Israel Syria War
Subject:
opeds: Stratetic
Depth and Other Myths - "Ha'aretz" 30 June 1995
Date:
Fri, 7 Jul
1995 08:11:15 +0300
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STRATEGIC DEPTH AND OTHER MYTHS
Article by Ze'ev Maoz, "Ha'aretz", June 30, 1995
Are the Golan Heights strategically important? Indeed
they are, but not
necessarily by means of an Israeli presence. The Golan
plateau becomes
important for Israel's defense when it is demilitarized.
Demilitarization
and an international presence together will provide a
deterrent, early
warning, and strategic depth. One gets the impression
of late that, in the
debate on the peace settlement with Syria, two completely
different camps
are facing each other from opposite sides of the political
divide. The
first is composed of high-profile "defense types" who,
because their feet
are firmly planted in the soil of reality, consider the
Golan Heights a
strategic asset that should not be forfeited. The second
camp is made up
of people perceived to be "white doves," a naive motley
group that is
prepared to purchase, for a piece of paper, the illusion
of peace without
true security. Not only generals have joined the first
camp, but also one
or two Orientalists who have come a long way in order
to warn against the
headlong rush to renounce strategic assets.
The Government of Israel is at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
the opposition in
the war for domestic public opinion. If the Government
propagandizes
overtly in favor of far-reaching territorial concessions,
it will weaken
its bargaining power with the Syrians (and the Americans).
If it abandons
the public arena to the opposition's propaganda, it will
harm its chances
of earning the public's consent to the peace treaty in
a referendum.
Beyond the problem of the political balance of forces,
there is an
imbalance in the very debate on security in Israel. As
the issue is
reflected in the media, the opponents of withdrawal from
the Golan Heights
have a monopoly in commentary on security with respect
to the peace treaty
with Syria.
The security debate on the strategic importance of the
Golan Heights
should focus on whether there are better or more preferable
alternatives
to ceding territory under the peace accord. To approach
this question with
logic -- not merely with political rhetoric -- it is
worth comparing the
advantages and disadvantages of two alternative scenarios.
One envisions
Israel retaining the Golan Heights without peace (even
those who oppose
withdrawal admit that it is unlikely that the Syrians
will agree to a
"peace for peace" settlement in the foreseeable future).
The other
foresees a peace treaty with security arrangements that
include
demilitarization, early-warning systems, and international
buffer forces,
with the Golan Heights not in Israeli hands. (Even those
who favor a
settlement and withdrawal from the Heights are unwilling
to go ahead
without these security measures.)
According to the opponents of withdrawal, Israel benefits
from holding the
Golan in several ways. First, its control acts as a deterrent.
It is the
presence of the Israel Defence Forces sixty kilometers
from Damascus that
deters Syria from attacking Israel. Second, the Golan
provides a
long-horizon early-warning capability by hosting early-warning
stations
right to the outskirts of Damascus, peering deep into
Syrian territory. A
third advantage is strategic depth that protects the
Galilee from attacks
and shellings.
There are three basic problems with the argument of the
Golan as a
deterrent. First, there is a precedent that shows it
to be fallacious.
Israel was stationed as close to Damascus in 1973 as
it is today (even
closer on some parts of the front), but this did not
deter the Syrians,
under Hafez al-Assad, from attacking. Second, a reliable
deterrent is
based not only on persuading the enemy that the cost
of a strike far
outweighs its benefits, but also on reducing the enemy's
political
motivation to strike. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked
even though they
did not think they could destroy Israel. Israel's continued
control of the
Golan Heights whets the Syrian motivation to seize by
force what the
opponents of withdrawal would deny it through a political
process. Third,
Israel's presence on the Golan crimps the possibility
of its embarking on
a preventive war or even a pre-emptive strike. Because
the Golan
ostensibly provides a margin of security, Israel's political
ability to
justify a pre-emptive strike is virtually nil -- another
precedent that
came to light in the Yom Kippur War. This means that
an IDF presence on
the Heights forces Israel to adopt a defensive policy,
in which it must
absorb the first blow.
The second argument, of the Golan as an early-warning
system, is
empirically baseless. Israeli warning stations on Mount
Hermon and
elsewhere on the Heights did not keep the Syrians from
achieving an effect
of total surprise in the Yom Kippur War. They did not
even warn the
soldiers stationed in the Mt. Hermon post that was captured
by the
Syrians. The warning stations do provide Israel with
visual depth, but
there are other ways of achieving this.
Moreover, as the Agranat Commission report shows, the
basic problem is not
the lack of intelligence information but the misevaluation
of such
information as exists. With the massing of Syrian regular
forces near the
frontier -- and in the absence of peace we cannot dictate
to the Syrians
how to deploy their armed forces on their own soil --
the early-warning
stations provide good information on the tactical level
but are poor
substitutes for good evaluation. In the absence of peace,
and with a large
Syrian deployment near the frontier, the evaluation problem
is especially
serious. In contrast, security arrangements that include
demilitarized
zones and dilution of forces may be preferable to early-warning
stations
as sources of information and are an extremely important
element in
strategic evaluation. A Syrian breach of demilitarization
or thinning of
forces would be very easy to detect and would attest
clearly to aggressive
intentions. By explicitly defining such a violation as
the crossing of a
red line, it would also provide sufficient reason for
a pre-emptive
strike.
As for strategic depth, the basis of this myth is the
argument that
Israel's situation in the Yom Kippur War would have been
far worse without
its presence on the Golan Heights. Because of its control
of the Heights,
the war was waged there. Had the Syrians possessed the
Golan, they could
have exploited their topographical advantage to attack
the Galilee and cut
off northern Israel, if not worse. However, what happened
in the Yom
Kippur War on the Golan front may recur under far worse
conditions in the
future. On the eve of the war, the Syrian army held a
10:1 advantage over
the IDF on the Golan front in total order of forces and
in the number of
tanks, artillery muzzles, formations, and the like. How
are things today?
According to Brigadier General (res.) Arye Shalev, in
his article "Peace
and Security on the Golan Heights," the ratio today,
in de facto
peacetime, is not much better. Five or six Syrian divisions
are deployed
in the area between Damascus and the Golan Heights, as
against one Israeli
division.
The Syrian army is based on regular forces with a ground
component that is
largely mechanized. Such an army can switch from a peacetime
deployment to
an offensive one in a matter of hours. In contrast, even
if Israel's
ability to mobilize its reserves or move masses of regular
forces to the
Golan has improved since 1973, it still needs 48-72 hours
to do so. In
other words, our situation on the Golan is not much better
than it was on
the eve of the Yom Kippur War. In the absence of a peace
treaty with
Syria, Israel cannot influence the size of the forces
stationed in
southwestern Syria, nor can it expand its regular order
of forces in the
Golan in peacetime because of IDF constraints. Nor can
Israel mobilize its
reserves on such a large scale whenever the Syrians elect
to mass
additional troops on the Golan front.
Another substantial difference between the situation today
and that
preceding the Yom Kippur War magnifies the expected cost
of a Syrian
surprise attack. The Jewish civilian population on the
Golan has grown
from fewer than 4,000 to 14,000. Once Syria's aggressive
intentions became
known in 1973, the first action the IDF took was to evacuate
the Golan
settlements. Would it be possible to evacuate 14,000
people on a few
hours' notice at a time when the few and narrow traffic
arteries in the
area must be reserved for the convoys heading up the
Heights? What will
happen if even this much notice is not given? Moreover,
the
anti-withdrawal people favor the expansion of Israeli
settlement in the
Golan -- justifiably, from their point of view. Suppose
that the Syrians
attack not this year but in five years' time, and suppose
that the
settlement enterprise on the Golan had succeeded in the
interim. Then, on
the eve of a Syrian attack, 50,000 Israelis will be residing
on the
Heights. How are we to evacuate them? And if this happens,
what will have
become of our strategic depth?
The claim that the Golan provides strategic depth that
protects the
Galilee has led to an absurdity: We are simply transferring
the Galilee to
the Golan, and the problem of defending the Galilee today
will turn into a
problem of how to defend the Jewish population of the
Golan a few years
hence. Or are those who favor our continued control of
the Heights arguing
that the lives of Golan residents are cheaper than those
of Galileans?
Let us also dismiss to the claim about the placing of
Syrian guns out of
range of the Jewish population. First, even today, 14,000
Israelis are
within range of Syrian guns. What about the population
of the Galilee or
the northern Negev? Yes, territory is important even
in the missile era,
but it no longer affords protection against a strike
at the rear.
According to the 1994 edition of the Jaffee Center's
strategic annual, The
Middle East Military Balance, the Syrians have sixty-two
Frog-7 missile
launchers (60 km. range, payload capacity of 450 kilograms
of TNT),
Scud-Bs (280 km. range, payload capacity of 800-1,000
kilograms of TNT),
Scud-Cs (500 km. range, payload capacity of 700 kilograms
of TNT), and
SS-21 missiles (70-120 km. range, payload capacity of
120 kilograms of
TNT). Thus, all of Israel is within Syrian missile range,
with or without
the Golan Heights. The correct conclusion to adduce is
that Israel should
negotiate for arms control with emphasis on surface-to-surface
missiles.
In the absence of peace, however, the arms race with
respect to these
missiles will not slacken and will almost definitely
escalate. Do the
Golan Heights have strategic importance? They do indeed,
but not
necessarily by means of an Israeli presence. The Golan
plateau is
important to Israel's defense when it is free of all
Jewish inhabitants
and all soldiers, Syrian and Israeli alike -- i.e., when
it is
demilitarized. Not only should the Golan itself be demilitarized;
so
should a large area to its east (including the thinning-of-forces
areas).
The security importance of the Heights manifests itself
not in the
positioning of one IDF division against six Syrian divisions
in peacetime,
but in the presence of a large international buffer force
(at least a brigade).
