Shall the university be controlled by trustees and administration or by faculty?

-Thorsten Veblin [1918] in Birnbaum, 1988:6

Thorsten Veblin’s query is as relevant today at the University of Michigan as it was nearly eight decades ago. Because of an ambiguous wording of the Regents’ Bylaws (a wording that is often repeated verbatim in the bylaws of the individual schools and colleges), it is not completely clear with whom the authority for the governance of the schools and units resides: with the faculty, with the administration, or with both. In this paper we examine that ambiguity in terms of the relative democracy of each unit. We look at governance as it is written in the bylaws and as it is manifested in actual practice.

We focus on the faculty executive committee as the unit governance entity that is particularly appropriate for an investigation of that ambiguity (it is appointed by Regential Bylaw for each school and college at the University). Of the eighteen units examined, only two specify that the executive functions shall be performed by anyone other than an executive committee. In the case of the Schools of Law and of Information and Library Sciences, the Dean performs these functions. For purposes of economy, we analyze only those executive committees to be found at the University of Michigan–Ann Arbor campus in units that both appoint their own faculty and are authorized to grant degrees. Our intent is to make determinations concerning the structure, membership, purview, and authority of the executive committees in relation to both the faculty and the dean of each respective school or college. Our purpose is to produce a content analysis of the bylaws as written and approved for every school or college at the University in order to refine our understanding of the executive committee. This content analysis is the basis for a much larger study to be undertaken at a later date. That study would comprise interviews with each units’ dean, and two to three senior faculty members, with the goal of determining the actual governance practices versus the written bylaws.

To fully understand the scope of the bylaws under consideration, it is essential to have an overview of how the Regents’ Bylaws delineate faculty and executive committee authority. Regents Bylaw 5.02 provides a general governance statement:

In each school, college or degree-granting division of the University, the governing faculty shall be in charge of the affairs of the school, college or division, except as delegated to the executive committee, if any …

While this appears rather all-encompassing, subsequent bylaws begin to delimit the purview of the faculty. Regents Bylaw 5.03 states in part:

The faculty of each school and college shall from time to time recommend to the Board for approval such regulations as are not included within these bylaws and which are pertinent to its structure and major operating procedures, such as departmental organization, requirements for admission and graduation, and other educational matters, the determination of which is within the peculiar competence of the faculties of the several schools and colleges.

Subject to the ultimate authority of the Board, the faculty of each school and college is also vested with plenary powers to make rules and regulations concerning other matters such as grading regulations, class attendance, committee organization and related internal matters … shall provide suitable instruction for the students enrolled in its school or college … shall recommend to the Board students under its jurisdiction who qualify for University degrees.

As if to complicate matters a bit further, the bylaws then direct attention to the role of the dean, and appear to contradict Bylaw 5.02, which had given authority to the governing faculty. Regents’ Bylaw 5.06 states:

The dean or director, or administrative head of a school, college, or department of instruction or research shall be appointed by the Board on recommendation by the president to act as executive officer of the school, college, or department.

If an executive committee has been created by the Board for the school, college or department, the dean, director, or head shall be assisted by the executive committee of which he or she shall be ex officio the chair. The executive committee in addition to assisting with administrative functions shall be charged with the duties of investigating and formulating educational and instructional policies for consideration by the faculty and shall act for the faculty in matters of budgets, promotions, and appointments.

Bylaw 5.03 is more explicit about the types of regulations the faculty of each college or school is authorized to make (upon approval of the Regents, of course). But, again, in Bylaw 5.06, the ambiguity returns. The relationship between, or the relative authority of, this head and the faculty is unclear. So, too, is the relationship between, and the relative authority of, this head and the school’s or college’s executive committee. The remaining part of 5.06 delegates authority to the executive committee to act on behalf of the faculty.

Two documents evidence that this is a contradiction that is apparent even within the University to its various constituencies (see Appendix A). The first is a clarification from the University Counsel that states:

inherent in the dean is all authority to administer the school not otherwise delegated to another in the Regents’ Bylaws or the Standard Practice Guide.

The second is a letter to Counsel from a faculty member requesting clarification of the Regents’ Bylaws with respect to that authority (see Appendix B). This faculty member notes the same contradiction that caught our attention.

We turned to extra-university guidelines in an attempt to find precedence for faculty-administrative relationships in terms of relative authority. The 1966 AAUP statement on the government of colleges and universities, which was jointly formulated by the American Council on Education, the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, and the AAUP, set forth the following guidelines:

1. The governing board of an institution of higher education, while maintaining a general overview, entrusts the conduct of administration to the administrative officers, the president and the deans, and the conduct of teaching and research to the faculty;

2. The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the educational process;

3. The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees offered in course, determine when the requirements have been met, and authorizes the president and board to grant the degrees thus achieved;

4. Faculty status and related matters are primarily a faculty responsibility; this area includes appointments, reappointments, decisions not to reappoint, promotions, the granting of tenure and dismissal;

5. The faculty should actively participate in the determination of policies and procedures governing salary increases;

6. Agencies for faculty participation in the government of the college or university should be established at each level where faculty responsibility is present. An agency should exist for the presentation of the views of the whole faculty

7. The agencies may consist of meetings of all faculty members of a department, school, college, division, or university system, or may take the form of faculty-elected executive committees in departments and schools, and a faculty-elected senate or council for larger divisions or the institution as a whole;

A follow-up AAUP document written in 1972 (rev.1990), "The Role of Faculty in Budgetary and Salary Matters," elaborates further:

8. budgetary decisions directly affecting those areas for which … the faculty has primary responsibility–curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the educational process should be made in concert with the faculty.

