The Road from Serfdom
In Defense of Libertarianism

by Jacob F.M. Oslick
“More often than not you hear so-called conservatives constantly singing the praises of the free market and stressing individualism rather than speaking about tradition and the spirit of community. The libertarians have so polluted the intellectual waters of true conservatism with their ideological filth that many conservatives now have trouble distinguishing between the two.”

—C.J. Carnacchio,

The Michigan Review, 4/1/99

For the past few months I’ve been salivating at a chance to respond to fellow Review columnist C.J. Carnacchio’s diatribe on my intellectual countrymen, with a classical-liberal counter-assault. Specifically, I take issue with Mr. Carnacchio’s talk of conservatives needing to defend “tradition,” and “community.” Of course, what conservatives really mean when they speak of such values is some form of government regulation of personal behavior. After all, political philosophy is not so much about mental  pathways (everyone favors their conception of “community” and “tradition”), but the halls of enforceable power. In a sense, conservatism constitutes moral authoritarianism, with the belief in certain universal virtues that should be imposed, and traditions uphold irregardless of cost.

In reality, of course, conservatives sometimes ignore this intellectual heritage. Thus, even though slavery was an essential part of the human condition for generations, I think you’d hardly find a conservative supporting its reinstitution on the grounds of “tradition.” Still, while accepting that past traditions may err towards evil, conservatives fail to apply this logic to the present day. Thus, self-identified conservatives form the assault lines in battles against gays, they continue to support tyrannical drug and prostitution laws, all upon the grounds of “community” and “tradition,” not to mention “virtue.” Mr. Carnacchio is correct to say I consider myself heir to the original ideals of the French Revolution. Indeed, I constantly reaffirm that, if government repressive becomes intolerable, a citizen has not only the right but the obligation to revolt. Mr. Carnacchio, on other hand, feels that oppression today is just, provided one’s ancestors were oppressed in a similar fashion a century ago, and thus such tyranny can be considered a “tradition,” or “virtue.” What they continuously neglect, though, is that “virtue” is not universal, but subjective based on personal opinions, and on the gulf of time (as it becomes a tradition). As Prof. Ralph Williams lectured on Dante’s anti-semitism, in a freshman year course of mine, “Forgive us our virtues O Lord, for we know not what we do.”

Conversely, Libertarians have nothing against “tradition” in general; they simply feel it should be limited by two general rules: 1) One’s cultural traditions should not be imposed on another lacking those customs; and 2) One’s traditions mustn’t violate the inalienable rights of another. Accordingly, despite being a steadfast classical liberal, I hold tight to beliefs and traditions considered antiquated by most of the world — from creationism to calling out thrice daily for the restoration of animal sacrifice.  But, as a classical liberal I limit my demands — the right for me to act and worship as I wish, without demanding likewise of others.

Conservatives often make this mistake. Nowhere else is this more clearly elucidated than in our totalitarian drug law system. A conservative feels that, because it offends his moral sensitivities, people should must be prevented from purchasing substances they feel will increase their enjoyment. The libertarian looks at the drug trade from a different perspective: the dealer profits because he is able to exchange goods he doesn’t want, for money to buy things he’d rather consume. The buyer purchases a substance he evidently considers more valuable then the bundle of goods he otherwise would have spent that money on. Effectively, both parties profit from trade. From the classical liberal view, only this matters: that an informed consent between two willing parties occurs. The sensitivities of others are irrelevant, as they are not direct parties to the transaction, and as such have no moral right to declare their world view superior to that of their fellow. In short, the libertarian agrees with John Stuart Mill that “the sole end for which mankind are warranted either individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.”

It is precisely because of this doctrine that libertarians often get confused with anarchists, or receive attacks such as the one Mr. Carnacchio threw last June: “Many libertarians worship the free market as if it were a religion — indeed many have no trouble replacing the cross with a dollar sign.” The reality, of course, is that, while classical liberals place a high value on individual choice, they recognize certain instances where government regulation is a necessity. Indeed, liberals often seem quite surprised by some non-market methods I favor, such as a per-unit tax on pollution, or third-world debt relief. Yet I carefully take this verse from Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom to heart: “The fact that we have to resort to the substitution of direct authority where the conditions for the proper working of competition cannot be created does not prove that we should suppress competition where it can be made to function.” MR