Good security arrangements may allow Israel to affect
the size and
deployment of Syrian forces outside the Heights. Finally,
a peace treaty
may include an arms-control regime with respect to surface-to-surface
missiles. The two factors, demilitarization and a sizable
international
presence, will combine to provide a deterrent, early
warning, and
strategic depth -- the very advantages that are attributed
to the Israeli
civilian and military presence on the Golan.
Withdrawal from the Golan Heights may enhance Israel's
deterrent capacity,
because in order to violate the agreement the Syrians
would have to seek
the removal of international forces. They would then
have to consider the
international cost of such an action and recall that
Israel's (ostensibly)
smaller margins of security will give it greater leeway
for strategic
operations such as preventive war and a pre-emptive strike.
The
demilitarization of the Golan and the area to its east
increases Israel's
deterrent because any violation of the demilitarization
and
thinning-of-forces agreements is tantamount to a casus
belli. Detection of
such violations neither presents a substantial intelligence
problem in
terms of information-gathering nor permits latitude in
strategic
evaluation. Paradoxically, the likelihood of a sudden
strike against
Israel without the Golan is much lower than its likelihood
when the IDF
mans the Golan early-warning stations. No one doubts
that if Syria decides
to attack Israel, it is better to fight on the Golan
than in the Galilee.
To do so, however, we would have to treat the Golan Heights
as a killing
field, as we did with the Sinai Peninsula. True, the
Golan is a
topographically dominant area, which makes it necessary
for Israel to have
a massive military presence there in the event of a war.
This should be an
important consideration in formulating the security arrangements.
This is
why Israel has demanded that the demilitarization and
thinning-of-forces
provisions include areas east of the current frontier
(as they do today).
The IDF would have to be able to occupy the Golan rapidly
at the first
violation of the demilitarization arrangements. These
solutions will
require the use of appropriate technology and agile,
mobile forces. The
political
circumstances that would sanction such activity must
also be set forth in
the security arrangements. Therefore, the first step
in the case of crisis
with the Syrians must be the rapid stationing of IDF
forces on a
civilian-free Golan Heights.
This leads to two major conclusions. First, a set of weighty
strategic
considerations favors security arrangements under a peace
treaty over
retention of the Golan Heights without peace. The strategic
picture is not
as cut-and-dried as those who favor our staying on the
Golan would have us
believe. Second, strategy is a world of uncertainty and
risk. There is no
perfect solution, and any solution is susceptible to
subversion. The way
to confront the aforementioned strategic problems is
through serious and
methodical discussion as opposed to a unilateral presentation
of the
problem as a confrontation between realists and idealists.
(The author is the head of the JAFFEE Center for Strategic
Studies. The
article does not necessarily reflect the Center's views.)
THERE WILL BE NO WAR
(Analysis by Amos Gilboa, "Ma'ariv", Jan 8, 1997, p.
B2)
I recently had a radio installed in my car; while it
was being installed,
a conversation was struck up between the salesman and
myself. "Are you an
officer, by chance?" he asked. "In the reserves," I replied.
"In what
corps?" he pressed me. "Intelligence," I replied. "Tell
me, will there be
a war between us and the Syrians?" he asked. "Are you
afraid?" I inquired.
"Yes, certainly," he replied. "Then don't be afraid,"
I told him.
I have no doubt that most of the people are afraid. Their
heads -- not the
Syrians', but ours! -- are already bloated with the threats
of war. Day in
and day out they hear that the likelihood of war has
risen recently. But,
this is not so.
The question is not whether war will break out, but rather
what factors
are liable to push Syria into a war against Israel and
under what
circumstances, and what factors and circumstances are
preventing Syria
from going to war. Let us see what we had in past wars,
or why the Arabs
in general, and the Syrians in particular, made war on
us.
In 1948, the Arab armies went to war with the objective
of preventing the
establishment of the state. They were convinced that
they would succeed in
defeating this new Jewish army which had arisen; except
for the Syrian
army, they were defeated.
In 1956, we were the ones who initiated the war.
In 1967, there was deterioration which ended in war with
Egypt. This
deterioration came against the background of a general
Arab preparation --
under Abd el-Nasser's leadership -- for war against Israel
with the
objective of annihilating it. To achieve this goal, a
joint Arab command
was set up, and preparatory stages for the war were determined,
at Arab
summits; Syria was an overlapping excess to the war itself.
The 1973 Yom Kippur War was, in practice, the first and
last war up to
now, which the Arabs initiated and prepared for. Egypt
led the
preparations. It is possible to summarize the factors
which pushed Egypt
into this war, in four groups:
* The temptation and provocation. The temptation to attack
Israel was low;
the IDF was strong and the Egyptian army did not have
the ability to fight
in the vastness of Sinai. But despite this, provocation
to go to war was
compelling. There was national motivation to erase the
humiliating defeat
of 1967. It was clear to Sadat that it was impossible
to go on in that
degrading position. Provocation gained over low temptation.
Lack of
recourse superseded the dangers.
* Governmental considerations. In other words, victory
or resounding
defeat and their implications on the lifespan of the
regime. With respect
to Sadat, it is possible to say today that he felt that
the actual act of
going to war would strengthen his regime, regardless
of the results.
* Pan-Arabic considerations. The compelling circumstantial
considerations
that pushed Egypt was the readiness of the Arab oil states
to impose an
oil embargo until "Israel completes a full withdrawal
from all the
territories captured in June 1967 and human rights are
restored to the
Palestinian people."
* International considerations. Chronologically, 1973
represented the
height of the Cold War between the two super powers.
The primary factor
that pushed Sadat was the consideration that the balance
of terror between
the two powers and their strong interests in the Middle
East will buy him
the freedom to maneuver and will prevent a humiliation
for Egypt.
Syria was then dragged in after Egypt. It neither initiated
nor devised
the war and the two groups of aforementioned factors
that pushed Sadat,
played no role for Assad.
In order to prepare for war, in 1973 the Syrian army
engaged in 6 months
of intensive training, accompanied by accelerated arms
acquisitions from
the Soviet Union.
And now, at the beginning of 1997? The IDF is preparing
for the worst
possibilities, and that is its job. A calm and considered
evaluation of
the four criteria lead me to conclude that the forces
pushing Syria to war
have not yet ripened and are still weak.
joust%
From analysis@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL Mon Feb 3 16:35:05
1997
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 1995 09:12:45 +0200
From: IIS News Analysis <analysis@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL>
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Subject: opeds: Warning Stations or Deterrent Stations
- "Davar" 6 Dec 1995
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WARNING STATIONS OR DETERRENT STATIONS
(Commentary by Levi Morav, "Davar Rishon", Dec 6, 1995,
p.7)
The return of Dennis Ross, the American envoy to the
peace talks with
Syria, to the region, has again raised the blood pressure
of Golan Heights
residents. At the same time, some color has returned
to the cheeks of
Third Way members, whose economic-social-political platform
focussed on
the struggle for continued Israeli control of the Golan.
Yossi Beilin is
again being interviewed on radio and television, and
being asked about the
secret channel.
The media, which completely missed the Israeli-Palestinian
channel in
Oslo, will not be caught with its pants down again. In
light of the
increasing noise on the northern front, the popular question
has become
whether something is actually happening, or whether we
are just witnessing
pointless maneuvering. The answer, which comes as no
surprise, is
complicated -- not only because of our Syrian rival,
but due no less, to
conceptual obstacles, which we ourselves have created.
It should be made clear that Syrian President Hafez Assad
is not making
any effort to facilitate either the resumption of negotiations,
or real
progress toward a comprehensive settlement. True, the
Syrians have been
talking in a softer tone, but their positions remain
as rigid as before.
There is more than a shred of truth in Minister Beilin's
criticism of
Syria's refusal to open a secret channel. Israel's three
major agreements
-- with Egypt, Jordan and the PLO -- were preceded by
secret, complex
contacts. And yet Assad continues to refuse. He wants
everything to be
open to the naked eye.
The big question -- to which there is no clear answer
-- is whether the
Syrian president has truly decided in favor of a peace
settlement with
Israel on the basis of "territory for full peace." More
and more, the
impression is that Assad would be happy if he could have
had the Golan
Heights in exchange for a peace agreement with the United
States. While it
is true that he is having problems as a result of our
(mainly political)
difficulty in winning the support of a majority in the
current Knesset for
any accord that involves a withdrawal from the Golan,
Assad is incapable
of adopting the same approach as Sadat, Arafat and King
Hussein -- which
stipulates that agreement itself creates a dynamic within
the other side.
There may not be a clear majority in the current Knesset
for a withdrawal
from the Golan in exchange for a full peace accord --
but a solid
majority, if a small one, among the people support the
idea. This majority
is not a static phenomenon, and may expand or shrink
depending upon the
behavior of the Syrians. In fact, the greatness of Sadat,
the architect of
the peace accord with Egypt, lay in his ability to bring
about a dramatic
shift in Israeli public opinion -- by flying to Israel,
coming to
Jerusalem and speaking to the Knesset -- to the point
that the "territory
(Sinai) for peace accords" position, which until then
had been advocated
by only a marginal left-wing group, was widely adopted.
Since Assad is neither mentally nor politically built
for such acts -- and
since a peace settlement with the Syrians is of first-level
strategic
importance for Israel -- I believe that there is room
to examine those
elements of the Israeli position which can make it easier
for the Syrians
to swallow the heavy price of an Israeli flag flying
over the Israeli
embassy in Damascus.
The first, and apparently primary, difficulty is what
has been described
as ground-based warning stations. Israel, with the support
of the United
States, has been firm in insisting that such stations
be constructed on
Syrian territory and on the areas of the Golan which
are evacuated. This,
in order to prevent a situation in which Syrian tanks
might roll, without
anything to stop them, toward the Galilee Panhandle and
the Jordan Valley.
The Syrians are refusing to permit this for two reasons.
Firstly, on a
matter of principle, Damascus is not prepared to accept
a foreign presence
on sovereign Syrian territory. The second, more secret,
reason is that
this would give Israel the option to launch an offensive
with the greatest
speed.