Of the eight items listed above, clearly the authority put forth rides on the side of the faculty, although the AAUP’s theme throughout is one of shared governance.

Birnbaum (1988:8) points out that the AAUP Joint Statement is considered by some to be an "academic Camelot" (devoutly to be wished for, but not achievable by mere mortals). But many others believe strongly in the principles that those statements outline. Still others believe that they are principles developed for an academy that no longer exists. Birnbaum notes that, for all its high principles, the AAUP statement " … is less successful in identifying the specific structures and processes that would implement these principles."

Mortimer and McConnell ([1978] 1991: 165) note the changes in higher education during the second half of the century that caused it to shift from "informal and consensual judgments to authority based on formal criteria." They raise the question of whether existing statements of shared authority provide adequate guidelines for internal governance. Mortimer and McConnell analyze senates, collective bargaining, and faculty relations with administrators, students, and trustees. They conclude that " … the formal authority of trustees and administrators is inescapable" (1991:166):

The major pressure for the redistribution of authority is an attempt to get trustees and their delegates to share this formal authority with faculty, students and others.

The authors also argue that "those concerned with college and university governance should eschew the search for separate areas of authority and look for ways to enhance joint involvement" (167). Although in our study we cannot promise to come to conclusions about the future of institutional governance, we can use Mortimer and McConnell to turn a critical eye toward the balance of authority (between administration and faculty) that is (or should be) specified by the bylaws.

Another author, Burton Clark ([1963] 1991), looks more specifically at the faculty side of the equation of this balance of authority. He characterizes faculty authority as being conditioned by a variety of factors peculiar to higher education institutions. The most notable factors are the work they do, the status system, and traditional sentiments. Authority, maintains Clark, has become decentralized in the multi-purpose college and university. This faculty orientation produces multiple value systems that are clustered around the individual disciplines, according to Clark (1991:451). Intense specialization of knowledge has led to the modern professor as "expert".

For Clark, the campus of the latter half of the twentieth century " … has moved away from the characteristics of community. It can no longer be described, he contends, as a "community of scholars." Clark continues: "a faculty member

does not interact with most other members of the faculty. In the larger places, he may know less than a fifth, less than a tenth. Paths do not cross. The professor … has an increasing number of interests that diverge … looking at total faculty, interaction is down, commonalty of interest is down, commonalty of sentiments is down (1991:452).

Clark’s over-generalization of American higher education aside, his work is helpful because he describes the dynamics of faculty governance today. Clark notes that the coordination of "work and policy," while once achieved informally on a "community" basis, has been transformed into bureaucratic ways and means. He went on to say that the "organization and authority of the faculty accommodate to these trends in at least three ways:

a.) Segmentation: the decision-making authority and influence of the faculty is now more segmented by sub-college, by division, by department. Since the interests of the faculty cluster around the departments, faculty participation in government tends to move out to these centers of commitment.

b.) Professionalization: the authority of the faculty which flows out toward the departments and other units of the campus becomes located n the hands of highly specialized experts; and, … takes on some characteristics of professional authority. Almost everywhere in modern large-scale organizations, we find a tug-of-war going on between administrative and professional orientations.

c.) Individualization: Within a department, faculty increasingly feel unable to judge the merits of other faculty in specialties they know nothing about. Some professorial experts have their personal authority greatly enhanced by money … moving from the faculty as a whole and as smaller collectivities to individual professors. The personal authority of the professional expert is increased in our time by the competitiveness of the job market.

These trends in faculty organization and authority, Clark argues, " … open the door to bureaucracy: more bureaucracy in the administration, more within the faculty itself … authority moves toward clusters of experts and the individual expert" (Clark: 1991:454). What we see here are structural and authority changes that have affected how faculty as well as administrators have organized their activities.

Clark Kerr (1994) takes off where Burton Clark left off, characterizing what he calls the "postmodern paradigm in academic life". According to this paradigm, faculty members have

less commitment to the local academic community and to citizenship obligations within it; have more attachments to economic opportunities off-campus or to off-campus political concerns on-campus. The campus is more of a means to nonacademic ends. In this new situation, implicit contracts governing behavior and informal means of enforcement are less effective. They may need to be reinforced by more formal codes of behavior … (1994: 132).

Kerr characterized the new academic culture as placing " … more emphasis on individual and group advantages and concerns, and less on the overall welfare of the college and university as a self-governing community concentrated on advancing knowledge."

Shared governance suffers, notes Kerr. He also points out that academic institutions have themselves added to these trends by emphasizing reward structures for faculty which give more credit for published research and external recognition than for teaching and contributions to internal governance. Kerr also notes that ever greater amounts of internal governance are being taken over by larger and larger administrative staffs. This, he argues, reduces the sense of the academy's being a self-governing community.

