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Notes:

All variables are used per capita, based on county population .

source, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1990.

source, Bureau of the Census 1984-90.

source, Bureau of the Census 1986-91 and 1991; county totals are estimated as in Mebane 1993.

units, $1000 per person.

units, jobs per person.

 

 

maximum is an elite-oriented targeting value maximum is not in the elite-oriented range

civilian procurements (.59, .61) military procurements (.00, 1.00)

military employment (.70, .71) civilian employment (.00, 1.00)

civilian salaries (.68, .68) military salaries

Federal welfare transfers (.61, .62) transfer payments no max

Federal education transfers (.60, .63) direct payments (.35, .44)

State highways transfers (.69, .75) Federal highways transfers (.00, 1.00)

State education transfers (.55, .59) Federal other transfers (.27, .37)

State welfare transfers (.35, .39)

State other transfers no max post-midterm

maximum is an elite-oriented targeting value maximum is not in the elite-oriented range

civilian procurements (.64, .71) military procurements (.79, .81)

civilian employment (.49, 1.00)

military employment (.00, 1.00)

civilian salaries (.02, 1.00)

military salaries no max

transfer payments (.00, 1.00)

direct payments no max

Federal highways transfers no max

Federal welfare transfers (.98, .98)

Federal education transfers no max

Federal other transfers (.70, .91)

State highways transfers no max

State welfare transfers (.92, .94)

State education transfers no max

State other transfers (.74, .98)

Source: Confidence intervals are computed using normal approximations and asymptotic standard errors obtained by the delta method from the asymptotic covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates of the targeting polynomials.

The polynomial does not have any maximum values.

 

 

maximum is a voter-oriented targeting value maximum is not in the voter-oriented range

military employment (.38, .39) civilian procurements

civilian salaries (.37, .39) military procurements (.61, .79)

military salaries (.25, .55) civilian employment no max

transfer payments (.15, .75) direct payments no max institutionally complex LFEs

maximum is a voter-oriented targeting value maximum is not in the voter-oriented range

Federal welfare transfers (.29, .35) Federal highways transfers no max

Federal education transfers no max

Federal other transfers no max

State highways transfers no max

State welfare transfers no max

State education transfers no max

State other transfers (.00, 1.00)

Source: Confidence intervals are computed using normal approximations and asymptotic standard errors obtained by the delta method from the asymptotic covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates of the targeting polynomials.

The polynomial does not have any maximum values.

 

  
Figure 1: Effects of support on federal local expenditures, pre-midterm

  
Figure 2: Effects of support on local federal expenditures, post-midterm

  
Figure 3: Effects of support on changes in local federal expenditures, by support