Israel is also aware of this logic. The question of whether
it is possible
to concede on these stations is the major one. Alternatively,
it can be
asked whether a genuine Syrian concession in some other
area -- such as
the distance of the military frontline from the shores
of the Sea of
Galilee, or continued Israeli rule (by lease) over the
Golan ridgeline --
can be obtained in exchange for Israel changing its position
on the issue
of the warning stations. In any event, the practical
issue is the
existence of some workable alternative to provide Israel
with the precious
time it requires to move armored units to face a Syrian
attack. The
military objective is to concentrate armored divisions
on top of the
Heights, and not exhaust them in battle on the slope.
It appears that Israel and the United States have sufficient
alternatives
- - from human intelligence (agents) to electronic devices
in space and/or
the stratosphere -- to prevent a Syrian surprise, and
to enable Israeli
forces to arrive rapidly at the foot of the Heights.
At the same time, it
is important to recall that Israel does not need to attack
Syrian armor
moving on the Golan. The movement of a substantial Israeli
force into
Lebanon's Beka'a Valley is likely to constitute more
of a deterrent to
Damascus than the re-conquest of the Golan. Clearly,
a pincer movement on
the Golan and in Lebanon should prevent Syria from entertaining
the
possibility of any such unconsidered thought.
Beyond the tactical and intelligence calculations (of
a military nature),
it is worthwhile to note that -- on the strategic level
-- we face no real
danger from the Syrians on the ground. Syria does not
aspire to liberate
the Galilee and grant Syrian citizenship to its Arab
inhabitants. Nor is
Syria capable, on the global or Arab level, of starting
a war with Israel.
It does not have the support of a foreign superpower,
and there is a clear
international coalition against any form of initiating
hostilities. Except
for southern Lebanon, where a guerrilla war against Israel
is being
conducted, there is no Arab state that would support
such a Syrian
adventure.
As a result, Israel can allow itself not only to be generous,
but also to
take calculated risks on the Golan Heights and the Syrian
front. It seems
that Peres understands this, and that Beilin is prepared
to act in this
way. Despite the fact that they do not have a majority
government, they
believe that a change in the Syrian position will also
bring about a
change here -- exactly like what happened on the Norwegian
track. That is
not to say that, this time, it will work out as well.
Assad is not Arafat,
for good and for bad.
Syrian Terrorism
WHO IS BLOWING UP BUSES IN DAMASCUS?
(Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff, "Ha'aretz", Jan 14, 1997,
p. B1)
The Syrian government's false charge, that Israel is
responsible for the
severe act of terrorism by bombing a passenger bus in
Damascus, worries
Israel. True, it is possible to dismiss the falsehood
by asserting that it
is Syrian nonsense, but the concern is that the Syrians
are planning some
mischief. Therefore, Israel turned to the Egyptians and
the Americans with
a request to inform the Damascus authorities, on its
behalf, that we have
nothing to do with the savage act of terrorism against
Syrian civilians.
The messages were delivered to their destination, but
Damascus stuck to
its position. In addition to the accusations, there are
also threats from
Damascus that Syria will exact payment from Israel, which
is supposed to
suffer from terrorist attacks.
What is worrisome and serious in and of itself, is the
fact that it is
fairly clear that the Syrians know the truth. They are
searching for the
guilty parties elsewhere, and the best evidence of this
are the mass
arrests that Syrian intelligence is conducting among
the Turkmen
population. This is something that cannot be hidden.
If they accuse Israel
of the attack, why are they detaining so many Turkmen
and subjecting them
to harsh interrogations? Everything is apparently connected
to the
murderous struggle being waged between the Kurdish PKK
-- whose commander,
Ojilan, lives in Damascus and from there issues the orders
to carry out
raids on Turkish villages across the border into Turkey.
In these raids,
Turkish civilians are brutally murdered -- men, women
and children.
All of this has been going on for a long time, and Turkish
intelligence
apparently decided to respond. At first, there were warning
actions
against Syrians in Lebanon, actions without casualties.
The Syrians
already knew then that these were in retaliation for
PKK attacks. Syrian
intelligence did not remain silent and it too carried
out a terrorist
bombing in Turkey, again, a warning action without casualties.
The next --
more serious -- stage, in retaliation for attacks by
the PKK, whose
headquarters are in Damascus, was apparently the bus
bombing. The result
is that a country which supports terrorism, and permits
attacks by
terrorist organizations from its territory, is itself
being forced to
contend with terrorism.
It is difficult for the Damascus authorities to explain
this complication
to the Syrian population. Therefore, they chose the easy
propaganda
excuse: Israel is to blame. However, it is possible that
this is more than
a search for a scapegoat for propaganda purposes; that
it is an attempt to
exploit an opportunity in advance of terrorist and violent
moves against
Israel. The Americans also suspect this and therefore,
they were quick to
come out against the unsubstantiated Syrian accusation
against Israel.
Speaking of terrorism, Damascus is suspected of involvement
in the
explosion in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 25 June last year,
in which 19
Americans were killed. A Saudi Shi'ite suspect, Jaffar
Shawikat, who was
detained by the Syrians, suddenly "committed suicide"
in jail when the
Saudis announced that they intended to question him.
The Americans also
suspect that someone in the Syrian jail helped him make
his "exit" before
he could expose his ties. And when the bus explosion
occurred in Damascus,
the Syrians used this to steer attention away from the
investigation in
Dhahran, to Israel.
The claim is that Israel also blows up buses in acts
of terrorism. Syria
is not the only one suspected of being a terrorist state.
The Israelis,
according to this claim, are in the same terrorism boat,
and therefore
Israel deserves to have its buses blown up, as has already
happened a
number of times. The timing, too, is not bad. If the
negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians are encountering serious
difficulties, it is
clear that a severe terrorist act in Israel by an organization
such as
Islamic Jihad could put an end to them. This is a good
option for Damascus
when it suits Syrian needs.
The timing also coincides with the possibility that the
Americans will
again try to renew the negotiations between Israel and
Syria. The Syrians
-- true to form -- usually accompany a political move
with violence. This
can be done in southern Lebanon through Hizballah or
other organizations
under Syrian influence, or through terrorist organizations
like Islamic
Jihad which are looking for an opportunity to act inside
Israel via
suicide terrorism. That is what worries Israel. The concern
is that
Damascus is planning a new escalation with Israel.
Subject:
opeds: Syrian
Missiles Prime Strategic Threat-"Yediot", Jun 22 1997
Date:
Sun, 29 Jun
1997 07:14:30 +0200
From:
IIS News Analysis
<analysis@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL>
Reply-To:
ASK@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL
To:
Multiple recipients
of list ISRAEL-MIDEAST <ISRAEL-MIDEAST@PANKOW.INTER.NET.IL>
=====================================================================
Information
Division, Israel Foreign Ministry - Jerusalem
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Note:
The translations of articles from the Hebrew press
are prepared by the Government Press Office
as a service to foreign journalists in Israel.
They express the views of the authors.
--------------------------------------------------------
SYRIAN MISSILES -- THE PRIMARY STRATEGIC THREAT TO ISRAEL
(Article by Ron Ben-Yishai, "Yediot Ahronot", June 22,
1997, pp.8-9)
THE SYRIANS ESTIMATE THAT ISRAEL HAS NO EFFECTIVE RESPONSE
TO A MISSILE
ATTACK ON IT. DAMASCUS' INTENTION: TO DETER ISRAEL FOR
THE NEXT FEW YEARS,
UNTIL THE "ARROW" MISSILE BECOMES OPERATIONAL. THUS SYRIA
WILL BE ABLE TO
CARRY OUT A LIMITED MILITARY OPERATION TO REVIVE THE
PEACE PROCESS. OVER
THE LAST MONTHS FORTIFIED LAUNCH SITES HAVE BEEN BUILT,
AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL WARHEADS ACCELERATED. EXPERIMENTS
WITH VX GAS --
FAILED. ISRAEL TORPEDOED SYRIAN MISSILE DEAL WITH CHINA
-- BY DIPLOMATIC
MEANS.
Syria is investing its main effort, in its preparations
for a possible
imminent confrontation with Israel, in accelerating improvement
of its
missile arm. That is what western intelligence agencies,
as well as
academics who closely monitor events in Syria, are saying.
According to
these sources, the heads of the Syrian army estimate
that Israel has no
sufficient military response to the ballistic missile
threat, and that its
Home-Front is particularly vulnerable to an attack of
this kind. For this
reason, in the last two years, the Syrians have sharply
cut budgets for
development and equipment-acquisition in the ground,
air and naval forces.
They are investing the money thus saved in improving
and broadening their
strategic missile disposition.
FORTIFIED LAUNCH SITES ----------------------
In the last months operations have been accelerated in
a number of areas
in Syria, including some far from the border with Israel,
extensive
construction activity of infrastructure for launch sites
has been
observed. Among other things, launch sites for Scud "B"
and "C" missiles
have been fortified against the possibility of air attacks.
Syria is
trying by these actions to repeat one of the achievements
of Iraq in the
Gulf War. Iraq built a large number of fortified shelters,
where they hid
the trucks which transported the Scud missiles. Some
of the large numbers
of shelters of this kind remained empty. Missile launches
were carried out
swiftly: the truck would leave the shelter, launch the
missile and return.
By night the trucks were moved to different shelters.
Thus, the U.S. air
force had difficulty locating the launchers. In addition,
intensive
efforts are being made to check the compatibility of
Syrian-made warheads
with these missiles. Under discussion are warheads that
carry nerve-gases,
and possibly also biological-warfare substances.
Western intelligence sources report that the Syrians are
experiencing
difficulties in rendering their chemical warheads --
currently the most
lethal in their possession -- compatible with their Scud
missiles. The
effort to fit the Scud with a VX nerve gas warhead --
considered the most
dangerous of all gases currently in use, has also apparently
until now
failed to yield definite results.