In 1969-70, the AAUP Committee T conducted a survey of chapter presidents and CEOs at all institutions that had an AAUP sponsor, in order to assess the level of faculty participation in college and university government, and to determine how closely colleges and universities were aligned to the 1966 Joint Statement. Despite uneven and low responses and some problems with data, the main conclusion was that

on the average, faculty participation in college and university government in the US is viewed by faculty and administrations as being at the level of ‘consultation.’

A School of Business faculty member has acquired the original data and is looking into a possible replication of the survey.

Nicholas Steneck (1991:10), in his historical overview of faculty governance at the University of Michigan, nicely summarized what it is supposed to comprise:

However complicated the governance system has become, its objectives remain the same. Faculty governance is still the means by which the Regents and their designated representatives provide some self-government to, seek advice from, and ask for consent from the faculty. It is a system that is designed to give the faculty a voice in the running of the affairs of the university.

Steneck indicated that faculty governance is supposed to accomplish these things, but he wisely noted that the question remains as to whether it truly accomplishes this objective or not. Steneck also posed an interesting paradox:

How can the opportunities for faculty input into governance seem so abundant, the structures so elaborate, and yet some faculty feel that their voices are not heard, that they do not have the opportunity for governance that they should, that the efficacy of the system is so questionable.

Steneck said that one sign of this faculty disinterest in governance is the low number of faculty who participate in faculty governance (approximately one in ten). He attributes this low number to several factors:

1. The size of the University puts physical constraints on "getting all the faculty together." In general, the larger the governing body, the smaller the attendance at meetings;

2. Decision-making in the 20th Century has become concentrated more and more in the hands of executive bodies, representative assemblies, and administrators. These executive bodies appear to have significant authority.

3. Representative bodies limit the participation of faculty in governance (only 65 Senate Assembly members of 3,000+ faculty, Steneck notes).

4. The growth in administration has removed the faculty from much of the routine decision-making and responsibility in running the University. While the faculty are free to do other things, such as research, they are also free to ignore the University.

Steneck noted that the concentration of more and more decision-making in the hands of the administration has had profound effects on faculty attitudes toward governance: "it distances faculty from and mystifies decision-making at the University" (Steneck: 12). From lack of knowledge follows lack of interest or incentive, according to Steneck, with the exceptions of teaching and the curriculum.

For Steneck, faculty are giving and getting differently from an earlier time. He said that they have fewer opportunities to participate as directly in major decisions that affect the future course and reputation of the University. They also do not participate in discussions about the planning of research at the University. And so, on the one hand, faculty perceive themselves to be losing representative authority and decision-making ability, while on the other, their pursuit of scholarship and research locates them in a realm much further away from the local community of scholars.

The Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs (1994) assesses the situation similarly:

There is a tradition at the University of Michigan of faculty participation in governance at all levels of the University. Faculty members have an opportunity to influence the units in which they work, their departments, and their schools or colleges. There is also a central, university-wide level of governance consisting of the Senate, the Senate Assembly, SACUA, and numerous Senate Assembly committees. This central governance system is the formal mechanism whereby faculty opinion and advice are communicated to the Executive Officers.

This would lead one to believe that the culture of governance at the University of Michigan is one in which faculty have a highly democratic role with significant authority and shared governance. Yet, in a Fall 1995 letter to SACUA members, SACUA’s current chair, George Brewer, asks

How can we gain/restore the respect for faculty governance that is so critical if the input of the faculty is to be meaningful in the guidance of this University? The faculty governance system … comprises the only elected group of faculty who can truly provide university-wide advice and guidance. Yet that advice is only effective if there is adequate respect for faculty governance among the general faculty and the administration.

These general tensions are evident as well in several different aspects of the individual school and college bylaws.

In order to get a general sense of faculty governance at the executive committee level at the University of Michigan, we examined the bylaws for eighteen schools, colleges and units. Of those eighteen, nine have fully developed and approved bylaws (College of Architecture and Urban Planning, School of Art, School of Dentistry, School of Education, School of Engineering, College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, School of Natural Resources and Environments, College of Pharmacy, School of Social Work), five have no bylaws or systematic, written guidelines (Schools of Business, Law, Information and Library Sciences, and Public Policy, and the Medical School). The remaining four (Division of Kinesiology, School of Music, School of Nursing, School of Public Health) have documents that approximate, to a greater or lesser degree, bylaws, but that are differently named (guidebooks, policies, etc.). In fairness to the new School of Public Policy, its faculty is in the throes this year of developing a working set of bylaws; its prior "division" status bylaws are no longer applicable. And, in fairness to the School of Music, its policy handbook is a set of bylaws in every aspect except name. In order to get a sense for the governance structure of units without formal bylaws, we relied on either existing policy or manuals issued by the units (Music, Public Health, Kinesiology), or on information the units sent to us at our request (Medical School), or on information solicited while attempting to procure written information or clarification (Business, Information and Library Sciences, Law, Kinesiology again), or from the brief descriptions of the Executive Committees that appear in the Regents Bylaws for each school and college that has one.

