/>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- [56] Simpro, <http://www.pre.nl/>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- 3 [57] Tool for Environmental Assessment and Management (TEAM), [http://www.ecobilan.com/uk\\_team.php](http://www.ecobilan.com/uk_team.php), accessed 06.27.2004.
- [58] GaBi, <http://www.gabi-software.com/>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- 5 [59] J.B. Zimmerman, Formulation and Evaluation of Emulsifier Systems for Petroleum- and Bio-Based Semi-Synthetic Metal Working Fluids, Ph.D. Thesis, The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, 2003.
- 7 [60] S.O. Ryding, Editorial: ISO 14042, *Int. J. LCA* 4 (6) (1999) 307, <http://www.scientific-journals.com/sj/lca/Pdf/aId/1363>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- 9 [61] US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Green Products by Design: Choices for a Cleaner Environment, OTA-E-541. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1992.
- 11 [62] S.J. Skerlos, K.F. Hayes, W.R. Morrow, J.B. Zimmerman, Diffusion of Sustainable Systems through Interdisciplinary Graduate and Undergraduate Education, Proceedings of the ASME: Manufacturing Science and Engineering Division, Washington, D.C., November, 2003.
- 13 [63] E.D. Williams, R. Ayres, M. Heller, The 1.7 Kilogram Microchip: Energy and Material Use in the Production of Semiconductor Devices, 36 (24) (2002) 5504–5510.
- 15 [64] J.C. Bare, G.A. Norris, D.W. Pennington, TRACI: The Tool for the Reduction and Assessment of Other Environmental Impacts, *J. Ind. Ecol.* 6 (3–4) (2002) 49–78.
- 17 [65] V. Peart, The Refrigerator Energy Use Study: Leaders Guide, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, Institute of Food and Agriculture Sciences, University of Florida, June, 1993. [http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/BODY\\_EH232](http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/BODY_EH232), accessed 06.27.2004.
- 19 [66] Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1995, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/gg96rpt/chap2.html>, 2001 Residential Energy Consumption Survey: Household Energy Consumption and Expenditures Tables, [http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/recs/recs2001/ce\\_pdf/appliances/ce5-7e\\_4popstates2001.pdf](http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/recs/recs2001/ce_pdf/appliances/ce5-7e_4popstates2001.pdf), accessed 06.27.2004.
- 21 [67] G. Marland, T.A. Boden, R.J. Andres, Global, regional, and national CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, US Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, TN, USA, 2003.
- 23 [68] J.B. White, EPA Weighs Changing the Way it Tests Gas Mileage, *Wall Street Journal*, March 26 (2004) A3.
- 25 [69] Environmental Protection Agency, Petition to Amend Fuel Economy Testing and Calculation Procedures, Request for Comments, Federal Register 40 CFR Chapter I, OAR-2003-0214, FRL-7640–7643 69 (60) (2004), <http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-AIR/2004/March/Day-29/a6827.htm>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- 27 [70] J.V. Carnahan, D. Thurston, Tradeoff Modeling for Product and Manufacturing Process Design for the Environment, *J. Ind. Ecol.* 2 (1) (1998) 79–92.
- 29 [71] L. van Grinsven, Mobile phone sales boom in 2003, and more is coming, *USA Today*, February 3, 2004, [http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/2004-02-03-cell-sales-boom\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/2004-02-03-cell-sales-boom_x.htm), accessed 06.27.2004.
- 31 [72] Associated Press, Discarded Mobile phones Pose Health Hazard, *USA Today*, May 7, 2002, <http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/05/07/cell-phone-pollution.htm>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- 33
- 35
- 37
- 39
- 41