WEAKENING OF THE ISRAELI HOME-FRONT -----------------------------------
The reasons why Syria is placing emphasis on what it calls
the "Strategic
missile arm" derive from the lessons Syria and other
states in the region
inferred from the experience of recent wars. For example,
the relative
weakness of their air forces, the successful use by Iraq
of missiles in
its war with Iran and in the second Gulf War, the inability
of the
Americans and their allies to find an appropriate response
in the Gulf
War, after they did not succeed in their attempt to destroy
the mobile
missile launchers. But the main lesson from the Syrian
point of view was
the response of Israeli citizens to the missile attacks
on the home front.
"As a result of the deterrent effect in this area", says
David Ivry,
senior adviser on strategic issues to the Defense Minister,
"ground to
ground missiles have become the main strategic threat
facing the State of
Israel. Not only Syria, but also Iran, Egypt and Iraq
are developing or
conserving their capability in this area."
UNTIL THE "ARROW" IS READY --------------------------
The Syrians, claim the intelligence sources, have reached
the conclusion
that the "window of military opportunity" -- that is
to say their ability
to threaten Israel with missiles -- is open for as long
as the "Arrow"
missile, and other means for intercepting missiles and
destroying
launching sites, have not yet come into operation. In
other words, the
fact of the missile threat gives to the Syrians in the
short term an
"umbrella", under the protection of which they might
launch a limited
military strike against Israel, the intention of which
would be to
kickstart the political process, without facing a heavy
blow in response
from the IDF.
The Syrians consider that Israel currently has no satisfactory
response to
missiles. Therefore -- from fear of a Syrian missile
strike -- the Israeli
government will be prevented from a too-hard response
to a Syrian military
operation limited in time and scope.
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN IDF ----------------------------
The IDF is aware of the Syrian intention to make use of
missiles as a
means to restrict the hand of Israel in the context of
a possible imminent
military confrontation. The Israeli security establishment
and the IDF is
therefore currently devoting serious thought and large
budgets to the
development of systems and means to counter the problem.
Similar efforts
are taking place in the air and ground arms of the IDF.
The intention is
to build a joint air and ground offensive capability
that will prevent the
launching of ground-to-ground missiles also from sites
in distant northern
Syria. Parallel to this, the Defense Ministry is quietly
carrying out
diplomatic operations which, inter-alia, will bring about
the cancellation
of a deal in which the Syrians were to acquire Chinese
M-9 ground to
ground missiles.
ISRAEL'S TOP ONLINE NEWS SOURCE
Tuesday, September 16, 1997 14 Elul 5757
ISRAEL TIME:
IDF: Syria preparing for partial retake of
Golan
By BATSHEVA TSUR
JERUSALEM (September 16) - Syria has stepped up its preparations
for a
surprise attack on Israel, even though it would prefer
a political settlement that
would get it the Golan Heights, a senior intelligence
officer told the Knesset
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee yesterday.
Damascus has plans to try to recapture part of the heights,
he said, and to use
this to force Israel's hands in negotiations. The Syrian
interest in this option is
growing, he said.
The Syrians view the US as the most effective broker of
a peace solution, the
officer said. But they will not agree to renew the talks
with Israel until they
have a promise Israel will return to the pre-June 1967
borders.
Syria continues to enjoy a promise of Iranian support
if attacked, the officer
said. But Iran, he said, is no less fanatical under the
new regime and still poses
the greatest threat to the region.
The Russians are "massively" involved in producing non-conventional
warheads
for Iran, and US intervention has failed to stop them.
"We could see a
prototype ready within a year or a year-and-a-half -
ahead of earlier
predictions," he said.
Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, who also briefed the
committee, said he
is in favor of renewing talks with Damascus. US Secretary
of State Madeleine
Albright's visit to the Syrian capital had "yielded partial
results," he said. "At
present it is an indirect process," Mordechai said, adding
he would like to see
direct talks.
"It is not by coincidence that Albright went to Lebanon
[yesterday]," Mordechai
continued. The recent IDF fatalities in Lebanon were
a result of "very
unfortunate coincidences" rather than a change in Hizbullah
tactics, he said.
Nevertheless, it could not be ruled out that these incidents
would encourage
Hizbullah to lay more mines.
The situation is very volatile and Israel is doing its
best to stabilize it without
further deterioration, he said.
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu hinted yesterday that
Israel would be
flexible on the future of the Golan Heights if Syria
agreed to resume peace
talks.
"The result probably will be very different for both of
us from the initial starting
position," Netanyahu said in a speech in Jerusalem. "That's
what negotiations
are for.
"The Syrians are allowed to put forth any demand they
want," he said. "I don't
ask Syria to give up its demands - neither should they
ask us to do so."
by Ze'ev Schiff, 'Ha'aretz', January 21, 1994, p.B5)
\par }\pard \qj\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\adjustright {=20
\par THE DISCUSSIONS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND SYRIA, IN
\par THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES,
WILL
\par BEGIN VERY SOON. THESE ARE THE MINIMUM ISRAELI LINES REQUIRED
TO MAKE
\par AN ARRANGEMENT WITH DAMASCUS POSSIBLE.
\par =20
\par Not only Israel, but Syria as
well, is subject to geographic
\par constraints on the Golan Heights. Until 1967, the
Syrians harassed
\par the Hula Valley settlements. They
worked to undermine Israel's
\par development plans, and attempted to divert the sources of
the Jordan
\par river which were in their territory. In the Six Day War
the situation
\par was reversed. After the Golan Heights were captured
by Israel, the
\par Syrians felt threatened. Their capital, Damascus, is
only about 60
\par kms. from the Israeli lines and there is no difficulty in
bringing it
\par into artillery range. The IDF presence in
southern Lebanon is a
\par reminder to the Syrians of what occurred
in 1982, when the IDF
\par advanced in the Beka'a Valley and positioned
itself on Damascus'
\par flank.
\par >From Israel's standpoint, there is one problem which does
not exist
\par on the Syrian side: the sources of the water which
empty into the
\par Jordan River and Lake Kinneret. The attempt to divert the
sources of
\par the Jordan River was one of the causes of the deterioration
of the
\par situation which led to the Six Day War. If the military
importance of
\par the Golan Heights to Israel emphasizes the operational
sphere, and
\par mainly the defense of the Galilee, the need to protect the
sources of
\par the water is a strategic need.
\par =20
\par It is important to emphasize that if
a peace agreement is not
\par achieved, the military situation on the Golan Heights will
not remain
\par static. Development of precision weapon systems and
munitions will
\par alter the battlefield in the future. These modern systems
will make
\par it possible to hit precise targets, both in
Damascus and deep in
\par Israel. This means that if peace
is not achieved, the mutual
\par perception of threat will become more acute.
\par =20
\par Prior to the Madrid Conference, military changes
took place which
\par must not be ignored. Though Syria
did not succeed in reaching=
strategic parity with Israel, its military capability should
not be
\par denigrated. Syria has developed a military capability
which it did
\par not have in the past and its ability to strike at the
Israeli rear,
\par at population centers and at other targets, enables Syria
to set a
\par heavy price for an Israeli attack on it. Thus, Damascus
has achieved
\par a deterrence capability which it did not previously have.
This is not
\par a strategic balance, but rather a new
mutual deterrence between
\par }\pard \qj\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\adjustright { Israel and Syria.
In=
this equation, the Israeli deterrent capability
\par }\pard \qj\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\adjustright { is indeed greater
than=
that of the Syrians, but the latter is enough
\par for Israel to consider its moves several times,
before undertaking
\par military action deep inside Syria. This is a new element
which must
\par be included in the Israeli security viewpoint.
\par =20
\par >From all of this, it is evident that when we
discuss the security
\par arrangements, there will, of course, also be a
need to take into
\par account the expected changes on the battlefield and in weapon
systems
\par and munitions. From the foregoing, several basic conclusions
may be
\par drawn. First, if Israel withdraws from the
Golan Heights without
\par broad security arrangements, better than those which were
established=
in the Sinai within the framework of the peace with Egypt --
it may
\par feel more threatened than it did before 1967. Therefore,
care must be
\par taken to ensure that the greater the depth of
the withdrawal, the
\par broader the security arrangements. If we are speaking about
a total
\par withdrawal, the security arrangements must be very extensive.
Second,
\par Israel must insist that the agreements guarantee the sources
of the
\par Jordan River.
\par =20
\par It is clear that when Israel determines the minimum conditions
which
\par it needs, it must be extremely careful not to pose a
threat to the
\par other side, as Syria must also avoid doing. Each of the
sides needs
\par to strive for an arrangement that will not give
the other side a
\par reason to shake free of the arrangement and cancel
it. Both sides
\par need to strive for possible arrangements which
will improve their
\par security, not undermine it. An attainable arrangement is
not always
\par synonymous with the ideal arrangement.
\par =20
\par First of all, we are referring to an arrangement which
will greatly
\par reduce the danger of a surprise attack. Israel needs to
strive for an =
arrangement which will grant it strategic depth in the
face of an
\par attack on the ground, in the air and in the ballistic sphere.
It must
\par achieve an improvement in its early warning capability on
the Golan
\par Heights and in Lebanon, in order that it have sufficient
time to call
\par up its reserves in the event of a violation of the agreement.
It must
\par reduce the cost of war in the event that, despite
everything, the
\par agreement does not hold. The agreement
must aid in preventing
\par mistakes in the field and not only in determining who was
the guilty
\par party after the fact. The problem is that in the
Golan Heights, a
\par relatively small area, it is difficult to draw
a territorial line
\par which will ensure equal security for both
sides. Therefore, the
\par arrangement need to be broader -- it cannot be reduced
only to the
\par territorial sphere.