Two Schools (Law and Information and Library Sciences) have no executive committees at all. The Law School has no executive committee on matter of principle. The faculty believe in a highly democratic, consensual governance by the entire governing faculty of the School (a "committee of the whole"). The School of Information and Library Sciences does not have an executive committee because it is such a small unit (although there was an indication during an informational phone call that an executive committee might be formed if the School gets much larger). Because there is so much regarding governance issues (across the board and across the University) that is not codified (and often not even in those units with bylaws), there remains a great deal to be learned about unit governance at the University of Michigan.

Nonetheless, there are some valuable observations to be made from the information we have gathered. We have analyzed the units according to dimensions that are relevant to faculty executive committees specifically, or to faculty governance in general. In Table 1, definitions of some of our dimensional variables are provided. An overview of our findings is reported in Appendix D and Appendix. Immediately below, we highlight this information and attempt to give a sense of the variability of the analytical dimensions across the University.

There is not a great deal of variance in the size and structure of faculty executive committees across the schools and colleges of the study. By size, we mean the number of faculty (or, in the rare cases, student) members on the committee. By composition, we mean the basic membership of that body (faculty, student, administrative representation). Per the Regents’ Bylaws, for instance, each executive committee has the dean of the school or the college as its head (which begins to describe the executive committee both in terms of size and structure). In most instances, the dean serves ex officio, voting only in the case of a tie. Each school or college determines the number of faculty members who will serve on its executive committee. For the University of Michigan, that number ranges from a low of 3 (College of Pharmacy) to a high of 6 (several schools), with most schools and colleges having either 4 or 6 faculty members on their executive committees (see Table 2).

A few schools and colleges specify additional ex officio members, often members of the Dean’s staff. For instance, in the College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Assistant and Associate Deans attend meetings (unless, of course, they are explicitly asked not to by the Executive Committee). Other units invite departmental or program chairs to sit in Executive Committee meetings (School of Education, Division of Kinesiology), or welcome student participation (although often only in an advisory capacity)(College of Architecture and Urban Planning, School of Education, College of Engineering, School of Natural Resources, School of Public Policy). In two cases, the Executive Committees themselves determine if there are to be any ex officio members, and who those members shall be (School of Nursing, College of Pharmacy).

The dimension of size and structure of executive committees seems, on the surface, to be fairly mundane. But this dimension is extraordinarily important in determining the relative democratic structure of the executive committees. Along with the membership criteria for the faculty members, it is a strong indication of faculty representation in this aspect of governance.

When we looked at membership criteria, we looked to the specifications that were required of faculty members wishing to serve on the Executive Committee. More specifically, we wanted to determine the balance between unit programs or departments and the balance of faculty ranks on the committees. Some units strove for program balance, while others tried to maintain a balance among ranks. Still others made no restrictions on rank or concentration at all (see Table 3 for our findings).

Those schools that were primarily concerned with program balance were explicit in the numbers of faculty members from each of the divisions or programs within their schools. For instance, both the School of Education and the School of Music specify in their bylaws the exact number of members of the executive committee that should be chosen from each program or group. Other units (College of Architecture and Urban Planning and the Division of Kinesiology) merely state that there should be balance between programs. Many units specify the ranks that faculty members of the executive committee should hold. Several require faculty members to have tenure (Architecture and Urban Planning, School of Dentistry, Medical School, School of Nursing, School of Natural Resources). Others look for a balance in the ranks, and determine that the executive committee should have at least one member from each of the three professorial ranks (School of Public Health, School of Social Work). Still other units specify only that members of the executive committee be members of the governing faculty (in which case it might be possible to have instructor or lecturer representation on the committee, even though it is not explicitly guaranteed).

This dimension is important, as was the size and structure dimension before it, in determining the relative democracy of the executive committees. It seems more likely that an executive committee will be democratic if it adequately represents both the different ranks of its unit’s faculty, and the different divisions, programs, or concentrations that are part of its academic structure. The first aspect of representation is important because of matters of seniority and tenure, the second because of the nature of the executive committee (if it has jurisdiction over the educational policies of the unit, it is important that the programs, divisions, or concentrations that would be impacted by those policies have adequate representation in the decision-making body that develops them).

Of all of the dimension categories analyzed in this study, the election/nomination process received the most attention overall in the bylaws and handbooks to which we had access. True, much of what was included was merely "dry" sets of rules that specified how ballots were to be filled out, signed, sealed, delivered, and counted. But what the various units included in terms of the election or nomination of faculty members to the executive committees revealed a great deal about the executive committee structure itself or about the relative democracy/authority of the unit.

In general, the units under study described variations on the Regents’ Bylaws’ specifications for the election of faculty nominees. The unit bylaws, by and large, specify that the faculty (most often the governing faculty) of each unit should submit a list of nominees (more nominees than there are vacancies on the committee) to the President (or, in reality, to the Provost, as the President has apparently delegated). The President then chooses one nominee for each vacancy to be approved by the Board of Regents.

Several schools have the equivalent of two ballots before sending the names on to the President. Very few of those with bylaws do not specify the election or nomination process in great detail (the School of Art is a notable exception). Some units specify that a Nomination and/or Election Committee handles the balloting and nomination (School of Dentistry, College of Literature, Science, and the Arts), while one (School of Business) designates that the outgoing members of its Executive Committee undertake the responsibility of conducting the search for the members to replace them.