- 1 [73] F. Taiarol, P. Fea, C. Papuzza, R. Casalino, E. Galbiati, S. Zappa, Life Cycle Assessment  
of an Integrated Circuit Product, In Proceedings of IEEE Intl Symposium on Electronics  
3 and Environment, IEEE, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 1999.
- [74] O. Kharif, Where Recycled Mobile phones Ring True, *BusinessWeek Online*, July 26, 2002,  
5 [http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2002/tc20020725\\_6433.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2002/tc20020725_6433.htm), accessed  
07.27.2004.
- [75] C.H. Marcussen, Mobile Phones, WAP, and the Internet The European Market and Usage  
7 Rates in a Global Perspective 2000–2003, <http://www.crt.dk/uk/staff/chm/wap.htm>, ac-  
cessed 06.27.2004.
- [76] V. Thomas, Demand and Dematerialization Impacts of Second-Hand Markets, *J. Ind.  
9 Ecol.* 7 (2) (2003) 65–78.
- [77] Ericsson, 2001 Sustainability Report, [http://www.ericsson.com/sustainability/download/  
11 pdf/Ericsson\\_sustainable\\_2001.pdf](http://www.ericsson.com/sustainability/download/pdf/Ericsson_sustainable_2001.pdf), accessed 06.27.2004.
- [78] B. Ram, A. Stevels, H. Griese, A. Middendorf, J. Muller, N.F. Nissen, H. Reichl, En-  
13 vironmental performance of mobile products, In Proceedings of IEEE Intl Symposium on  
Electronics and Environment, IEEE, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 1999.
- [79] A. Prasitnarit, Life Cycle and Social Implications of Mobile phone Remanufacturing and  
15 Recycling, Masters Thesis, Technical University Berlin, Germany, 2003.
- [80] I. Nicolaescu, W.F. Hoffman, Energy Consumption of Mobile phones, In Proceedings of  
17 IEEE Intl Symposium on Electronics and Environment, IEEE, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2001.
- [81] IDEMAT Database, Emissions Associated with Air Travel, Technical University of Delft,  
19 The Netherlands, 2001.
- [82] C.C. Reyes-Aldasoro, F. Kuhlmann, Telecommunications and Internet in the Future So-  
21 ciety: Myths and Realities, *Computers and Communications, Proceedings. IEEE Interna-  
tional Symposium*, 1999.
- [83] L. Lynton, Nations in Race to Provide the Best in Essential Services, *Global Logistics and  
23 Supply Chain Strategies*, Keller International Publishing, 1997, [http://www.glses.com/arch-  
ives/11.97.nationsrace.htm?adcode=75](http://www.glses.com/archives/11.97.nationsrace.htm?adcode=75), accessed 06.27.2004.
- [84] United Nations, Supporting Afirca's Efforts to Achieve Sustainable Development. United  
25 Nations, New York, 2002, <http://www.un.org/issues/docs/d-afric.asp>, accessed 06.27.2004.
- [85] D. Nik, K. Nir, The Global Digital Divide and Mobile Business Models: Identifying Viable  
27 Patterns of e-Development, IFIP WG9.4 Conference, Bangalore, India, May 29–31, 2002,  
528–540.
- [86] A. Bayes, Infrastructure and Rural Development: In-sights from a Grameen Bank village  
29 phone initiative in Bangladesh, *Agric. Econ.* 25 (2001) 261–272.
- [87] J. Fiksel, Emergencye of a Sustainable Business Community, *Pure Appl. Chem.* 73 (8)  
31 (2001) 1265–1268.
- [88] J. Schwarz, B. Beloff, E. Beaver, Use Sustainability Metrics to Guide Decision-Making,  
33 *Chem. Eng. Prog.* (July 2002) 58–63.
- [89] R. Veenhoven, Why Social Policy Needs Subjective Indicators, *Soc. Indic. Res.* 58 (2002)  
35 33–45.
- [90] United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, 2002, [http://  
37 www.undp.org/hdr2002/](http://www.undp.org/hdr2002/), accessed 06.27.2002.
- [91] M. Munasinghe, Is Environmental Degradation an Inevitable Consequence of Economic  
39 Growth: Tunneling through the Environmental Kuznets Curve, *Ecol. Econ.* 29 (1) (1999)  
89–109.
- [92] G.A. Keoleian, et al., *Industrial Ecology of the Automobile: A Life Cycle Perspective*.  
41 Warrendale, Society of Automotive Engineers, 1997.

- 1 [93] J. Michalek, P.Y. Papalambros, S.J. Skerlos, A Study of Fuel Efficiency and Emission  
Policy Impact on Optimal Vehicle Design Decisions, *J. of Mech. Des.*, (2004), to appear.
- 3 [94] National Renewable Energy Laboratory, <http://www.ctts.nrel.gov/analysis>, accessed  
06.27.2004.
- 5 [95] D. McFadden, Quantal Choice Analysis: A Survey, *Ann. Econ. Soc. Meas.* 5 (1976)  
363–390.
- 7 [96] I. Currim, Predictive Testing of Consumer Choice Models that are Not Subject to Inde-  
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives, *J. Market. Res.* 19 (1982).
- 9 [97] H.J. Wassenaar, W. Chen, An Approach to Decision-Based Design, Proceedings of  
DETC'01 ASME Design Engineering Technical Conferences, DTM-21683, Pittsburgh, PA,  
September 2001.
- 11 [98] J.H. Boyd, R.E. Mellman, The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on the US Automotive  
Market: An Hedonic Demand Analysis, *Transport. Res. A*, 14 (1980) 367–378.
- 13 [99] US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Highway  
Policy Information, Source: Ward's 2001 Automotive Yearbook and the Annual Ward's  
Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures Publication, [http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/  
line4.htm](http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/line4.htm), accessed 06.27.2004.
- 15 [100] Train, Kenneth, *Qualitative Choice Analysis: Theory, Econometrics, and an Application to  
Automobile Demand*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986.
- 17 [101] M. Delucchi, T. Lipman, An Analysis of the Retail and Lifecycle Cost of Battery-Powered  
Electric Vehicles, *Transport. Res. D-Transport and Environment* 6 (6) (2001) 371–404.
- 19 [102] D. Whitney, Cost Performance of Automobile Engine Plants, International Motor Vehicle  
Program, Working Papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 8.22.2001, [http://  
web.mit.edu/ctpid/www/Whitney/morepapers/Engine.pdf](http://web.mit.edu/ctpid/www/Whitney/morepapers/Engine.pdf), accessed 06.27.2004.
- 21 [103] S. Matthews, L. Lave, Applications of Environmental Valuation for Determining Exter-  
nality Costs, *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 34 (2000) 1390–1395.
- 23 [104] L.S. Dixon, S. Garber, M. Vaiana, California's Ozone-Reduction Strategy for Light-Duty  
Vehicles: An Economic Assessment, Rand, 1996, [http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/  
MR695.1/](http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR695.1/), accessed 06.27.2004.
- 25 [105] J. Tirole, *The Theory of Industrial Organization*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.
- 27 [106] J.L. Sullivan, R.E. Baker, B.A. Boyer, R.H. Hammerle, T.E. Kenney, L. Muniz, T.J.  
Wallington, CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Benefit of Diesel (versus Gasoline) Powered Vehicles, *Environ.  
Sci. Technol.* 38 (12) (2004) 3217–3233.
- 29
- 31
- 33
- 35
- 37
- 39
- 41

QA :4

QA :5



AUTHOR QUERY FORM

**ELSEVIER**

# **Sustainability Science and Engineering**

JOURNAL TITLE:	SUSE
ARTICLE NO:	1023

*Queries and / or remarks*