\par =20
\par If an agreement is achieved, it would necessarily lead to
changes in
\par the Israeli military doctrine. All the more so
if, parallel to a
\par }\pard \qj\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\adjustright { withdrawal in the
north,=
the IDF carries out a redeployment in the
\par }\pard \qj\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\adjustright { West Bank,
within the=
framework of the agreement
with the
\par Palestinians. It is clear that the territorial component
of Israel's=
deterrent formula will change: it will be based
more on security
\par arrangements. If those who negotiate on behalf of Israel
succeed in
\par achieving good security arrangements, there is a chance
that under
\par the new conditions of peace we may even be able to improve
our early
\par warning of war. We learned from the Yom Kippur War that
holding the
\par Golan Heights did not help us and that the intelligence
early warning
\par failed. Good security arrangements can add improved early
indications
\par in the event that the other side intends to violate the
agreement and
\par is preparing for an attack. The early warning could be better
than it
\par is today, and allies would be witness to a massive violation
of the
\par agreement. It is true that if, despite everything, the early
warning
\par fails and a Syrian attack begins which would surprise Israel
and the
\par international peace-keeping force -- the lack of an Israeli
military
\par presence would make it much more difficult for the IDF
to recapture
\par the Golan Heights and launch a counterattack.
This is an extreme
\par scenario which would mean not only a Syrian violation
of the peace
\par agreement but also a conflict between Syria and the United
States.
\par =20
\par There is one important condition, which is
not connected to the=
territorial security arrangements: a
Syrian commitment in the
\par framework of the agreement that Damascus will
not join in a war
\par against Israel if another Arab state attacks
us. Syria must also
\par undertake not to cancel its
agreements with Israel if the
\par Palestinians, or another Arab state, violate their
agreements with
\par Israel.
\par =20
\par Lebanon's Integration
\par ---------------------
\par It is impossible to reach satisfactory security arrangements
between
\par Israel and Syria without involving Lebanon in
them. Thus, Lebanon
\par could also benefit from a comprehensive arrangement between
its two
\par stronger neighbors, whose forces are stationed on its land,
and the
\par pressure on it would be reduced.
\par =20
\par Israel cannot agree to a withdrawal from the Golan Heights,
total or
\par nearly total, as long as a Syrian army is
stationed in Lebanon's
\par Beka'a Valley. The inevitable danger created by the
presence of a
\par Syrian army in Lebanon, especially in the Beka'a,
will increase if =
the IDF withdraws from the Golan Heights. Israel
and Syria must
\par undertake, perhaps in the framework of the agreement,
to withdraw
\par from Lebanon. In any case, if Israel withdraws from southern
Lebanon,
\par a Syrian army could not be stationed in the Beka'a Valley.
Israel and
\par Syria even need to state that they have no territorial
demands upon
\par Lebanon, and that they both support
that country's territorial
\par integrity. Both sides also need to undertake not
to operate other
\par forces in Lebanon as proxies (such as Hizballah and the
South Lebanon
\par Army) in an overt or covert war. Lebanon's situation
will improve,
\par but its government must make a commitment that
Lebanese territory
\par will not serve as a base for aggression
against Israel. It must
\par undertake not to permit a foreign army, which is in a
state of war
\par with Israel, to be deployed on its territory (for example,
to expel
\par the Iranian Revolutionary Guards). It
must disarm the militias,
\par especially those operating against Israel. In addition,
Lebanon must
\par undertake not to harm, and not to permit
damage to, the Jordan
\par River's sources which lie in its territory.
\par =20
\par The security arrangements will include various components,
some more=
important than others, but there are two conditions which I feel
must
\par definitely be addressed if Israel seeks to ensure
its security and
\par fundamental interests. If they are not accepted, Israel
will have no
\par choice but to continue with the existing
situation, despite the
\par inherent dangers -- until Damascus becomes reconciled to
them.
\par =20
\par First and foremost is the defense of the sources of
Israel's water.
\par There are two sides to the water issue: one
is connected to Lake
\par Kinneret, which is entirely in the sovereign territory of
Israel; the
\par other is connected to the sources of the Jordan
River, which flow
\par from the Golan Heights. The
matter of Lake Kinneret is more
\par important, since we are talking about the largest
(and only) water
\par reservoir of the State of Israel. Israel can in no way agree
to the
\par Syrians returning again to the shores of Lake Kinneret.
It may be
\par recalled that, up to the Six Day War, the international
border passed
\par about 10 meters from the northeast part of the lake.
In fact, the
\par Syrians took over the narrow strip and saw themselves as
partners in
\par the lake. They interfered with fishing activities
and harmed both
\par civilians and security personnel. They even threatened to
contaminate=
the water if Israel attempted to pump water from the Kinneret
without
\par their agreement. Here, the problem is not with Syrian tanks
and army
\par units. Not only must Syrian military personnel be prohibited
from the
\par lake, but Syrian fisherman as well. The reason for this
is that the
\par waters of the Kinneret must not become a
bone of contention and
\par source of trouble for both sides, especially for Israel.
This water
\par is dearer and more important to Israel than oil. The way
to resolve
\par the problem lies in border corrections,
which will be discussed
\par below.
\par =20
\par The Banias is a water source for the Jordan River, stemming
from the
\par Golan Heights. Here, too, it would be
desirable to reach border
\par corrections, but states do not rush to give up rivers. Damascus
talks
\par about the international law which instructs on joint
use of river
\par waters, but it also knows, from its dispute with Turkey,
that this
\par law is not clear. Therefore, Syria will have
to undertake not to
\par attempt again what it tried to do before the Six Day
War, when it
\par sought to divert the Banias. Israel will have to insist
that in the
\par framework of the agreement there will be a joint
commission which=
will determine the division of the Banias waters.
Syria will also
\par have to commit itself to regional cooperation on utilizing
the flood
\par waters which feed the Jordan River, the Kinneret and the
Yarmuk, as
\par well as to prevent contamination of the Kinneret.
\par =20
\par Long-term Demilitarization
\par --------------------------
\par A second necessary condition, which should in no case be
compromised,
\par is a complete ban on offensive forces on the Golan Heights
for a long
\par period. The demilitarization would continue as long
as one of the
\par sides insists on it.
\par =20
\par The purpose of the demilitarization is to prevent
surprise attacks,
\par to detect troop concentrations and to enable
observers to detect
\par violations of the agreement as early as possible. This would
prevent
\par friction and the unintended deterioration
of the situation.
\par Demilitarization would not be intended to harm the security
of one of
\par the sides. It would therefore not be a complete prohibition
of all
\par weapons, but rather a demilitarization of weapons
which create an =
offensive capability; for example, armored forces, artillery
in large
\par quantities and containers used for assault
engineering, and, of
\par course, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile
batteries, as
\par well as precision-guided weapon systems. There also
needs to be a
\par prohibition against establishing landing
pads and logistics for
\par helicopters. Only a limited number of transport
helicopter flights
\par would be permitted in the demilitarized area. It is
also important
\par that the limited forces in the demilitarized area
not be able to
\par conduct maneuvers of larger than
battalion-size, and without
\par helicopter transport. Furthermore, advance notice
of the maneuver
\par would have to be given to the other side.
\par =20
\par The demilitarized zone also needs to be larger than the
area on the
\par Golan Heights currently held by Israel.
It would include Syrian
\par territories east of the area from which Israel
withdraws, although
\par the border of the demilitarized zone from the east does
not need to
\par include the approaches to Damascus.
The Syrians should not be
\par concerned that they will be prevented from defending
their capital.
\par However, the forces defending Damascus in the direction
of the Golan =
Heights need to be defensive forces, not
armored divisions. The
\par border of the demilitarized area from the east needs to
extend to the
\par army camp at Qatana, and in the southeast to the
direction of the
\par Dar'a town junction.
\par =20
\par In between, in the center of the demilitarized area, there
will be a
\par buffer zone, broader than the current one, which was
established in
\par the disengagement of forces agreement. It needs to be not
less than
\par 20 kms. wide. In the demilitarized zone, no
military presence of
\par either of the sides would be permitted, the fortifications
within it
\par would be destroyed and an international force
would be stationed.
\par Syrian residents would be able to settle in it and a
limited number
\par of Syrian police, armed only with small
arms, would be able to
\par operate there.
\par =20
\par Syria will certainly demand from Israel a similar demilitarization
of
\par its territory, but due to the differences in the size of
the areas,
\par Israel would be able to demilitarize only a
symbolic area in the
\par Galilee panhandle. This was also the arrangement between
Egypt and=
Israel when a narrow strip of
the Israeli Negev desert was
\par demilitarized. The same limitations placed on the Syrian
forces east
\par of the area currently under IDF control
would be placed on the
\par Israeli forces which would remain for a period of time in
the Golan
\par Heights. In other words, their offensive capability would
be removed,
\par just as that of the Syrian forces east of the buffer zone
leading up
\par to the Qatana area would be removed.
\par =20
\par Israel must demand that its limited military presence
in the Golan
\par Heights continue for as long a period as possible. This
period would
\par be divided into stages, and in each
stage the Israeli military
\par presence would be reduced. These
stages would run parallel to
\par broadening normalization of relations between the two countries.
\par =20
\par It may be assumed that the Syrians will be prepared to agree
that the
\par overall period of the continued Israeli presence would run
5-6 years.
\par This is a period of time which cannot
satisfy Israel from any
\par standpoint. From Israel's standpoint, there
would have to be a
\par partial military presence of 15-20 years.=20
\par Early Warning Stations
\par ----------------------
\par In the framework of the partial military presence, Israel
would also
\par maintain its early warning stations in the Golan Heights
and on Mt.
\par Hermon. One of the arguments
made against the necessity of
\par maintaining the Israeli early warning stations is that it
is possible
\par to achieve early warning through satellites
alone. Satellites can
\par supply important information, mainly deep inside an
area, but the
\par experts say that harsh weather conditions or technical
malfunctions
\par can blur the images and information coming from satellites.
According
\par to them, there is no substitute for early warning
stations on the
\par ground.
\par =20
\par First of all, there is the Israeli early
warning station on Mt.
\par Hermon. In addition, Israel would be able to set
up early warning
\par stations on Tal Bental and Tal Avital or Yosifon, and in
the southern
\par Golan Heights on Tal Faras. If stages are determined for
the Israeli
\par presence on the Golan Heights, it will be possible to leave
the early
\par warning stations in the second stage, while
the other forces are=
greatly thinned out. In any case, the early warning stations
would be
\par operated only by the Israelis. The Syrians say that the
Israelis must
\par immediately evacuate the station on Mt. Hermon and transfer
it to the
\par Americans, as was done in the Sinai.