For all of the details provided about the election and nomination process, a significant area of murkiness remains. That is, because all units submit a number of nominees for the executive committee to the President (or Provost) that is greater than the number of actual vacancies on the committee, the authority for the final determination of the actual membership of the committee is administrative. The President (or his designate) has the authority not to send the name of the top vote-getter to the Board of Regents for final approval. In this sense, the executive committee members are appointed, and not elected. We would suspect, of course, that, in most cases, the faculty’s wishes would be taken into consideration, but the bylaws allow for some leeway in this regard, and especially in those units in which the ballot results are not reported to the faculty at large. The dimension of the election/nomination process, then, is of utmost importance in determining the relative democracy of the executive committee (and perhaps even the relative authority afforded the faculty and the administration of the unit).

Several units refer to their governing faculties when specifying eligibility for membership on the executive committee, or when determining election procedures for the members. The Regents’ Bylaws are quite explicit about the definition of governing faculty (generally, all full time professorial appointments, and full-time lecturers and instructors of at least one year who have been granted governing faculty status by the governing faculty of their individual unit). For most units, then, unless otherwise specified, we assumed adherence to the Regents’ definition. Some units, however, were notable because they added to the list of governing faculty provided by the Regents or they offered new rubrics of their own. Those schools and colleges that deviate from the Regents’ definition of governing faculty seem to be those units with clinical appointments (most notable is the School of Dentistry, which includes clinical instructional staff with .50 appointments or higher in its governing faculty).

This dimension is only distantly reflective of a unit’s democracy or the relative authority vested in the executive committee. Nonetheless, it is a significant dimension to consider, because a unit’s definition of governing faculty has direct impact on who is permitted to serve on the executive committee and who is permitted to vote for its members.

Although there is a certain amount of murkiness in the unit bylaws concerning the executive committee’s relationship to its dean, this murkiness is of a different sort than the ambiguity inherent in the election and nomination process. In that process, administrative authority to make the final decision about executive committee membership was clearly written into the bylaws, even though such a transfer of authority allowed for the possibility that faculty authority to determine its own governance body could be obviated altogether. The executive committee’s role vis-à-vis the dean’s, however, provides the playing field on which an even more significant struggle for power (between faculty and administration) could play itself out. Additionally, the variance across the units on this dimension indicated a variance in the relative authority afforded the faculty executive committee.

Per Regents’ Bylaws, most units designated "assisting the Dean" as a function of the executive committee. Indeed, there is a strong relationship assumed between an executive committee and its dean merely by virtue of the dean’s chairing of the executive committee. Furthermore, the dean is often designated as the Executive Officer of the school or college. But never is it clear in which venues the executive committee or the dean has explicit authority. It is perhaps least clear in units whose bylaws designate one of the functions of the executive committee to be to "assist" the dean in the management of the affairs of the school or college. Some units reiterate the tripartite division of authority to which the Regents delegate the matters of the school or college: to paraphrase, the management of the affairs of the unit is delegated to the governing faculty, the dean, and the executive committee. Because of the murkiness of the election and nomination process and of the executive committee’s assistive function to the dean, none of the significant relationships (between governing faculty and executive committee, between the dean and the executive committee) is without ambiguity.

Of all the information we collected about unit executive committees, perhaps the most clear about this dimension was an informational letter sent by the Dean of the Medical School to his Executive Committee in 1981. In it, he maintains that it is the Executive Committee functions to assist, advise, and act. He admits that the boundaries between those duties are often unclear. When they are, he continues, he, the Dean, will indicate to the Executive Committee whether it has direct responsibility, an assistive role, or an advisory role in whatever matter is at hand. Here, and only here, is there an acknowledgment of the way that the executive committee’s authority (relative to the dean’s) changes depending on the matter being considered. Here, too, though, is the reification of the dean’s authority to determine exactly how that authority will vary.

Although agenda setting is vitally important to the relative authority of the executive committee, it appears only rarely in the bylaws of schools and colleges. In those that it does (Schools of Art, Engineering, Natural Resources, and Social Work), there is an interesting span of possibilities for determinations of agenda setting. The School of Social Work, for instance, allows any governing faculty member to add to the agenda of an executive committee meeting. Both the School of Natural Resources and the College of Engineering specify committees that are permitted to set the agenda. Both units also allow faculty members to do so as well, but faculty from Engineering first need signatures from two other faculty members. In the School of Art, the Dean prepares the agenda, distributes it to Executive Committee members, and posts it at least three days before a meeting.

That variability in who is permitted to set the agenda for executive committee meetings exists even in this small sample of schools and colleges is an indication that agenda setting is yet another arena in which the relative power of the dean and the executive committee can be played out. Because so few units mention agendas in their bylaws, however, follow-up interviews would be necessary to determine the full scope of this dimension.

As we move along our list of analytic dimensions, we come to a cluster that often appear as what we call "boilerplate" dimensions: functions (both broad and vague) that are listed in the Regents’ Bylaws and often adopted word for word in the bylaws of the individual bylaws of schools and colleges. Included in this cluster are 1) educational and instructional policies, 2) appointments, 3) promotion (and tenure–not explicitly mentioned in the Regents’ Bylaws), and 4) budget.

