key terms to be able to use and explain for the midterm exam (Spring 2006)

Condorcet paradox

transitive and complete preferences

vote cycle

sophisticated voting

sincere and strategic voting

heresthetic:  strategic voting, agenda control and dimension manipulation

majority rule

Borda count

choice from all subsets, unrestricted preferences, pairwise
independence, weak Pareto and dictatorship

the fully decisive set can contain only one individual

non-manipulability

single peaked preferences

median voter theorem

two dimensional spatial preferences

euclidean metric

nonseparable preferences

ideal point

winset

Pareto set

uncovered set

majority rule chaos

agenda setting with sincere voters and with strategic voters

median line

the generalized median and the yolk

battle of the sexes, coordination and prisoner's dilemma games

Nash equilibrium

parties and collective action problems

district magnitude

Duverger's Law

the M+1 rule

Duvergerian and non-Duvergerian outcomes

coordination failure

coalition-proof Nash equilibrium

bimodality hypothesis

rational expectations condition and Duverger's Law

beliefs about preferences, expectations about strategies