\par =20
\par The approach needs to be different: if the agreement
is followed,
\par Israel could agree, after a number of years, to the setting
up of a
\par Syrian early warning station on the Hermon,
parallel to the one
\par operated by the IDF. Both sides could observe the other's
territory,
\par in order to ensure that there is no surprise
attack being planned
\par against them. Israel has no such intentions and it should
not flinch
\par over the setting up of a Syrian early warning station near
its own on
\par Mt. Hermon.
\par =20
\par Is an American Force Necessary?
\par -------------------------------
\par In the argument over the early warning stations, the
question will
\par arise of the supervision of the agreement
and what international
\par forces will participate in its
implementation. From Israel's =
standpoint, it is important that supervision
and verification be
\par carried out by both sides, and not only by forces and observers
from
\par outside. Mutual supervision is very important for
increasing mutual
\par trust. It would be good to have joint patrols of Syrian
and Israeli
\par inspectors, who would carry out this inspection
together in each
\par other's territory.
\par =20
\par The other elements of supervision would be done
with the help of
\par satellite photographs and planes. The satellite pictures
and airplane
\par photographs would most probably be supplied by
the United States.
\par Another aspect of the supervision would be carried out by
observers,
\par who would be supplied by countries maintaining diplomatic
ties with
\par both sides, and most probably supervised by the United Nations.
\par =20
\par Who will be the foreign forces, in an international
framework, who
\par will be involved in enforcing the agreement between Israel
and Syria?
\par Israel has never agreed to foreign forces being responsible
for its
\par ongoing security. Also, this has
usually been the formula for
\par misunderstandings and conflicts with friendly
countries, who sent=
their forces to fulfill this function. An example of this
has been
\par the deterioration of Israel's standing in public opinion
in several
\par countries which sent forces to UNIFIL.
\par =20
\par Therefore, it would be better not to invite the United States
to send
\par army units to enforce the agreement between Syria and Israel,
and to
\par position them between the two. Syria is also not wild about
the idea.
\par The American Administration has signalled
its readiness to send
\par forces to the Golan Heights, if
both sides request this. The
\par administration assumes that Congress will approve such a
request.
\par =20
\par The United States will render its services
to the agreement in
\par another way -- by supervising it. For example, by providing
satellite
\par capabilities and by conducting flights over the demilitarized
zone,
\par by dispatching experts to the inspection teams and
(of course) via
\par the supply of sophisticated equipment
for intelligence warning
\par stations. This will suffice to grant an important deterrent
dimension
\par to the agreement, and there is no need
to station thousands of
\par American soldiers in the 'middle.'
On the level of bilateral =
relations between Israel and the United States -- if Israel does
not
\par feel secure, it can reach an agreement with
the Americans whereby
\par Israel will receive military assistance in the event
of a military
\par conflict (following a massive Syrian breach of the agreement).
\par =20
\par Israel will also have to discuss,
with the United States, the
\par question of future arms supplies to the region. Following
the Camp
\par David Accords, the United States became the primary weapons
supplier
\par to Egypt. This must not recur in
the case of Syria, even if
\par Washington offers Israel compensation for arms sales to
the Syrians.
\par These are issues better discussed at the outset.
\par =20
\par One of the most difficult problems about
the agreement with the
\par Syrians relates to the Israeli settlements on the Golan
Heights. From
\par the perspective of Prime Minister Rabin, this is the
most difficult
\par stumbling block -- especially if he plans to hold a referendum
on the
\par agreement with Syria. The Syrians are insisting upon
the evacuation
\par of the settlements. They will certainly agree to a phased
evacuation
\par (even over a fairly long time), but this is their
demand. It must=
also be remembered that they intend to return (to the
Golan) those
\par displaced Syrians who escaped during the Six Day
War. There is a
\par dispute about the number of displaced Syrians today, but
even those
\par who accept lower estimates are talking about 150,000 people.
Many of
\par them live south of Damascus. It is difficult to expect that
they will
\par return and live in harmony with the Israeli settlers
working their
\par lands.
\par =20
\par The problem of settlements, from the standpoint
of Rabin and his
\par government ministers, is not actually a security one. Rabin
does not
\par feel that the existence of the settlements
are of any security
\par importance. Since they are mostly small communities,
they are even
\par liable to be a burden on the army (in the event that war
should erupt
\par -- as in 1973).
\par =20
\par In actuality, the settlements have complicated the
security-related
\par significance of the Golan Heights -- it could
better serve as a
\par defensive buffer zone without them. It was first conquered
after the
\par repeated attacks on the Israeli settlements in the
valley, and the=
significance of the Golan as a buffer zone was distorted after
scores
\par of new settlements were established
in the area. The Golan
\par settlements have no 'defensive belt,' and their
situation is even
\par more complicated because many of them were established on
the forward
\par line (in order to allow for plowing up to the border). The
result is
\par that these settlements are exposed,
as were the Hula Valley
\par settlements in the past.
\par =20
\par On the assumption that we are talking about full
peace with Syria
\par (and the end of the conflict with it) -- as President Assad
said --
\par there will be no choice, but to evacuate Golan
Heights communities
\par from the territory to be left by Israel. It should be
assumed that,
\par toward the end of the Israeli military presence on the Golan
Heights
\par (and maybe even prior to it), Syrian residents
of the area will
\par return to the Golan Heights. Israel
will certainly demand that
\par Damascus allow Israeli residents (who wish to do so) to
remain under
\par Syrian rule. It is doubtful that many will see fit
to remain, but
\par Damascus will grant such permission.
The question is whether
\par situating Israelis and Syrians together
in the area previously =
occupied by Israel will promote the
growth of good neighborly
\par relations.
\par =20
\par Just as the transformation of Lake Kinneret into
a divisive issue
\par must be prevented, the Golan lands must also not become
the subject
\par of a quarrel between Israeli and Syrian farmers. At
the same time,
\par Israel must have an interest in the development of the Golan
by the
\par Syrians. Regional development and investments in industry
will give
\par the Syrians an added interest in cultivating the peace and
protecting
\par their accomplishments.
\par =20
\par Border Adjustments
\par ------------------
\par When Rabin and Peres speak of withdrawal on the Golan Heights,
their
\par intent must be understood more as a proposal for border
adjustments
\par (and less as a demand to keep one-half or one-third
of the Golan
\par Heights). I do not know if this
demand is intended (first and
\par foremost) to save Israeli settlements. The intent, by way
of border
\par adjustments, is to improve the security conditions and to
prevent an=
undesired deterioration in the current situation. The best example
is
\par the adjustment in the Sea of Galilee area due to Israeli
sensitivity
\par regarding this important water reservoir. In
order to achieve a
\par border adjustment here, it would even be worth consenting
to exchange
\par symbolic territories elsewhere, despite the
geographic difficulty
\par this would entail.
\par =20
\par A second place where Israel can demand a border
adjustment is the
\par area of the cliffs overlooking the Hula Valley (at least
in one or
\par two places). For instance, near Kibbutz Gadot in the
central Golan
\par Heights or near Kfar Szold in the north. The most
desirable outcome
\par would be that the border pass a few hundred
meters east of the
\par escarpment.
\par =20
\par Damascus will certainly object to this demand. One of its
claims is
\par that the acquisition of land by force cannot
be condoned. It is
\par interesting that they do not accept this principle when
talking about
\par the acquisition of land in Eretz Israel during the 1948
war. In the
\par War of Independence, the Syrians seized the Hama area at
the meeting =
point of the Syrian, Israeli and Jordanian borders.
In truth, the
\par city was occupied by the Jordanian army and transferred
(afterwards)
\par to the Syrians. During the Six Day War, the IDF seized Hama
and the
\par corridor leading to it. Arafat also mentioned (once) that
this area
\par belongs to Palestine and, accordingly, he demanded it for
himself. In
\par any event, there is no basis for the Syrian claim to
return to the
\par 1967 borders in the Hama area. Syria will not return to
this area.
\par =20
\par The Structure of the Armies
\par ---------------------------
\par One matter remains almost ignored, even though it is very
relevant to
\par the security arrangements -- the structure of
the two armies. If
\par Syria and Israel embark on the path of peace, it is possible
that the
\par two militaries will be simultaneously reduced in size. In
down-sizing
\par the armies, the goal is to limit offensive elements
without harming
\par defensive capabilities. Accordingly, the agreements
must include a
\par special section that will deal with the
future structure of the
\par militaries and also discuss the deployment of some
primary weapons
\par systems. Indeed, the security problems of
the two parties are =
not only
\par bilateral -- but, nevertheless, an understanding
can be reached
\par without impairing their defensive abilities.
Such an arrangement,
\par will also enable the later reduction of defense budgets
in Syria and
\par Israel.
\par =20
\par If the Syrians are prepared to discuss the matter,
Israel would be
\par able to respond affirmatively -- as would be
appropriate -- once
\par Syria consents to reduce its forces, alter its military
structure or
\par deploy some of its units in a less threatening
manner. Today, the
\par Syrians are not ready to listen to this, but I have heard
(from the
\par Americans) that these proposals did not fall on inattentive
Damascus
\par ears. Without committing to anything, the Syrian military
hierarchy
\par has begun discussions on the possible need to reduce the
Syrian army
\par (as well as the best way to do so) -- should the
day come when a
\par peace agreement is signed with Israel.
\par =20
\par Today, the Syrian military numbers 11-12 divisions, with
a number of
\par independent units at its disposal. The goal must be
to reduce the =
Syrian army to to 7-8 divisions -- about five of them permanent
units
\par with the rest being composed of reservists.