The most vague of this group is the executive committee’s role in the development of educational and instructional policies. Of the units that make mention of such issues, all but one use the Regents’ Bylaws "boilerplate" formula (or, in the case of a lack of written information, we were given the "boilerplate" formula by phone). The one that does not, the School of Natural Resources and Environment, instead lists a series of similar concerns delegated to the executive committee. In representing the governing faculty of that unit, the executive committee "represents the governing faculty as a whole in matters of long-range planning, [ … ] and insure[s] the vigorous pursuit of the mission of the School." In addition, the executive committee reviews issues such as structure, organization, properties, committees, officers, curricula, appointments, research and development, etc., and makes recommendations to the governing faculty. In no other set of bylaws is the scope of the executive committee so explicitly spelled out. In fact, in the bylaws of Architecture and Urban Planning, there is no mention whatsoever of the executive committee’s responsibility for educational or instructional (or even long-term or strategic planning) issues.

The role of the executive committee in the faculty appointment process is specified more fully in several bylaws (the rest either have adopted the "boilerplate" formula in their written policies or bylaws, or are assumed to have done so). Although Architecture and Urban Planning includes the "boilerplate" formula, for instance, different wording makes it clear that the executive committee plays an assistive role to the Dean in this process. In the Schools of Natural Resources and Social Work, however, the deans and the executive committees appear to work in tandem in the appointment process. (Of course, in units where there are standing search or appointment committees [Schools of Dentistry, Natural Resources, Music, Nursing, Public Health, and Social Work], the executive committee’s role might be somewhat diminished even if the authority in the appointment process remains within the venue of the governing faculty as a whole.)

The School of Art, on the other hand, seems to have implemented a process in which the Dean is afforded greater authority in the appointment process than in other schools and colleges. Here, the executive committee advises the Dean regarding proposed new appointments to the faculty, but recommendations for those appointments originate with the Dean. Once again, we see great variation in the way that governance issues become governance processes at the unit level.

As with the appointment process, the bylaws of more schools and colleges are explicit about the role of the executive committee in the processes of promotion and tenure than they are about educational and instructional issues. Here, too, the "boilerplate" formula is an oft-repeated description of the executive committee’s role, but several units expand on it. Again, the executive committee of the College of Architecture and Urban Planning seems to have more of an assistive function in this process. The School of Education explicitly delegates the responsibility of the promotion process to the executive committee. The executive committees of the Schools of Engineering and of Social Work also seem to have extensive authority in this process. The Dean and the executive committee of the School of Art apparently work in tandem to determine annual merit increases, but there is no other specific mention of promotion and tenure processes (except for the "boilerplate" formula). Three units (the Schools of Dentistry, Education, and Natural Resources) have promotion and tenure committees. In these units, the executive committee seems to play a diminished role in the process of promotion and tenure, even though (as was the case with the appointments process) authority in this process still resides with the faculty.

It should be noted that, for many of the bylaws and policy guidelines or handbooks, matters of promotion and tenure were of great importance (if we are to judge by the voluminous descriptions of the processes). But little is mentioned that relates directly to the executive committees. Still, this highly sensitive process could be a source of authoritative tensions between the administration and the executive committee. For that reason and because the "boilerplate" formula leaves a great deal of room for power plays, the promotions and tenure dimension is a significant one.

In the matter of budgets, most bylaws are silent about executive committee roles (except for the requisite mention of the Regents’ Bylaws "boilerplate" formula). They are also silent about which budgets the executive committee might make recommendations about. Only the School of Art makes extensive reference to budgets with regard to the executive committee (even though it is left unclear what is included in those budgets). There, the executive committee approves the budget, but, again, as was the case with appointments, any recommendations about the budget originate with the Dean. Any authority the executive committee might have in this area is further lessened by the bylaws. They specifically state that the Dean administrates the budget and that he or she is not required to obtain executive committee approval for specific expenditures within budget categories. While this might not be a unique division of labor between deans and executive committees across the University, it is interesting that the School of Art bylaws (and only those bylaws) are so explicit about it.

In order to determine how much authority the executive committees have in this cluster of issues, we looked to each unit’s standing committees. We reasoned that the executive committee would have less direct authority in matters for which another faculty committee had been elected or appointed. As is to be expected, where committees were mentioned, there were often several listed, dealing with everything from space allocation to rules to honors programs, and everything in between.

We took note, however, of two committees that were extraordinary in that they approached, in scope and/or intent, the role and function of the executive committee. The College of Engineering, for instance has a Standing Committee comprising the Dean, the Executive Committee, the Department Chairs, departmental faculty appointed by the Dean, and members of the Dean’s staff approved for membership by the Executive Committee. The Standing Committee has largely a communicative function within the college, but it is authorized to review, discuss, and advise on any matters affecting the College. It is significant that this committee has the potential to have several administrative members, but also to have at least partial jurisdiction over the affairs of the College (an authority otherwise delegated to the governing faculty as a whole or to the executive committee, which acts on its behalf).

