Table 1: Types of local federal expenditure

variable[a]	description
transfer payments[b,e]	transfer payments to individuals
civilian employment[b,f]	Federal government civilian employment
military employment[b,f]	Federal government military employment
civilian salaries[c,e]	salaries and wages, all civilian and Postal Service employees
military salaries[c,e]	salaries and wages, all military personnel
civilian procurements[c,e]	procurement contracts, all except Defense Department
military procurements[c,e]	procurement contracts, Defense Department
direct payments[c,e]	direct payments other than for individuals
education transfers[d,e]	transfers to local governments for education
highways transfers[d,e]	transfers to local governments for highways
social welfare transfers[d,e]	transfers to local governments for public welfare, employment security, health and hospitals, housing
other transfers[d,e]	all other transfers to local governments

Notes:

[a] All variables are used per capita, based on county population[b].

[b] source, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1990.

[c] source, Bureau of the Census 1984–90.

[d] source, Bureau of the Census 1986–91 and 1991; county totals are estimated as in Mebane 1993.

[e] units, $1000 per person.

[f] units, jobs per person.

Table 2: 95% confidence intervals for support values that maximize local federal expenditures

pre-midterm

maximum is an elite-oriented targeting value		maximum is not in the elite-oriented range	
civilian procurements	(.59, .61)	military procurements	(.00, 1.00)
military employment	(.70, .71)	civilian employment	(.00, 1.00)
civilian salaries	(.68, .68)	military salaries	no max[a]
Federal welfare transfers	(.61, .62)	transfer payments	no max
Federal education transfers	(.60, .63)	direct payments	(.35, .44)
State highways transfers	(.69, .75)	Federal highways transfers	(.00, 1.00)
State education transfers	(.55, .59)	Federal other transfers	(.27, .37)
		State welfare transfers	(.35, .39)
		State other transfers	no max

post-midterm

maximum is an elite-oriented targeting value		maximum is not in the elite-oriented range	
civilian procurements	(.64, .71)	military procurements	(.79, .81)
		civilian employment	(.49, 1.00)
		military employment	(.00, 1.00)
		civilian salaries	(.02, 1.00)
		military salaries	no max
		transfer payments	(.00, 1.00)
		direct payments	no max
		Federal highways transfers	no max
		Federal welfare transfers	(.98, .98)
		Federal education transfers	no max
		Federal other transfers	(.70, .91)
		State highways transfers	no max
		State welfare transfers	(.92, .94)
		State education transfers	no max
		State other transfers	(.74, .98)

Source: Confidence intervals are computed using normal approximations and asymptotic standard errors obtained by the delta method from the standard errors of the coefficient estimates of the targeting polynomials.

[a] The polynomial does not have any maximum values.

Table 3: 95% confidence intervals for support values that maximize changes in local federal expenditures

institutionally less complex LFEs			
maximum is a voter-oriented targeting value		maximum is not in the voter-oriented range	
military employment	(.38, .39)	civilian procurements	no max[a]
civilian salaries	(.37, .39)	military procurements	(.61, .79)
military salaries	(.25, .55)	civilian employment	no max
transfer payments	(.15, .75)	direct payments	no max
institutionally complex LFEs			
maximum is a voter-oriented targeting value		maximum is not in the voter-oriented range	
Federal welfare transfers	(.29, .35)	Federal highways transfers	no max
		Federal education transfers	no max
		Federal other transfers	no max
		State highways transfers	no max
		State welfare transfers	no max
		State education transfers	no max
		State other transfers	(.00, 1.00)

Source: Confidence intervals are computed using normal approximations and asymptotic standard errors obtained by the delta method from the standard errors of the coefficient estimates of the targeting polynomials.

[a] The polynomial does not have any maximum values.

Table 4: Presidential vote choice probit regression equation estimates

variable	I	II	III
Constant	$-.252$ $(-.509, .001)$	$-.313$ $(-.580, -.055)$	$-.318$ $(-.581, -.063)$
Party identification[a]	.521 (.467, .581)	.534 (.478, .595)	.533 (.478, 594)
Spending scale[a]	.440 (.106, .778)	.524 (.053, .718)	.381 (.046, 715)
National economy evaluations[a]	.540 (.220, .874)	.524 (.208, .866)	.526 (.210, .870)
Family finances evaluations[a]	.330 (.060, .607)	.330 (.057, .611)	.327 (.059, .608)
Civilian employment[b]	—	1.072 $(-.250, 2.401)$	.853[c] (.155, 1.570)
Military employment[b]	—	.733 $(-.435, 1.885)$	.853[c] (.155, 1.570)
Nongovernmental employment[b]	2.762 (.351, 5.328)	3.571 (.960, 6.708)	3.716 (1.124, 6.848)
$-2\times$ log-likelihood	731.94	723.86	724.06

Source: Equations for the probability of voting for the Republican rather than the Democratic presidential candidate, using 1988 ANES and contextual data. $N = 975$ respondents from 91 counties. In equation I, 85.6% correctly classified, $\gamma = .82$.[d] In equation II, 85.0% correctly classified, $\gamma = .83$. In equation III, 85.1% correctly classified, $\gamma = .83$. Coefficients are probit MLEs. 95% confidence intervals (percentile-t bootstrap) are in parentheses. Intercept-only: $-2\times$ log-likelihood = 1348.76.

[a] survey attitude variable.

[b] county-level change (purged): total for 1987–88 minus total for 1985–86.

[c] parameters constrained to equal one another.

[d] γ (Goodman-Kruskal gamma) measures the rank correlation between observed responses and predicted probabilities.