Also related to the
\par military structure issue is the deployment of certain weapons
systems
\par outside the demilitarized areas
(i.e. combat aircraft and
\par surface-to-surface missiles). The transfer of combat aircraft
to rear
\par airfields is insignificant in the eyes of many, but it is
sufficient
\par since this would grant Israel a few minutes of advance warning
and it
\par will be viewed in a positive light. The situation is
different with
\par respect to the surface-to-surface missile systems of the
Syrian army.
\par The Syrians claim that their missiles are geared primarily
toward the
\par achievement of strategic balance with the
Israel Air Force. The
\par proposal to alter the deployment is not
intended to reduce the
\par strength of the Syrian military, but to set limits to
its offensive
\par capability. The agreement must be on the location of
the launchers,
\par and on the number of missiles for each launcher. Such
an agreement
\par will obviously require third-party supervision.
\par =20
\par Each of the elements mentioned will certainly generate great
disputes
\par between the parties. It is a given that
there will also be an=
argument concerning timing. President Assad is driving toward
a rapid
\par settlement, partially because of his fear that trends within
the Arab
\par world are liable to shift -- and turn against
the peace process.
\par Opposite him, Rabin is driving toward a phased agreement,
wherein the
\par performance of the other party will also be examined as
a factor to
\par determine progress. It is clear that the final goal will
already be
\par determined at the outset, but each stage -- which will
continue for
\par longer than the Syrians believe -- will include the major
elements of
\par the agreement. A little withdrawal, more normalization
of relations
\par and security arrangements -- until
the final phase, when the
\par withdrawal (including the settlements) is completed and
relations of
\par full peace with open borders are achieved.
\par =20
\par Will the plan succeed? If peace with Syria is
the strategic goal
\par toward which Israel is driving, and if the Syrian
decision to make
\par peace with Israel and end the conflict is indeed a strategic
concept
\par -- as President Assad said in Geneva -- then the chance
for peace is
\par very great. It is clear that the price Israel will pay will
be high.
\par It will be worthwhile if a new era
is introduced, as Assad has=
commented. Syria has been a difficult enemy, but we must
not forget
\par that there have already been agreements and
settlements with the
\par Syrians -- and the latter have complied with them in all
respects. We
\par were not always just, and the Syrians were not always
wicked. When
\par the interest of the two nations is to end the wars between
them and
\par to respect each other, the chances are that the peace agreement
will
\par succeeded and that security will be maintained.
\par=20
\par THE PROBABILITY THAT SYRIA WILL GO TO WAR -- INCREASING
CONSIDERABLY
\par (Analysis by Ze'ev Maoz, "Ha'aretz", Aug 18, 1996, p.B3) [ MAOZ
WAS A=
STUDENT OF RT\rquote S IN JERUSALEM AND IN ANN ARBOR.]
\par =20
\par AS THE FREEZE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA CONTINUES, THERE
IS AN
\par INCREASING CHANCE THAT SYRIA WILL BE MOTIVATED TO INITIATE A WAR
-- THE
\par CASUALTIES OF WHICH, ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, WILL BE CIVILIANS ON
THE HOME
\par FRONT -- IN ORDER TO "THAW" IT. ACCORDING TO THE IDF AND THE POLITICAL
\par ESTABLISHMENT, THERE IS A LOW PROBABILITY OF SUCH A WAR.
\par =20
\par In contrast to the Palestinian track, where the Netanyahu government=
has
\par adopted the taking avowed policy of honoring agreements, there
has been=
a
\par 180-degree reversal on the Syrian track. The current government's
\par positions, both official and unofficial, give expression to a
maximum
\par retreat from the understandings reached during the Israeli-Syrian
\par negotiations under the Rabin and Peres governments -- the extension
of=
UN
\par Security Council Resolution #242 to the Golan Heights; the principle
of
\par "land for peace" or, in Syrian parlance, "total peace for total
\par withdrawal," and; the principle of mutual, but not necessarily
\par symmetrical, security arrangements. In the negotiations conducted
by
\par previous governments, the Syrians were given to understand that
the
\par principle of withdrawal to the international border was acceptable
to
\par Israel; thus, the territorial dispute between the parties was
centered=
on
\par the gap between the international border and the 1967 border.
\par =20
\par Since no agreement was ever reached -- even on the level of an=
agreement
\par of principles to anchor (in writing) the common basis for the=
negotiations
\par -- the Netanyahu government is entitled to view itself as free
from any
\par commitments made by previous governments. From the standpoint
of public
\par opinion, Netanyahu can assume that this policy expresses the will
of=
most
\par of the people, since various polls indicate that the majority
opposes a
\par comprehensive withdrawal from the Golan Heights. At the same time,
the
\par Syrians view themselves as cheated. Israel, according to their
\par understanding, has backed away from significant commitments made
in the
\par negotiations, and we have thus (from the Syrian perspective) returned=
to
\par the situation which existed before the Madrid Conference.
\par =20
\par More than it was designed to form a new basis for negotiations,
the=
barren
\par "Lebanon First" initiative was an attempt to place the blame for
the
\par suspension of negotiations on Syria's shoulders. Here, Netanyahu
can=
score
\par himself another public relations success -- but public relations
are=
one
\par thing, and policy is something else. The Netanyahu government's=
position
\par on the Syrian issue is a legitimate position in terms of international
\par procedure. Assad, who refused to reach a consensus document of=
principles
\par with Israel, can only complain to himself about the retreat of
the=
current
\par Israeli government from the positions of previous governments.
\par =20
\par Still, the new state of affairs created on the Syrian track requires
\par political and strategic analysis, as well as a look at preparations
for
\par new dangers. The main significance of the political reversal on
the=
Syrian
\par track is the considerable increase in the probability of a war
against
\par other Arab elements as well. Therefore, as
\par long as the Netanyahu government continues its current policy
-- whose
\par practical meaning is "peace for peace" -- it must prepare the
IDF and
\par Israel's citizenry for war in the not-too-distant future.
\par =20
\par First, it is worth presenting the counter-analysis. There are
many=
within
\par the IDF and the political establishment who believe that, despite
the
\par anticipated (and perhaps desirable) stalemate in the negotiations
with
\par Syria, there is a low probability of war in the near future. This
\par assessment is based on two main components: the geo-strategic
situation
\par and the balance of military forces.
\par =20
\par Geographically, the IDF sits only 60 km. from Damascus. This fact=
deters
\par Syrian military adventurism. Moreover, the political conditions
on the
\par pan-Arab scene make it difficult to forge a common pan-Arab front.
In=
the
\par event of such a war, Syria will be able to rely upon only itself.=
Syria's
\par potential allies are neutralized militarily (Iraq) and politically=
(Egypt
\par and Jordan). Even the chance of an economic front providing=
international
\par support for Syria, if it attacks Israel, is fairly slim. Saudi
Arabia=
is
\par profoundly connected to the United States, and it is difficult
to=
assume
\par that the Saudis would risk American assistance to come to Syria's
aid=
with
\par an oil boycott. Given the economic conditions prevailing today,
an oil
\par boycott could work to the detriment of the Saudis and the Gulf
states.
\par Iran has neither the practical option to transfer sufficient military
\par forces for the purpose of aiding the Syrians, nor the ability
(for now)=
to
\par launch missiles on Israel. This combination of the geo-political
and
\par inter-Arab factors greatly complicates Syria's ability to start
a war.
\par =20
\par Since the mid-1980s, Israel's predicament -- with respect to the=
Syrian-
\par Israeli and Arab-Israeli balances of force -- has significantly=
improved.
\par The enlarged strategic gap stems, inter alia, from the collapse
of the
\par Soviet Union, from the Russian demand that the Syrians cover their=
debts,
\par from Syria's need to pay hard currency for the procurement of
any and=
all
\par weapons systems from Russia, and (mainly) from the absence of
any=
Syrian
\par ability to acquire Western weapons. The Syrian military is encountering
\par difficulty in both converting outdated weapons systems into new
systems
\par and obtaining spare parts for existing systems.
\par =20
\par As for intelligence, the chance of being surprised is now much
smaller
\par than in 1973, since the greatest attention -- in this era of peace
with
\par Egypt and Jordan -- is being directed at Syria, and any change
in=
Syria's
\par deployment would set off alarm bells in Israel.
\par =20
\par The military risks to Syria, derived from a war conducted under
such
\par conditions, immeasurably outweigh the expected gains. In the past,=
despite
\par extremist anti-Israel rhetoric, Syrian conduct on the ground has=
usually
\par been cautious, expressing a consideration based on an assessment
of the
\par risks and chances involved.
\par =20
\par Syria obviously has irritation and attrition options in Lebanon,
which
\par would make life in northern Israel unbearable. But even here,
the new
\par government is confronting the Syrians with new risks; even in
this=
case,
\par the probability of Israel responding directly against the Syrian=
military
\par in the Lebanese Beka'a Valley is higher than in the past. Even
with=
regard
\par to Lebanon, past experience shows that the Syrians well-know how
not to
\par rock the boat beyond the necessary minimum to pressure Israel
-- and=
how
\par to stop rocking it as soon as the risks outweigh expected benefits.
\par=20
\par The main risks of a war against Syria, according to this conception,=
stem
\par from two factors -- judgmental errors by the Syrian political
and=
military
\par leadership, and a loss of control over the situation in Lebanon.
As=
long
\par as Assad is aware of the risks, it is not likely that war will
erupt.
\par =20
\par The problem is that such an analysis assumes wars are initiated
to be=
won.
\par But the longer that the freeze in negotiations continues, the
more=
Syria
\par may be motivated to initiate a war to "thaw" it -- even if such
a war=
ends
\par in a draw, or even a Syrian military defeat. The main objectives
of=
such a
\par war will be political (vis-a-vis Israel, the United States and
the Arab
\par world), psychological (vis-a-vis public opinion and the political=
system
\par in Israel) and military (mainly for the sake of achieving some
limited,=
or
\par even symbolic, military accomplishment).