The School of Music has a similar entity, the Council of Departmental Representatives. This Council, according to the School of Music’s policy manual, is the only consituted and elected legislative body for the governing faculty. In this regard, the council approaches the role of the executive committee, and may impinge upon the executive committee’s authority in some matters (follow-up interviews would help determine if this is the case).

Here, with the establishment of standing committees, there is room for play. If the other committees are appointed by the dean (even if the executive committee itself is elected democratically), the relative democratic voice of the faculty in governance issues is diminished. In addition, there might be more administrative participation on standing committees than on the executive committee. Again, the faculty authority in matters with such committees might be diminished. To take a different perspective, however, in larger units, in would be inconceivable for the executive committee to try to tackle its many responsibilities alone. In this case, standing committees would play a valuable role in faculty governance, even if they shift authority away from the executive committee proper.

Our analysis of the dimensions of faculty executive committees led us to examine the relative democracy and authority of those bodies. These two variables are telling indicators both of the ambiguity in the Regents’ Bylaws and of the tension between the faculty and administration. We define the two concepts as follows. By democracy, we mean the extent to which the authority to determine a unit’s governance decisions is dispersed to the executive committee as a representative body of the governing faculty, arising from free elections. By authority, we mean the extent to which the executive committee executes the responsibilities delegated to it by the Regents’ Bylaws and the governing faculty.

As we tried to make sense of the great variability across units in terms of the relative democracy and authority of the executive committees, we looked at the units from different perspectives. We wanted to see if there was a relationship between the size of a unit (see Table 4), or its Biglan academic classification (see Table 5), for instance, and the democracy and authority of its executive committee. While it would appear that the smaller-sized units would enjoy higher levels of democracy with relation to their executive committees, this might not be the case. A number of intervening factors mitigate that relationship. A strong dean or a tradition of strong faculty participation in governance could easily shift the balance of authority within the unit.

For instance, a small school with a past history of high faculty interest in governance issues, could be transformed by a transfer of authority from the faculty to the Dean. Conversely, the pendulum could also swing the other way. Although the faculty might now enjoy extensive authority and democracy in their governance, this might not always have been the case. Strong deans can circumvent faculty authority. On the basis of the bylaws alone, however, we cannot identify such trends in any of the units.

Another way of grouping units is according to the Biglan Academic Classification, which classifies disciplines according to the dimension of hard-soft, pure-applied. There appeared to be a relationship between those units that fell into the soft-applied quadrant and higher levels of authority and democracy in executive committees. But this way of grouping the units is inadequate for the units under study, both because of the high number of cross-disciplinary units that fall outside of the traditional classification system, and because of the lack of insight into the units’ actual practices, which interviews would provide.

It is meaningless to make too many generalizations about the relative democracy or authority of faculty executive committees based solely on the bylaws. As we have noted throughout this paper, the bylaws (both Regential and unit) leave room for ample variation in the manner in which functions are carried out. The completion of interviews in every unit examined is imperative if we are to be able to draw conclusions about the executive committees that are grounded in concrete qualitative data. Interviews would give a much fuller picture of both the present dynamics of a unit’s governance, and the historical development that gave rise to those dynamics in the first place. A goal would be to interview the Dean, at least one senior faculty member on the Executive Committee, and at least one additional senior faculty member (an AAUP member where possible, to provide an alternate perspective).

We have developed a proposed interview schedule that contains a series of open-ended questions. It comprises questions concerning faculty governance and authority in general, as well as about the specific functioning of the Executive Committee. By asking general questions about faculty governance, one would be able to learn more about the inner workings and relationships in the units, particularly when the bylaws were not clear.

It may be that the initial ambiguity and the initial tensions in the bylaws that we had been aware of are played out in the actual practices. Because there is room for interpretation in the bylaws, there is also room for potentially very different practices. Strong democracy and faculty authority can be exercised in one school at any given time and in the same, or a similar, school, strong centralized authority exercised by the dean can be the rule of the day. No matter how many times one reads a set of bylaws, one isn’t able to ascertain the "full picture." And no matter how well-developed they are, bylaws cannot give an accurate representation of what actually goes on in a unit. For this reason, interviews with members of each unit under investigation are a vital and necessary component of the analysis of faculty executive committees and faculty governance.

It may also be that there are some inherent contradictory forces in academic governance today that contribute to this unresolved tension between faculty and administration and to the lack of clarity about the relative authority of each in Regential and unit bylaws. According to Etzioni ([1964] 1991:441),

… the most basic principle of administrative authority and the most basic principle of authority based on knowledge–or professional authority–not only are not identical, but are quite incompatible.

It is this incompatibility that gives rise to the initial tensions between the faculty and the administration, both of whom are delegated, and expect to, govern their respective units. In addition, as Etzioni points out, the faculty, as a group of professionals, also expects a certain amount of autonomy:

… the autonomy granted to professionals … is diametrically opposed to the very essence of the organizational principle of control and coordination by superiors–i.e., the principle of administrative authority

Perhaps this lack of clarity in the bylaws is both necessary and sufficient to allow these two groups to negotiate their authority as best fits their particular governing unit at any particular given time. The personalities of the players, the circumstances within the governing unit, the historical development of the unit, each call for differing degrees of autonomy and authority in faculty governance. A further exploration of these dimensions would shed new light on these issues.