Table 5: Probabilities of a pro-incumbent (pro-Republican) vote at minimum and maximum values of local-area employment changes and subjective economic evaluations

	nongovernmental employment		civilian employment		military employment		national economy evaluations		family finances evaluations	
	$-.08^a$	$.17^b$	$-.38^a$	$.34^b$	$-.47^a$	$.28^b$	0^a	1^b	0^a	1^b
at mean of PID	.35	.71	.39	.63	.36	.61	.43	.64	.45	.58
strong Democrat	.03	.18	.04	.13	.03	.12	.05	.14	.06	.10
Democrat	.09	.36	.11	.28	.10	.26	.14	.28	.15	.23
independent-Democrat	.22	.57	.25	.47	.23	.46	.29	.49	.30	.42
independent	.40	.76	.44	.68	.42	.67	.49	.69	.50	.63
independent-Republican	.61	.89	.65	.84	.63	.83	.69	.85	.71	.81
Republican	.79	.96	.82	.94	.80	.93	.85	.94	.86	.92
Strong Republican	.91	.99	.93	.98	.92	.98	.94	.98	.95	.97
mean probability[c]	.43	.65	.46	.60	.44	.59	.49	.60	.50	.56

Source: Computed using the vote choice probit regression equation point estimates of Table 4. The probability for each level of party ID and each minimum or maximum value is computed with the other variables in the equation at their mean values in the 1988 ANES sample. Employment-changes values are for the purged data.

[a] Minimum value. For evaluations, 0 means “worse.”

[b] Maximum value. For evaluations, 1 means “better.”

[c] Average of the probabilities over the seven party ID categories, weighting by the sample proportions for the PID categories among voters in the ANES data. In order from strong Democrat through strong Republican the proportions are .199, .165, .112, .063, .128, .148, .186.

Table 6: Effects of LFEs on individuals' subjective economic evaluations

variable	national economy evaluations	family finances evaluations
Intercept 1	−.956 (.069)	−.628 (.090)
Intercept 2	.468 (.065)	.328 (.089)
Party identification[a]	.166 (.017)	.111 (.019)
Family income in 1987 ($1000)[a]	—	.010 (.0019)
Military procurements[b]	.126 (.064)	—
Direct payments[b] × party id.[a]	—	−.143 (.066)
Federal education transfers[b]	—	6.492 (3.264)
Federal social welfare transfers[b]	−1.843 (.440)	—
Federal social welfare transfers[b] × spending scale[a]	−2.442 (1.169)	—
Civilian or military employment[b]	—	35.15 (17.95)
Civilian or military employment[b] × spending scale[a]	−91.46 (43.05)	—
Nongovernmental employment[b]	3.722 (1.286)	2.900 (1.393)

Source: Ordered probit regression equations for the probability of giving a more favorable response, using 1988 ANES and contextual data. National economy $N = 975$ ($\gamma = .34$)[c] and family finances $N = 901$ ($\gamma = .29$) respondents. Coefficients are MLEs. Standard errors are in parentheses.

[a] survey attitude variable.

[b] county-level change: total for 1987–88 minus total for 1985–86.

[c] γ (Goodman-Kruskal gamma) measures the rank correlation between observed responses and predicted probabilities.

Table 7: Probabilities of evaluating the national economy as "better" at minimum and maximum values of the LFE changes that have heterogeneous effects

	social welfare transfers		civilian employment		military employment	
SPEND value	-1.03^a	$.27^b$	$-.011^a$	$.0065^b$	$-.0156^a$	$.0053^b$
increase all index items	.067	.298	.029	.389	.011	.349
neutral (SPEND = 0)	.848	.026	.190	.190	.192	.192
decrease all index items	.9998	.0004	.552	.070	.709	.087

Source: Computed using the ordered probit regression equation point estimates of Table 6. The probability for each level of SPEND and each minimum or maximum value is computed with the other variables in the equation at their mean values in the 1988 ANES sample. LFE-changes values are for unpurged data.

[a] Minimum value.

[b] Maximum value.

Table 8: Effects of LFEs on individuals' partisanship and spending tastes

variable	party identification	spending scale
Intercept	−1.854 (.300)	−.278 (.019)
Family income in 1987 ($1000, logged)[a]	.371 (.085)	—
Direct payments[b]	1.121 (.291)	.170 (.037)
Federal education transfers[b]	−15.22 (6.33)	—
Federal highways transfers[b]	—	−.981 (.520)
Federal social welfare transfers[b]	−2.065 (.747)	—
Federal other transfers[b]	5.832 (1.638)	.482 (.193)
Nongovernmental employment[b]	—	.891 (.357)
Nongovernmental income[b]	.161 (.055)	—

Source: Ordinary least squares regression equations, using 1988 ANES and contextual data. $N = 901$. Party identification equation residual mean square error = 4.71 ($R^2 = .07$). Spending scale equation residual mean square error = .084 ($R^2 = .04$). Standard errors are in parentheses.

[a] survey attitude variable.

[b] county-level change: total for 1987–88 minus total for 1985–86.

Figure 1: Effects of support on federal local expenditures, pre-midterm



Notes: Quasi-likelihood estimates. The number in parentheses shows the degree of the targeting polynomial.

Figure 2: Effects of support on local federal expenditures, post-midterm



Notes: Quasi-likelihood estimates. The number in parentheses shows the degree of the targeting polynomial.

Figure 3: Effects of support on changes in local federal expenditures, by support



Notes: Computed using the targeting polynomial estimates shown in Figures 1 and 2.