\par =20
\par Does this sound familiar? Just as Anwar Sadat determined the military
\par objectives of the Yom Kippur War based on his political needs,
Assad=
can
\par define his military aims based on the political need of resurrecting=
the
\par negotiations. And therefore, analyzing the possibility of war
under
\par current circumstances must focus on Syria's motivation, no less
-- and
\par perhaps even more -- than on considerations of military profit
and=
loss.
\par =20
\par In a situation where the chances of an agreement (on terms that
will
\par satisfy Syria) have considerably decreased, Assad faces two inter-Arab
\par scenarios, each creating incentives for war. According to the
first
\par scenario, the peace process on the Palestinian track continues
in one=
form
\par or another, and the Arab world continues its reconciliation with=
Israel.
\par In this situation, there is a significant risk of perpetuating
Israeli
\par rule on the Golan Heights. A Syrian attack on Israel -- as preventive
\par medicine -- would stand the Arab world on the horns of a difficult
\par dilemma. In the best case, Syria would be likely to receive military
or
\par economic support from some Arab countries; in the worst case,
Syria=
would
\par win Arab political support, at least in the form of pressuring
the=
United
\par States to actively intervene toward moving the negotiations forward.
\par =20
\par According to the second scenario, there would be a radical change
in
\par Israel's relations with Arab countries due to a stalemate on the
\par Palestinian track and Jordanian disappointment with the fruits
of=
peace.
\par Here as well, a war would likely restore Syria to its position
as a=
leader
\par in the peace process -- thereby bringing the Palestinians, and
even the
\par Jordanians, to fall in behind the Syrian position. In both scenarios,=
an
\par inability to ignite the process through a military initiative
could
\par exacerbate Syria's political condition.
\par =20
\par Militarily, preparedness for war can be based on two possibilities
--
\par defining limited goals (and, therefore, a limited war), or taking
high
\par risks (with the intention of striking Israel's home front). A
limited=
war
\par assumes that Syria has a monopoly on the war's opening and concluding
\par terms. As long as Israel holds the Golan Heights, the option of
a pre-
\par emptive Israeli strike is not politically possible. Further,=
transferring
\par the war to Syrian territory would create severe political problems
and
\par increase the chance of military intervention by other Arab countries.=
As
\par in previous wars, an Arab initiative for a ceasefire will always
win
\par=20
\par =20
\par A second possibility stems from the fact that Syrian frustration
over=
the
\par political situation might increase to the point where Syria is
willing=
to
\par bear risks and make sacrifices. The only area in which Syria has
the
\par capability of causing genuine damage to Israel -- if not militarily,=
then
\par certainly psychologically -- is an attack on the home front.
\par =20
\par The risk to Syria is obviously a massive Israeli response against=
parallel
\par targets in Syria. The level of risk to Syria does not depend on
Israeli
\par ability, but on the Syrian readiness to take casualties in order
to
\par achieve political results. The level of risk -- not acceptable
when=
there
\par are political alternatives -- could be acceptable in a situation
in=
which
\par Syria feels that its back is against the wall or that time is
working
\par against it.
\par =20
\par Indeed, there is no certainty that conditions for war -- from
Syria's
\par perspective -- will ripen in the near future. It could be that
the=
balance
\par of risks and chances will bring Assad to the conclusion that as
bad as=
the
\par political and territorial status quo is for him, a war would lead
to=
even
\par worse consequences. However, the main claim is that as long as
the
\par political stalemate continues, Syria's motivation to resort to
military
\par measures -- and its willingness to take the risk -- will increase.
\par =20
\par The military problem from Syria's outlook could be redefined as
how to
\par reduce military damage, or how to make a symbolic achievement
in a
\par military confrontation, and not how to win a war; or worse yet:
the=
level
\par of readiness to take casualties in exchange for spilling Israeli
blood=
and
\par striking at Israel's national morale through an attack on the
home=
front,
\par and not the reduction of the number of Syrian casualties in the
war.
\par =20
\par The Netanyahu government is entitled to change the previous=
government's
\par policy on the Syrian track, even if there is no public declaration
that
\par indeed this is the case. However, it is obligated to prepare for
the
\par possible consequences of this turning. It must be said openly
that such=
a
\par war -- like the Yom Kippur War -- will not develop because Syria
wants=
to
\par destroy Israel, but because the Syrian political option has failed.
The
\par concept of "peace with the Golan" is a pipedream, which the Syrians=
will
\par not buy. Therefore, the choice is "peace or the Golan." If Israel=
chooses
\par to keep the Golan Heights under its sovereignty, the government
must
\par publicly say to the nation that it is very likely that we will
have to
\par defend this sovereignty by force. And it is possible that the
principal
\par casualties -- this time -- will be citizens, on the home front.
\par =20
\par Even if the government is unable to broadcast such a message to
the
\par nation, from a political standpoint, it is obligated to make this
clear=
to
\par the security establishment, and give it the tools to cope with
the rise=
in
\par the likelihood of war, and especially with the new threats which
stem=
from
\par the increase in Syria's ability to attack the home front.
\par =20
\par [The writer is the Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies=
at
\par Tel Aviv University.]
\par From analysis@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL Thu Aug 22 10:29:14 1996
\par Date: Thu, 22 Aug 1996 16:12:00 +0200
\par From: IIS News Analysis <analysis@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL>
\par Reply-To: ASK@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL
\par To: Multiple recipients of list ISRAEL-MIDEAST
\par <ISRAEL-MIDEAST@PANKOW.INTER.NET.IL>
\par Subject: opeds: How to Say "Probability" in Syrian-"Ha'aretz",
Aug 22,=
1996
\par =20
\par --------------------------------------------------------
\par =20
\par HOW TO SAY "PROBABILITY" IN SYRIAN
\par (Analysis by Zvi Barel, "Ha'aretz", Aug 22, 1996, p.B3)
\par =20
\par ASSAD'S SYRIA HAS NEVER GONE TO WAR AGAINST US ON ITS OWN, AND
THERE IS
\par NOT MUCH CHANCE OF AN ARAB COALITION AGAINST ISRAEL BEING FORMED
NOW.
\par =20
\par >From at least one perspective, the preoccupation with Syria is
amusing=
--
\par it enjoys complete freedom of action to combine scenarios of Assad's
\par possible behavior. This Syrian enigma offers almost no information,
and
\par all attempts to analyze it can only be theoretical. Consequently,
as=
long
\par as the theory (or any other theory) goes unrefuted, it remains
valid.
\par =20
\par Professor Ze'ev Maoz, Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic=
Studies,
\par offered his scenario here; according to Maoz, there is a probability
--
\par and under certain circumstances, a high probability -- of war
with=
Syria.
\par Maoz bases this scenario on three basic assumptions. The first
is wars=
are
\par not necessarily initiate to be won. "The longer that the freeze
in
\par negotiations continues, the more Syria may be motivated to initiate
a=
war
\par to thaw it," Maoz writes. Maoz believes that, since the definition
of
\par victory is vague, it can be assumed that Assad will declare victory
if=
he
\par rescues the negotiations from their stalemate by military means.
If so,
\par would it not be worth proving, at the outset, that Assad is even
\par interested in thawing the frozen negotiations? Or, in other words,
that=
he
\par has already considered and examined the profit-and-loss equation,
and
\par reached the conclusion that impasse and time are working against
him --=
to
\par the point of being prepared to sacrifice Damascus for the Golan=
Heights?
\par =20
\par The two other assumptions are built on two contradictory scenarios.
\par According to one, the normalization in Israel's relations with
the
\par Palestinians and other Arab countries will progress in such a
way that
\par Israel will be able to perpetuate its control over the Golan Heights.
\par Thus, only a Syrian-initiated war against Israel will likely renew
the
\par negotiations, or at least cause Arab countries to press the United=
States
\par into pressuring Israel. The opposite scenario, advanced by Maoz,=
suggests
\par that the peace process will become stuck in such a way as to drag
the
\par Palestinians and the Jordanians into lining up behind Syria --
which=
would
\par become the leader of the Arab world, and almost be obliged to
begin a=
war
\par against Israel in order to preserve its new status as a political=
leader.
\par =20
\par These two scenarios are possible, just as every theoretical scenario
is
\par possible in the Middle East. But relying on such scenarios means=
accepting
\par the fundamental assumption that the formation of an Arab coalition=
against
\par Israel is still possible.
\par =20
\par This assumption is not only crucial, but one must go to great
lengths=
in
\par order to prove it -- since Assad's Syria has never gone to war
against
\par Israel on its own. Assad has always taken the trouble to surround=
himself
\par with a few allies, always fighting as part of a team. It is Israel
that
\par was mistaken, under the Labor government, in thinking that Assad
was
\par isolated due to the peace process, and that he would thus make
the=
effort
\par to join. Assad proved that, even when the process prospered --
with the
\par Palestinians, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Tunisia and Morocco embracing
Israel=
--
\par he was not isolated. At the time, he issued his historic declaration
on
\par Syria's strategic decision to cling to the peace option, which=
obviously
\par did not prevent him from again trying to organize Arab ranks and=
arrange
\par summit conferences (with Mubarak's encouraging assistance). As
such,=
the
\par conclusion that an isolated Assad will initiate a war, is very=
improbable.
\par =20
\par If Assad always takes the trouble not to be isolated -- something
which=
he
\par has apparently succeeded in doing -- can it be assumed that he
will
\par succeed in forming a coalition that would agree to go into battle=
against
\par Israel? Such a scenario has already existed several times in the
past,=
and
\par an Arab coalition was even formed against an Arab country -- Iraq.
Why
\par couldn't Israel be the next target?
\par =20
\par In order for such a prediction to be realized, there would have
to be a
\par very strong common denominator, intense motivation and a tangible,=
almost
\par total Israeli threat to each country in this an Arab coalition.
But=
such
\par determination has lost its momentum -- after the Camp David Accords=
with
\par Egypt, and then following the peace agreements with the Palestinians=
and
\par the Jordanians. Even if the process becomes completely stuck,
the peace
\par option has already been etched in the region's historic memory.
The war
\par option, therefore, has lost its exclusivity. While the conception
of=