American Association of University Professors (1990). "Statement on the Government of Colleges and Universities" in Policy Documents & Reports. Washington, D.C.: A.A.U.P.

American Association of University Professors (1971). "Report of the Survey Subcommittee of Committee T". AAUP Bulletin, Spring 1971. 68-73; 122124.

Berdahl, Robert O. ([1989]1991). "Shared Governance and External Constraints," in Marvin W. Peterson (Ed.), Organization and Governance in Higher Education. Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster.

Birnbaum, Robert (1988), How Colleges Work. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Board of Regents (1995). Bylaws of the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan.

Clark, Burton R. ([1963]1991). "Faculty Organization and Authority," in Marvin W. Peterson (Ed.), Organization and Governance in Higher Education Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster.

Etzioni, Amitai ([1964]1991). "Administrative and Professional Authority," in Marvin W. Peterson (Ed.), Organization and Governance in Higher Education. Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster.

Faculty Senate Assembly and Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs (1992). Handbook of Faculty Governance. Ann Arbor, Michigan. Unpublished Monograph.

Kerr, Clark (1994). Higher Education Cannot Escape History. Albany: State University of New York.

Mortimer, Kenneth P. and McConnell, T.R. ([1978]1991), "Process of Academic Governance," in Marvin W. Peterson (Ed.), Organization and Governance in Higher Education. Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster.

Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs (1994). The Structure of Faculty Governance at the University of Michigan. Ann Arbor: Michigan. Unpublished Monograph.

Steneck, Nicholas H. (1991). Faculty Governance at the University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs. Unpublished Monograph.

The School of Natural Resources and Environment’s bylaws depict a faculty governance structure with a strong degree of democracy and representation, as well as an Executive Committee with a relatively high amount of authority. This was evident in the large number of standing committees, the clearly specified central roles and functions of each of these, particularly the Executive Committee, and the democratic process by which committee membership was selected. An added indicator was the inclusion of two students on the Executive Committee, as well as student membership on each of the standing committees. (We later learned that student participation is something that the faculty feels is a necessary component of their unit’s governance). We interviewed two senior faculty members, one of whom was a current member of the Executive Committee, and the other of whom was faculty parliamentarian. We did not interview the interim dean because he did not feel he had sufficient experience to answer our questions. He referred us instead to the parliamentarian. The school’s recent history has included some changes in leadership, as well as an institutional review to justify its continued existence.

It was clear from both interviews that a previous dean had on occasion "short-circuited" faculty governance. The present state of affairs, however, is one in which much of the governance of the School comes "from the ground up," and much of the work is conducted by the Executive Committee and the other standing committees, where appropriate. Whereas not all faculty participated equally, and more senior faculty members participated than others, each of the central aspects of faculty decision-making (educational and instructional issues, strategic planning appointments, promotion and tenure) were heavily determined by either the Executive Committee or another relevant standing faculty committee. There was only one exception to this. Only the budgetary issues were primarily within the purview of the Dean. Generally, the School can be characterized as having "dispersed power and lots of process," essentially supporting our analysis of the bylaws.

The bylaws of the School of Art appeared to provide the faculty with extensive participative authority. The school is relatively small in terms of number of full-time faculty. It has, in the recent past, undergone multiple changes in leadership and reviews to justify its existence.

Faculty governance at the School of Art has also been characterized by change. Particularly under the current leadership, faculty governance has been greatly impacted. One faculty member characterized faculty governance as being suddenly "toothless," with only "gumming" power. This person also described the faculty as "demoralized," but sensed a resurgence of interest on the part of the faculty in governance issues. This same individual characterized the authority in the School as being squarely located with the Dean, and maintained that the committee structure as outlined in the bylaws was not extant, since committees were either appointed by the Dean (rather than elected), or simply not appointed at all.

Another faculty member saw the stronger dean’s role as being a necessary product of the extensive transition in the School, and the need to achieve change, despite the reluctance of the faculty to either accept change or become a part of the process. This faculty member was willing to accept decisions made by the Dean, even if this individual disagreed with them, because it was appropriate for the Dean to override the faculty with his opinion, because that was the privilege of his leadership and vision for the School.

The Dean himself felt frustration over the faculty’s speaking "with two faces." He said that they want to be empowered both with information and with responsibility, but then when they are, he characterized them as "resenting the burden he’s placing on them." The Dean readily admits to having made significant changes, but not without concern for the potential of losing respect for faculty governance or violating ethical principles. He was fully aware that the faculty would characterize their satisfaction with governance in the School as "it stinks." But the Dean also indicated that, while the faculty were quick to express their negative thoughts and feelings concerning things that he was attempting to accomplish, they were reluctant to counter his ideas with constructive ones (something that he now requires them to do, if they choose to express criticism). Each decision the Dean has made that has taken authority from the faculty has been made consciously. But each has also been a decision that he felt had to be made in order to get the job done. It is not without a great deal of soul-searching that the Dean has made the sweeping changes at the School that he has.

Here can be seen, then, an example of written bylaws that give faculty extensive participative authority, but actual practice that belies that authority. Instead, authority has shifted to the Dean, at least for the present time and circumstances.